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INTRODUCTION
At first glance many Christians would say that an atheist
is one who does not believe in God, that religion has to do
with one's relationship to God, and that Christianity is the
religion par excellence and therefore is definitely a matter
of theistic belief. In fact, the use of the words "God,"
"religion," and "Christianity" is considerably more problema¬
tic than such a simple outlook recognises# This thesis is an
exploration of some of the problems involved and an attempt to
demonstrate in what manner the terms "religious atheist" and
"Christian atheist" are meaningful#
From the outset it is perhaps easy to designate Buddhism
as a form of "religious atheism" and the ten subjects of our
study by contrast as "Christian atheists#" This usage assumes
a broad category—religious atheism—which may be represented
by the belief system of individuals from any part of the globe
and which is represented by most, if not all, Buddhists as well
as, we shall argue, our ten Christian subjects# Likewise it
assumes that the adjectives "Buddhist" and "Christian" may be
used to qualify the term "religious atheist" by indicating
which religious tradition most strongly and decisively contri¬
butes to the cultural context of a given religious atheist.
The Problem of "God"
The problem posed by the general Christian assumptions
about religion will not be so easily disposed of as by a simple
designation of usage# The key to this lies in that first
assumption that an atheist is one who does not believe in God#
Even here there are two foci# First, "the term 'God' lacks
2
clear, univocal meaning which can be unanimously communicated,"
as S. Paul Schilling so clearly states. Secondly, and in
consequence to some extent of the first, "the word 'atheism' is
2
very imprecise."
Therefore, to define the atheist as one who does not
believe in God, is to introduce the question of what one means
Ska such an expression. The Christian might again seek
simplicity in his response. Thus he could introduce the credal
formula and assert that by "God" is meant "the Father Almighty,
3
maker of heaven and earth." Alternatively he might refer to
one of the statements of belief born in the milieu of the
reformation and its aftermath:
One living and true God, everlasting,
without body, parts, or passions; of
infinite power, wisdom and goodness; the
Maker, and Preserver of all things both
visible and invisible. ^
—Article 1, Articles of Religion
There is but one only living and true God,
who is infinite in being and perfection, a
most pure spirit, invisible, without body,
parts, or passions, immutable, immense,
eternal, incomprehensible, almighty, most
wise, most holy, most free, most absolute,
working all things according to the council
of his own immutable and most righteous
will, for hi3 own glory; most loving,
gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abun¬
dant in goodness and truth, forgiving
iniquity, transgression, and sin; the
rewarder of them that diligently seek him;
and withal most just and terrible in his
judgements, hating all sin, and who will
by no means clear the guilty. ^
—The Westminister Confession of Faith
1. Schilling, God in an Age of Atheism, p. 120
2. Hibblethwaite, The Council Fathers and Atheism, p. 8
3. The Apostles Creed and The Nicene Creed, The Book of
Common Prayer, p. 15
k. The Book of Common Prayer, p. 60%
5. The Westminister Confession of Faith, pp. 6-7
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Recently, in line with this tradition, H. P. Owen defined
God as "the Creator, who is infinite, self-existent, incorpor¬
eal, eternal, immutable, impassible, simple, perfect,
omniscient and omnipotent,"^ Kai Nielsen attempted to
formulate standard Christian belief in God in this way:
God ... is taken to be the creator of
the universe and, as we have seen, he is
thought to be transcendent to the universe
though somehow immanent in the universe in
the sense of being active in the universe.
But he is still conceptualised as being
distinct from the universe (the world),
though indeed he manifests himself in the
universe, 7
Nels Ferre tells us that "God is the supreme being, not only
distinguishably more and other than the world who yet works in
g
the world, but also who is a separate being," William 0,
Fennell offers the minimal formulation of "some kind of trans¬
cendent divine being who is related meaningfully and
9
purposively to the world of nature and to human history,"
Such formulations as these attempt to express what might
well be called, and frequently is called, "classical theism,"
Alternatively, it may be called simply "theism," However it is
10
designated, it represents "a particular view of God," a view
11
in which God is separate and the world is dependent, in which
God is "a Being which is unique, unitary, incorporeal,
infinitely powerful, wise and good, personal but without
12
passions and the maker and preserver of the universe,"
6, Owen, Concepts of Deity, p, 1
7, Nielsen, ScepticTsm, p, k6
8, Ferre, "God without Theism," Theology Today, Oct,, 19&5,
P. 373
9, Fennell, "Religion Post Mortem Dei," The Meaning of the
Death of God, Murchland (editor), p, 153
10, Ferrd7"~op. cit., p, 373
11, Ogden, "Faith and Secularity," God, Secularisation and
History, Long (editor), p, 36 ~ ~ ~ " *
12, Flew, God and Philosophy, p, 28
k
If this is what is meant in the statement that an atheist
is one who does not believe in God, the statement may be
revised to specify that the atheist is one who rejects "theism"
meaning the understanding of God which such traditional
definitions as those above attempt to verbalise. Such a
revision confronts us with the imprecision of "atheism" for
now its meaning is dependent upon the meaning of the word
"God" and it ceases to identify those hypothetical purists
who reject all possible understandings of "God." This
suggests, as Ferre sees, that "a person can call himself an
atheist and still believe in God who is not theistically
13
understood."
As the ordinary Christian may have difficulty recognising
his God in the theological or philosophical definitions of
theism and may sense the threatened distortion of his usual
meaning which Ferre'' puts his finger on, he may come to
recognise what Steeman pointed out; "We call somebody an
atheist ... in so far as we miss in him the belief in God as
1^t
we understand God." Such a shift in the meaning of atheism
however, will serve no purpose of the believer attempting to
keep the issues simple, making its meaning dependent on the
proliferation of understandings of God which are to be found
among men.
One might attempt to then argue that "atheism (is) the
deliberate, definite dogmatic denial of the existence of God"
13. Ferre', op. cit., p. 373
14. Steeraan, "Psychological and Sociological Aspects of




where God is "the God of the religious consciousness," Such
a line of thought would seek to identify the issue with some
internal, universal experience of God preceding conscious
conceptualisation or verbalisation and would thereby designate
an attitude or response and involve one in an argument over
the meaning of "belief" and 'experience,'' This forces theology
into a psychological mode and thereby abandons the traditional
and popular usage of the phrases "believe in God" or "accept
theism" as referring to cognitive activities.
It seems all too clear, as Steeman says, that "atheism
16
cannot be detached from the image of God which it rejects,"
and this means quite simply that "atheism" as it is usually
used and as we use it, does not entail, necessarily, the
rejection of "God" but only of one or more meanings of the word
and specifically those meanings which are associated with the
word "theism" are involved in this activity.
If the assumption is followed that the traditional and
popular belief in God generally assigned to Christianity can be
designated as "theism" any rejection of this belief (which,
admittedly, may find diverse expression while sharing some
common core) would be a-theism. One potential difficulty with
such a use is its narrow base. Atheism by this understanding
is a phenomenon linked to the Christian proclamation. Yet, as
the Second Vatican Council recognised, both the Moslems and
15« Borne, Atheism, p, 8
16, Steeman, op, cit., p, 29
6
17
Jews share "theism" which is not distinctively Christian,
as Shubert Ogden points out1^ and as is apparent from the
formulations of it which are given here*
%
To cope with this situation, the use of atheism may be
broadened to include the traditional formal understanding of
God shared by the three great Western religions: Judaism,
Islam and Christianity. This understanding lies behind
Cardinal Konig's belief that the roots of atheism are found
19
only in the Western world and that as Steeman sees it,
atheism rejects the dominant religious notions of Western
20
culture. Atheism is thereby a phenomenon linked not just to
Christianity but to that broad concept: Western culture.
Such a way of viewing the matter supports the deep chasm
between East and West and implies that the oriental religions
are implicitly atheistic because of their separation from
theistic culture. To call Buddhism atheistic is therefore to
recognise its oriental character more than to comment on the
status of the concepts for "God," "god" or "gods" which it
might contain. It is superfluous therefore to speak of
"atheistic Buddhism" as Buddhism by cultural position cannot be
other than atheist.
Yet we are not concerned here with vast cultural differen¬
ces but v/ith differences between men regardless of whether they
belong to the same culture or not. Atheism must therefore be
17» Lumen Gentium (The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church),
Article 16| The Documents of Vatican II, Abbott (editor),
PP. 3^-35
18. Ogden, op. cit., p. 29
19* Quoted in Hibblethwaite, op. cit., p. 83
20. Steeman, op. cit., p. 29
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confined to the specific understanding of God designated as
"theism" without intending thereby any single formulation
whether cultural (Western), religious (Christian, Moslem,
Jewish), or dogmatic (credal, confessional, personal).
This is to admit that no single or simple definition of
the God of the theists exists which does not merit possible
challenge from theists. For pragmatic purposes^therefore^the
functional meaning of theism which underlies its subsequent use
in this thesis is represented by a "traditional" and "orthodox"
belief to which many Christian thinkers have attempted to give
expression and which is represented in our quotations from the
Creeds, the Articles of Religion, the Westminister Confession,
Owen, Nielsen, Ferre', Fennell and Ogden,
Atheism is the rejection of this "traditional" and
"orthodox" theism. However even as that theism is rife with
subtle difficulties and discrepancies, its rejection has yet to
be defined in terms of its extent and its precise nature. Our
functional definition therefore is decidedly preliminary and
will merit further refinement in the course of the development
engaged in here. Even as atheism cannot be separated from what
is understood by "God" or "theism," one can expect that the
meaning of these terms will become clearer with the specific
designation of what is denied by a given atheism.
Just as no definition of "God" or "theism" merits unchal¬
lenged acceptance, neither does any simple definition of atheism.
If belief in God can include a multitude of highly disparate
affirmations, unbelief can reflect a vast spectrum of disagree¬
ment as well. This is only to say, of course, that the terms
8
being used here demand definition or some explication of their
use. If there was a time when their meaning was clear without
this, this is not such a time.
Religion and Christianity
To define atheism as the rejection of a specific conception
of God known as theism is still not to solve its questionable
status as a potentially "religious" reality. Thus when John
Reid expresses the general understanding of religion as man's
21
relationship with God he implicitly leaves room for an atheism
which relates to a non-theistic God and is therefore religious.
To avoid this he would need to specify that the God intended in
his statement is the God of theism—at least by our use of
these words. Indeed, as it happens, Reid would do this for,
following Aquinas, he specifies that all other positions than
22
traditional orthodox theism are atheistic.
Clearly, if we are to speak of a religious atheism without
embroiling ourselves all over again each time in the problem of
"God," an understanding of "religion" in which the use or
non-use of God is indeterminate must be arrived at. Contrary-
wise, refusal to do so can only lead to a judgement of the
orient as not only atheistic but irreligious as well. All
non-theistic religions could only be seen as not, in fact, true
religions.
Definitions of religion which avoid the problem of "God"
(or god) are not new. Clifford Geertz attempted just such a
21. Reid, Man Without God, p. 88
22. Ibid., p. 20
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definition when he conceived religion as a cultural system or
specifically as:
(1) A system of symbols which acts to
(2) establish powerful, pervasive, and
long-lasting moods and motivations in men
by (3) formulating conceptions of a
general order of existence, (*f) clothing
these conceptions with such an aura of
factuality that (5) the moods and motiva¬
tions seem uniquely realistic. 23
Robert Baird attempted a far simpler one which drew on Paul
2k
Tillich's concept of ultimate concern. For the purposes of
this study we would suggest that the following understanding
will function best:
A religion is a tradition of myths,
symbols and dogma which tends to cohere
in a specific understanding of man and
the world and tends to reveal strong
cultural linking. Buddhism and
Christianity are taken to be exemplary
of this.
To be religious is to take one or more
religions as profoundly important to
one's understanding of oneself and one's
world and to use the materials of that
religion (those religions) in this process
of understanding.
In our usage therefore a religious atheist is one who is
religious but not theistic. It is also obvious that the
religious atheist will be a heterodox phenomenon in theistic
religions and an orthodox phenomena in atheistic religions
therefore, but it is not obvious that the use which a religious
man makes of religious traditions will necessarily be formula¬
ted as either theistic or atheistic. Our concern is that he
involve himself with the materials of religion and not, at this
point with the degree of freedom and originality which he may or
may not display in the process.
23. Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," The World Year¬
book of Religion, Cutler (editor), p. 6^3
2k» Baird, Category Formation and the History of Religions, p. 18
10
Religious atheism is identifiable by the fact that,
without affirming theism, "it invests the natural world from
which divine presence and providence have been totally excluded,
25
with theological significance," as Susan Anima Taubes puts it|
26
or expresses ultimate concern, as John Cooper describes it;
or possesses "a powerful element of nonidolatrous faith" as
Samuel Miller elucidates in speaking of the "structure of
religious atheism."2^ Indeed the religious atheist may well
find himself attempting to answer the same questions as the
pQ
theist and thus be closer to him than his non-religious
associates who are neither concerned with nor able to use the
religious materials of their culture.
Implicit in what we have said of religion is the definition
of Christianity by which we are operating. "Christianity" is
taken as a specific religious tradition, as indeed Buddhism is
taken as another specific religious tradition. Each possesses
not only its own materials but its own history of the use made
of those materials by men both individually and in groups. One
is not identified with a given tradition, therefore, because
he reflects the uses made by the majority—i.e. is orthodox,
but because the key to his religious quest and expression is to
be found in the materials available to him from that tradition.
A man's religious tradition is identifiable by the myths,
symbols and dogmas which emerge in his religious activities.
So long as these possess currency that tradition will continue
to live even though the specific understanding of man and his
23* Taubes, Susan; "The Absent God," Tovrard a New Christianity.
Altizer (editor), p. 107
26. Cooper, The Roots of Radical Theology, p. 167
27. Miller, Samuel; The Dilemma of Modern Belief, pp. 51-52
28. Maclntyre, "The Debate about God," The Religious
Significance of Atheism, Maclntyre and Ricoeur, p. 55
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world toward which it tends undergoes the most radical
reformulations or fragments into many such understandings.
Perhaps Hinduism could be considered an example of the latter
situation in the extreme and Islam an example of the most
rigorous attempt at uniformity.
That "Christian religious atheism" may seem full of
internal contradictions is doubtless due to, more than anything,
the highly conservative and conforming forces which have
characterised Christianity. Nevertheless if each word is
taken in the context intended for this study, the three can be
used together for designating the use of materials from the
Christian tradition by those deeply involved with such materials
and with the whole Christian tradition who nevertheless do not
understand man and his world in the usual manner designated as
"theistic."
Matters of Perspective
Three further points must be made explicit with regard to
the perspective of this thesis. The first is the acceptance
and acknowledgement of a tendency which some might well argue
is distinctly "Western" or Occidental, to segregate the
religious aspects of one's life from supposedly non-religious
aspects. This reaches deeply into the thorny issues related to
the term "secular" with which this thesis is deeply involved.
Nevertheless our meaning here is even more fundamental than
that distinction and has rather to do with a perpetual
inclination to break human existence down into categories such
as "religious." This is accepted, although not uncritically
and thus not without modification of a conscious effort to
12
control it, because it is understood to be inevitable to some
degree and because it is assumed that the result is only
different from and not necessarily inferior to a hypothetical
perspective resulting from the opposite tendency.
The second but related point is that the perspective here
will be predominantly philosophical rather than theological,
historical or anthropological. By this we mean that it is not
a contribution to the theology of religion, the history of
religion, or to the anthropological study of homo religiosus as
much as it is a contribution to the philosophy of religion.
It will be less dependent upon orthodox dogmatic Judgements,
historical roots or the actual practices of ordinary believers
than it will upon ideas, thoughts, abstractions provoked by or
expressed through religious materials and encountered on their
own merit. Obviously no final separation of these disciplines
is possible, but just as certainly a preferred perspective can
be assummed, and some pattern of consistency maintained with
regard to it.
Finally, language must be recognised as creating a distinc¬
tive bias of its own. When, as in the case of this thesis,
ideas are developed in one linguistic structure only—namely
English—it must be understood that they are adapted to it if
originally formulated in another language. This process of
adaptation is clearly acknowledged and its corollary made
explicits The ideas are treated as they find expression in
English. Certainly an effort can be made to grasp the original
meaning, especially through the study of the original language,
but in the final analysis translation is always interpretation
and must always be recognised as such even when the differences
are so miniscule or subtle as to elude clear identification.
13
In the case of Buddhism this is a particularly important
point. Many of the concepts are culturally linked in the most
profound sense and the linguistic barrier reflects this. The
result is that one who is not a native to Buddhist culture and
language can never fully possess the Buddhism of those who are.
This is not to say that the Western student of Buddhism cannot
arrive at a fuller and richer understanding of its propositions
on a philosophical basis than can the Buddhist peasant, for
example, but it is to say that his sophisticated understanding
of Buddhism will differ significantly from that of the learned
Buddhist of a Buddhist country.
It is best, perhaps, for the sake of clarity and freedom,
to suggest that our understanding of Buddhism is an interpre¬
tation which, with the growth of Buddhist literature in English,
develops its own traditional formulations and expressions. It
thus merits acceptance for what it is: English (designating
language not ethnic group) Buddhism, A Buddhist who is a
native of a Buddhist country and who has become a scholar of
the English language might quarrel with the results of this
process but his difficulty at that point is only ours in
reverse: English Buddhism is as difficult for him to grasp
without interpretation producing its effects as is Sanskrit or
Pali Buddhism (for example) difficult for us.
In summary therefore, we can state that this thesis will
consider the phenomenon of religious atheism as it developed
in the Christian context roughly between the years 1933 and
29
1972, and found expression in the writings of ten persons:
29. Beginning with the entries in Simone Weil's diaries which
are profoundly religious and ending with Van Buren's The
Edges of Language, published in 1972.
14
Simone Weil, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Gabriel Vahanian, Paul Van
Buren, William Hamilton, Thomas J. J. Altizer, Dorothea Solle,
Herbert Braun, William Mallard and Alistair Kee.
The order in which the Christian atheists are given here
and which is generally followed throughout the thesis, is of
no great significance although it reflects the chronological
order of their appearance as significant contributors to
Christian atheism. It should be noted that in the case of both
Simone Weil and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, publication in English of
the materials with which we are concerned did not occur until
the 1950's although the diary entries and letters were written
prior to or during 1944.
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PART Ij GENERAL SURVEY
A, Christian Atheism
CHAPTER 1: God
There are three categories of religious atheism repre¬
sented in the persons we are studying. The first might be
described as that of a basically simple atheism. It is an
attempt to get at the idea that there is no God^in the sense
of rejecting all theistic meanings for the word. This category,
Category I, is so clearly atheistic that it makes our somewhat
pained definitions in the Introduction seem unnecessary. In
general terms one can say that where it is found, the mood is
secular and profane in the sense of denying the otherworldly
or supernatural and affirming in straightforward terms the
completeness of the man-and-his-world unity.
The second, Category II, could well be referred to as a
case of "suspended theism." It represents the position taken
when the problem of theism is felt to be located in and
confined to man. Thus atheism is seen as a given condition in
which one finds oneself, always accompanied by a reserve or
silence of something unsaid and unfinished. The vague shadow
1
of what Reid called non-theistic concepts of divinity, if not
of classical theism itself, haunts the tone and context of this
atheism.
The third, Category III, does not represent a fundamental
denial of God, nor a description of man as atheistic for some
reason having to do strictly with him. Rather it is an atheism
1. Reid, op. cit., p. 16
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of a Divine process and it suggests that God is changing in
some manner which the Christian observes as a movement from a
theistic universe to an atheistic one. Change initiated by God
is creating an atheistic climate.
Thus in Category I, man sees no God; in Category II, man
is not able to see God; and in Category III, man sees God
becoming no God. Alternatively one might put it: Category I
is a hard atheism in a Christian context} Category II is an
atheism rooted in the doctrine of man or theological anthropol¬
ogy; and Category III is an atheism rooted in the doctrine of
God.
1. Simone Weil
Immediately with Simone Weil we discover that atheists do
not always represent only one of the three categories, for hers
is rooted both in her vision of God and in her understanding of
man's situation. Thus one side of Weil's atheism is essentially
metaphysical. Here Weil conceives of God as creator but as
creator of his own divine movement which changes nothing and
2
reveals his own non-existence.
To communicate this vision Weil employs a variety of
themes. She speaks of God's withdrawal which is a movement of
3
love even as creation is the creation of love. Added to this
is the concept of a deifugal force and a divine renunciation
if
"which permits a part of being to be something other than God."
However a third motif returns the second to the position of the
2. Weil, Intimations of Christianity Among the Ancient Greeks
(subsequently referred to as: Intimations of Christianity),
P. 93
3. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 28
4. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p. 193
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firsts The creation is a compact mass of obedience which
responds to God's creation of it and renunciation of himself
5
in it by its own renunciation which Weil calls decreation.
Thus in a complex manner the whole universe may be seen as
God's activity within himself by which he experiences the
extremes of himself. He is not himself by withdrawal, abdica¬
tion and renunciation, and this not-himself aspect of God may
be variously called creation and designated as a deifugal
force. As creation however it returns the empty side of God to
himself by the act of decreation, the renunciation of its own
createdness, and the turning of the divine love back toward
itself so that it becomes self-love.
In order to engage in this self-negating, self-restoration
movement however, God empties himself^ and this self-emptying
is an eternal diminution which it is easy for Weil to speak of
7
as God's eternal feeding upon himself. Thus the movement
which accounts for God and the universe alike is a divine
activity described variously as self-love, self-contemplation,
self-eating, diminution, emptying, creation/decreation.
Weil's image is of a dynamic emptiness which because it is
dynamic is better served with the form "emptying" to designate
an eternal shrinking due to the diminishing effects of self-
eating which is at once the divine life and the divine love
which everything is. God in his own extremity, the emptiness
5. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p. 193S Gravity and
Grace, pp. 28 and 33
6. V/eil, First and Last Notebooks, pp. 70, 1*4-0, 297
7. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p. 1*4-9; Waiting on
God, pT~S7
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of his own being, is the not-God as well as the is-God. To
envision God as did Siraone Weil is to envision utter Godless-
ness and its extreme contrast, taken together as a dynamic
reality of circular movement for which negative ontology is
most appropriate and imputations of substance and existence
are least appropriate.
From the standpoint of man in creation the reality of this
God is encountered first of all in his non-existence. Man must
know God as non-existent, he must pray to God "with the thought
8
that God does not exist" and he must love God which means that
he must love "what does not exist, while knowing it does not
9
exist." God is "that which is worthy of love, but which in
10
our sense of the word existence, does not exist."
Relative to this problem for the soul of loving the non¬
existent, Weil tells us:
I am quite sure that there is a God in
the sense that I am quite sure my love is
not illusory. I am quite sure that there
is not a God in the sense that I am quite
sure nothing real can be anything like
what I am able to conceive when I pro¬
nounce this word. But that which 1^
cannot conceive is not an illusion.
Thus Weil indicates that while one root of atheism is in the
very nature of God, the other is in the very nature of man.
Man simply cannot know God as existent.
Atheism is thus the proper process of keeping God "hidden
12
and nameless in the soul." When it is sustained it purifies
8. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 19
9. Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 323
10. Ibid., p. 325""
11. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 103
12. Ibid., p. 49
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men of seeking a God for consolation# Because of his
withdrawal, abdication and renunciation, God is weak and
1^1
impartial in the world and he changes nothing whatsoever#
Thus in no way can God help, console or contribute to men's
condition. Atheism is true for it knows this truth about God#
However, a man may have no experience of God yet not deny
him as would the atheist# Such a man knows "the false God who
is like the true one in everything except that we cannot touch
him" and is prevented by that false God "from ever coming to
15
the true one#" In the non-atheistic case "we have to
believe in God who is like the true one in everything, except
that he doe3 not exist, since we have not reached the point
16
where God exists#"
Thus V/eil conceives idolatry and atheism as the only two
possible responses to God, but the former is handicapped
because it gives way to the need to believe which is a form of
seeking consolation from God, so that Weil considers the
17
atheist is nearer to God than the idolater# Atheism is a
discipline which correlates with the truths which can be known
about God,
Weil hallows the lack of the experience of God by
correlating that condition with the absence of God which is the
way men understand the withdrawal of God in creation—his
deifugal flight from himself which diminishes him and empties
him so that he might love himself, contemplate himself and eat
13. Ibid., P- 10*f
1^. Ibid., P. 101




himself. Thus Weil can tell us that "the absence of God is the
mode of divine presence" and that "he who has not God within
18
himself cannot feel his absence."
Man must realise that God being what he is and the creation
being what he is also, "God can only be present in creation
19
under the form of absence." Man therefore loves what is
20
absent as well as non-existent. This atheism is^therefore^
a mode of love which knows that it can have no object and that
it does not have its beloved. Yet the love is there whether it
assumes an idolatrous or atheistic form so long as the exper¬
ience of God's absence, of no experience of God, or God's non¬
existence is there.
Not surprisingly Weil also sanctifies suffering in her
vision. Thus in the creation of his own extremes, Weil tells
us that God himself:
... went to the greatest possible
distance, the infinite distance. This
infinite distance between God and God,
this supreme tearing apart, this agony
beyond all others, this marvel of love,
is the crucifixion. Nothing can be
further from God than that which has
been made accursed.^1
Indeed the cross becomes the very form of the Godhead and thus
of creation, in Weil's formulation:
The two halves of the Soul of the World
are crossed, one upon the other; the
cross is oblique, but all the same it is
a sort of cross. But opposite to that
crossing point the two halves are joined
and welded, and the whole is enveloped by
a circular movement, a movement which
changes nothing, which curies upon itself;
18. Ibid., p. Zk
19. Ibid., p. 99
20. Ibid.
21. Weil, Waiting on God, p. 68
21
the perfect image of the eternal and
blessed act which is the life of the
trinity.22
Suffering is therefore the very structure of the Divine, of
totality and thus of creation. It is as much a characteristic
of God as is emptiness and love.
Likewise it is a characteristic of the world and man's
existence in the world. We know it as imprisoning necessity,
inconsolable affliction, the torment of loving what does not
exist, of knowing that our creation is brought to fulfillment
23
in its decreation. Indeed, the very self-emptying which
decreation is actualises the absence of God and may thus be
24
described as "redemptive suffering" since God's absence is at
once his mode of presence and his self-crucifixion,
Man's confinement to atheism is thus established in two
structurally related modes: 1) man's inability to identify
God because God is not existent and present but emptying and
withdrawing} and 2) man's character as creature which by
definition means his place in that movement of God named
"absence" and "withdrawal" and "abdication." These are,
ultimately, but two approaches to the one truth of man's being
without God and represent forms of both Category II and
Category III atheism.
22. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p. 68
23. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 99? First and Last Notebooks,
PP» 323 and 324
24. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 24
22
2. Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Bonhoeffer's Letters and Papers from Prison are notorious
for their fragmentary and sketchy theology, and those letters
which contain the materials of greatest relevance to us, are
typical in this regard. It is even doubtful that Bonhoeffer
would be included in this study were it not for the later
influence of the thoughts he expressed, primarily in the Spring
and Summer of 19^, since his development along these lines was
in such a preliminary stage. Largely because of his later
influence however, it would now be unthinkable to exclude him.
This influence is explicitly acknowledged. Paul Van Buren,
for example, speaks of a Post-war radical theology which is
based on Bonhoeffer and as such can be regarded as "a general
movement." In the same vein, he describes Letters and Papers
from Priscn as "just the kind of thing my generation was
25
looking for."
William Hamilton testifies to the impact of Bonhoeffer's
thought when he cites his Letters and Papers from Prison as
pages which "held a sort of desperate importance" and the
acquaintance of which he listed as one of three events signal¬
ling "the slow deterioration in me of that good old world of
26
middle-of-the-road ecumenical neo-orthodoxy." Also he
specifically says that Bonhoeffer's "greatest importance to
the death of God theology ... (is) in helping us work out a
27
truly theological understanding of religionlessness."
25. Mehta, The Mew Theologian, pp. 5^-55 (from an interview
between the author and Van Buren)
26. Hamilton, "The Shape of Radical Theology," Frontline
Theology, Peerman (editor), p. 69
27. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," Radical
Theology and the Death of God (subsequently referred to as
Radical Theology), Altizer and Hamilton (editors), p. ^0
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Hamilton even once wrote that "a strong case can be made that
the most decisive theological influence on the younger genera-
28
tion of protestants today is Dietrich Bonhoeffer." In this
regard he cites three crucial themes of Bonhoeffer's: The
world's coming of age; the need for a religionless Christianity;
and a shift from theology to ethics as participating in the
29
sufferings of God, Hamilton believed Bonhoeffer brought a
movement "from theology, apologetics, criticism of culture, the
problem of communication, and even from hermeneutics, to the
shape and quality of our lives,
Thomas J, J, Altizer cites one of Bonhoeffer's teachings
that (in Altizer's words): "The presence of Christ can be known
only in the body of a broken and suffering humanity, for the
Jesus whom we know is wholly detached from the divine attributes
31
of his traditional image," To this he responds that "for the
first time in its history, theology is now called to a radi-
32
cally kenotic Christology," Only such a combination as
Bonhoeffer's "'religionless Christianity' with a life without
33
God may be judged to be fully radical," Altizer asserts.
These references show the intricate relationship with, and
heavy dependency on, Bonhoeffer's thought of a time less than a
year before his death. As Van Buren, Hamilton and Altizer are
themselves such committed explorers of the problem which has
drawn our attention, their reference back to Bonhoeffer indicates
our need to turn our attention in that direction as well,
28. Hamilton, "Dietrich Bonhoeffer," Radical Theology, Altizer
and Hamilton (editors), p. 113
29. Ibid., pp. 115-118
30. Ibid., p. 118
31. Altizer, "Word and History," Radical Theology, Altizer and
Hamilton (editors), pp. 135-13&
32. Ibid.
33. Altizer, Toward a New Christianity, p, 111
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Bonhoeffer's theology in this period, focused on first of
all what might be called God's superfluity. This is the
correlate to the world's corning of age, for with that phenom¬
enon, "knowledge and life are thought to be perfectly possible
without (God)" since he "is being increasingly edged out of the
34
world." Thus Bonhoeffer sees God "relegated to the realm
35
beyond experience," and as "superfluous as a Deus ex machina"
which would have in the past solved problems and provided
support in instances of human failure.^ The tendency, in the
face of this erradication of the traditional areas for the
identification of God, would be to relegate him "to some last
secret place" but Bonhoeffer rejects even this as a meaningful
37
treatment of the issue of God. God cannot any longer be
regarded as a stop-gap.^
If God is thus no longer something on which man can
clearly be shown to be dependent and if it can clearly be shown
that man is unable to experience him as well, then it is
apparent that there is a problem in finding "a place" for God.
In several letters Bonhoeffer suggested that the center of man's
life, man's "strongest point," man's strength and not his
39
weakness, might be the locus of God. He also referred to God
^fO
as "the 'beyond* in the midst of our life." Yet it is hard
to see anything revelatory of God in the life of autonomous and
34. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Pacers from Prison, p. 114
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 93
37. Ibid., p. 118
38. Ibid., pp. 103-104
39. Ibid., p. 931 p. 104j p. 118
40. Ibid., p. 93
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secular man which he himself will see and recognise as
indicative of the divine. Thus these expressions of
Bonhoeffer's have generally been found to be infertile and are
acknowledged but then laid aside.
During the latter part of July, 1944, Bonhoeffer seemed to
reverse his approach, God's new homelessness in man's exist¬
ence is not now described in the context of autonomous man and
the world come of age, but in the context of God's own act of
forsaking us in an effort to make us "live in this world without
using him as a working hypothesis" and to teach us "that we
must live as men who can get along very well without him,"
The initiative has passed to God who is not now edged out of
the world by man's new maturity but who abdicates to force on
man that new maturity and to assume a new locus for himself:
the Gross, This led to Bonhoeffer's second theological focus:
ifl
God's weakness and suffering,
Bonhoeffer now speaks of Christ helping us "by his weakness
and suffering," and he describes God as "weak and powerless in
the world," He sees the Bible as directing us "to the power-
lessness and suffering of God" because "only a suffering God
can help" and because it is by his weakness that he "conquers
42
power and space in the world,"
While working with this theme, Bonhoeffer makes two of his
most famous statements. "Before God and with him" he says, "we








both this focus and the earlier one. God is impotent in man's
life. He is without place or position from which he may effect
change, answer questions and offer help. Yet Bonhoeffer will
not abandon the concept of God's presence and reality. What¬
ever they mean however, they must be understood in the light of
our basic godlessness. Paradoxically again, Bonhoeffer suggests
that even though the world is more godless than in the past
"perhaps it is for that very reason nearer to God than ever
kk
before."
This development thus far would clearly seem to be an
apology for autonomous, secular life which exists without
recourse to deity yet knows of the deity. The whole impetus
of Bonhoeffer's expressions here drives toward the explicit
development of some concept of process. Logically Bonhoeffer
could not explain such knowledge unless it came from a past
when God had a place in man'3 life and performed functions for
him. Implicit in his thought is an approval of a process by
which God weans man of dependency on him and leaves man to a
world without any divinity but the memory of that one which had
once been a factor in that past period of the world.
With the introduction of the language of suffering,
however, a subtle shift is given to this theology, and it is in
this context that a second often quoted statement of Bonhoeffer's
is set. "Man is challenged to participate in the sufferings of
God at the hands of a godless world," he thus writes. In
some sense help and conquest both have meaning in relation to
Mf. Ibid., p. 12*f
lf5. Ibid., p. 122
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God's suffering and powerlessness, and in some similar sense
it would seem man's suffering takes on a meaning for which the
word "participation" may be appropriate. In this light the
impotent God is also the suffering God and Christian man knows
God both through the Bible and through the act of living as a
Christian, and as an autonomous man in a world come of age.
Fragmentary though it may be, then, Bonhoeffer's theology
in these letters suggests that the Christian can only know God
as superfluous, powerless and suffering. Such a God is clearly
not the God of classical theism and is just as clearly not the
effective and effecting divinity of other non-theistic adapta¬
tions of classical theism. It is not just that the ancient
heresy of patripassionism is restated and broadened (God
himself suffers), but that as well, the classical divine
attributes are both denied and replaced by their contraries as
far as man is concerned. In the end, suffering alone must bear
anything divine in the mature world, yet without affecting that
world which is whole without it.
Thus Bonhoeffer would seem to combine the characteristics
of both Category II atheism which conceives man as the locus of
the problem, and Category III atheism which conceives some
process in God accounting for it. Man becomes autonomous and
his world comes of age in such a way that there is no longer
any place or role for God. Correspondingly, God is in a
process of forsaking man so that he will learn to live without
God, and is assuming a role of suffering and powerlessness
which, even though Bonhoeffer speaks of it as helping man,
changes nothing of that autonomy and godlessness which now con¬
stitutes man's proper and inevitable nature. Man on his part
is both without God and, as such, suffering with God.
28
3. Gabriel Vahanian
Biblical transcendentalism claims, according to Gabriel
Vahanian, that "man and the world are God's creation; therefore
God is wholly other than what he creates and neither manner the
world is conceived as a self-efficient and self-reliant
46
entity." This "wholly other" God stands behind the dilemma of
God which Vahanian labelled "the death of God" and which, in
his writings, he describes again and again as a cultural
occurrence.
Given this premise, it is not surprising that there is a
motif of mystical vocabulary in Vahanian. Thus he champions
the principle "that the finite cannot comprehend the infinite
(finitum non est capax infiniti)" and the transcendental cate¬
gories stand for Vahanian whether or not they are recognised by
. . 47
the "cultural religiosity." God must be, Vahanian asserts,
48
in that he is inevitable, wholly other and wholly present.
Initially then, the ultimate truth of Biblical thought is
defended in the face of the situation which Vahanian goes on to
describe.
The difficulty arises when God "becomes a cultural
accessory or a human ideal," for when that happens, he dies,
49
precisely because of his transcendent nature. Vahanian
insists that there is nothing sacrilegious in speaking "of the
death of God or of God as the chief failure of man," for one is
46. Vahanian, The Death of God, pp. 14-15
47. Ibid., p. 231
48. Vahanian, "Beyond the Death of God," The Meaning of the
Death of God, Murchland (editor), pp. 11-12
49. Vahanian, The Death of God, p. 231
in so speaking, referring to the ethnolatrous concept by which
a culture would attempt to take God into its own form and
50
content. Such concepts remain valid, however, "only so long
as they spearhead the spontaneous expression of a particular
human experience" and they live "only so long as their cultural
51
framev/ork lasts,"
This natural tendency of the cultural concept to lose its
efficacy and life must be expected if God is, ultimately,
beyond man's ability to comprehend him. For Vahanian, the
process in our time and culture is part of the death of the
52
Christian era and our passing into a post-Christian age.
He blames Christendom for this, calling it (by the reverse of
Kierkegaard's judgement) "the fundamental misfortune of
55
Christianity," It is to him but another name for V/estern
culture, however, and he sees an irony in the fact that
Christianity created it and that it, in our day, "changed our
54
world into a no-God's land,"
If it is natural for cultural concepts of God to die
because they must ultimately fail to comprehend him, Vahanian
sees the need to create such concepts as equally natural. This
tendency he designates as "religiosity" and castigates it as
55
"the paraphernalia of faith in God," Even in times such as
ours when the cultural concepts of God are dead or dying,
50, Vahanian, "The Future of Christianity in a Post-Christian
Era" (subsequently referred to as "The Future of Christian¬
ity"), Toward a New Christianity, Altizer (editor), p, 255
51. Ibid.
52, Vahanian, The Death of God, pp, 229-230
53. Vahanian, "Beyond the Death of God," op. cit,, p, 3
5^. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 11
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religiosity as such survives on in idolatrous forms. Nor is
such religiosity confined to "the canons of any of the tradi-
56tional historical religions" so that it is not surprising
to find in the wake of the Christian God's death a radically
57
new secular and immanentalist form emerging.
This religiosity displays a secularism which would make
itself at home in the world and results in an anthropocentrism
58which is the heart of immanental attitudes and outlook. With
this change God can no longer be identified "as prime mover or
universal sustainer of the world of phenomena" nor can there be
"any ready-made codes, whose enforcement depends on inqixisitorial
59
procedures or on obscurantist theologies," What Christianity
had bequeathed to the world no longer carries the force of
cultural assent. Put otherwise, "Western culture is practically
immunized against Christianity" and, put conversely, the
Christian tradition itself has been culturally neutralized,^
The result from the theological point of view is another
dimension yet of the atheism implied by the death of God—the
first dimension being the loss of a valid cultural theology,
which loss reveals man's essential religiosity. This nev?
dimension is the acknowledged atheism of our time, to which
God's ultimate irrelevance is a more meaningful statement than
61
whether he is real or just an idea. Thus Vahanian can
emphasise that to this modern mentality "God is dead, not in
sheer intellectual scaffoldings, but in the down-to-earth give
56, Vahanian, No Other God, p, 31
57, Vahanian, The Death of God, p. XXXII
58, Vahanian, No Other God, p. 18j The Death of God, p, 187
59, Vahanian, The Death of God, p, 193
60, Vahanian, "The Future of Christianity," op, cit,, p, 164
61, Vahanian, The Death of God, p, 187
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and take of the human condition." In this new awareness
resulting from the transition from transcendence to immanence
the "superfluity of God--whether he is or not—is the
65
predicate#"
Vahanian would thus agree with Bonhoeffer that man is
64
moving away from a reliance on "supernatural crutches." In
the "thorough-going scientific view of reality" possessed by
modern man, God is no longer necessary: "He is irrelevant—he
65
is dead," for the "meaning-giving center of the universe"
66
whatever it is, "cannot be called God." Vahanian also agrees
that God "cannot be taken forgranted" nor can he "be used
merely as a hypothesis, whether epistemological, scientific,
or existential, unless we should draw the degrading conclusion
that 'God is reasons.'"^''
God's death is thus two-sided: The loss of our cultural
concept of him and the substitution of a worldview which
believes itself to be independent of him. Even so, Vahanian
insists that God's death "belongs wholly to, and is grounded in
68
man's natural inclination to religiosity." Thus even given
these atheistic expressions, "man is not an atheist, except by
contrast with an established theism," and thus Vahanian antici¬
pates either "the recovery of our classic transcendental cate¬
gories" or God's being "renaturalised into an immanental force.
62. Ibid.
63. Vahanian, No Other God, p. 16
64. Vahanian, "The Future of Christianity," op. cit., p. 265
65. Vahanian, The Death of God, p. XXXII
66. Ibid., p. 193
67. Vahanian, "Beyond the Death of God," op. cit., pp. 11-12
68. Vahanian, The Death of God, p. 6
69. Vahanian, "The Future of Christianity," op. cit., p. 257
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This demonstrates however, a curious complexity in
Vahanian's thought, for man is seen as both necessarily pro¬
jecting idolatrous concepts of God and as being godless in the
wake of the loss of the cultural concept of God and its
replacement by an autonomous and anthropocentric worldview.
Thus Vahanian states that man now "directly experiences" God's
absence and death so that "it is a practical awareness by which
70
authentic existence often is measured," Likewise the
resultant contemporary atheism "however strange , , , is in
71
fact an athedlogy of man without God,"' Therefore even for
valid theology Vahanian has taken our situation in the context
of God's death so seriously as to demand a "methodological
72
atheism" with which to respond to the cultural phenomenon.
It would seem Vahanian feels modern theology to be
confronted with two vast chasms of error. On the one hand, the
theologian may cling to the culturally abandoned concept of God,
which anyway had reached idolatrous proportions to become that
paraphernalia of religiosity Vahanian so abhors , On the other
he can invert his former theism into a contemporary atheism.
Here again however, he faces two threats: an atheology or
atheism which affirms and glories in the new immanentism, and
a profane secularism which adopts a scientific worldview to
which God is irrelevant, Vahanian gives expression to all
these dangers and condemns them all.
The fundamental affirmation of the God who is "wholly
other" cannot, given Vahanian's analysis, find expression in
70, Vahanian, The Death of God, p, 187
71, Vahanian, No Other God, p. 17
72, Ibid,, p. 32
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any culturally viable form, however, and it is for this reason
that he proposes a methodological atheism by which the
theologian admits that he can neither speak of God nor abandon
his obligation to acknowledge the transcendent. By it he
admits that he feels impelled toward faithfulness to a God
which he no longer has.
Vahanian is thus a clear and surprisingly consistent
Category II atheist. Atheism is commended because of the
realities of man's present condition. God remains what he has
always been and man confronts the fundamental truth about their
relationship: Finitum non est capax infiniti. This confronta¬
tion occurs because of (1) the collapse of Christendom and its
ethnolatrous concepts of God; (2) the growth of man's autonomy
exemplified in the new scientific worldview which makes God
irrelevant and underwrites a radical immanentismj and (3) an
ever-present idolatrous tendency which prevents a pure and
simple atheism and results in the constant substitution of what
are, in one form or another, essentially false gods for the
unattainable and unconquerable spectre of transcendent deity.
Thus Vahanian seems to be saying what Bonhoeffer did when
he spoke of man's autonomy and the world's coming of age, but
to Vahanian these are not symptoms of a divinely appointed
process but instead, of man's incipient religiosity and
idolatry. Likewise Vahanian responds theologically by conceding
to the possession of a theology informed by Biblical transcen¬
dentalism but empty of cultural expression—and thus empty as
well of relevance to post-Christian man. In light of this
situation he accepts a methodological atheism by which to avoid
34
the pitfalls of man's nature and his cultural situation
combined. Like Weil he prefers atheism to idolatry and sees
no alternative to these.
4. Paul Van Buren
Paul Van Buren in his first book. The Secular Meaning of
the Gospel, chose to abandon "a straightforward use of the word
73•God'"'^ because, as he put it (in opposition to Nietzsche),
7 2+
"the word 'God' is dead." By this he meant that the word
"equivocates and misleads," that "it seems to be a proper name,
calling up the image of a divine entity, but it refuses to
75
function as any other proper name does." Thus, he speaks of
♦
our empirical difficulty with "talking about God at all" as "we
do not know 'what' God is, and we cannot understand how the
word 'God' is being used,"''^
In these terms he developed the weakness of Christian
theism and attempted to write theology which interpreted the
77
Gospel "on the basis of certain empirical attitudes" and
which would be concerned for, among other things, "the logical
78
analysis of theological statements." In this task he utilised
79
"the modified verification principle" and engaged in "a care¬
ful, functional analysis of the language of the New Testament,
80
the Fathers, and contemporary believers." Before such an
onslaught of secular devices it is not surprising that no
74. Ibid., P. 103
75. Ibid., P. 145
76. Ibid., P« 84
77. Ibid., P. 20
78. Ibid., P. 18
79. Ibid., P* 156
80. Ibid., P. 19
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supernatural or transcendent deity could be maintained and thus
he would afterwards refer to this kind of theology as "empirical
81
and—let us say—a-theistic."
Later Van Buren would write of The Secular Meaning of the
Gospel as not having been "anything more . . . than an invita¬
tion • • • to look at the matter in question in a certain
way," and he would undertake qualifications, clarifications
and entirely new approaches as a result of the fact that the
book on reflection is valued by him primarily because it
"served to help over a hump"—that of his own theological
past. Modified though his thought in it may have been,
however, he continued to deny a straightforward use of the word
"God 5" continued to approach the problem which it raises pre¬
dominantly through modern empirical, logical and linguistic
considerations; and most sharply differs from it in a willing¬
ness to take that problem more seriously and directly and not
to brush it off quite so abruptly as he did in that work.
Over a period .of years following the publication of The
Secular Meaning of the Gospel, Van Buren would write a series
of articles (later collected and published in his second book,
Theological Explorations) tackling the problem of God in quite
different ways. Thus he once suggested that "if we are to work
within the dualities of human experience," it might be specifi¬
cally a doctrine of God which "must be given up for the time
being." This he felt was called for because of the "too modern,
81. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p. 67
82. Ibid., p. 10?
83. Van Buren, "Theology in the Context of Culture," Frontline
Theology, Peerman (editor), p. 48
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• • • too literal, too prosaic, too unimaginative" character¬
istics of modern theologians such as himself who were also
guilty of "accepting too uncritically the culturally privi-
ledged status of the language of factuality, explanation and
the ordinary." In this mood he shys away from "too much clarity,
explanation and precision ... about matters which have led
men of other ages to tremble," and suggests that "God" might be
located "within the metaphorical language of imagination and
insight." The shift from the rigid and closed anti-theism of
The Secular Meaning of the Gospel is clearly demonstrated by
At one point Van Buren also picked up on Bonhoeffer's
"vor und mitt Gott leben wir ohne Gofct" ("before and with God
we live without God") which Van Buren felt gave voice to the
belief that "the theism of Western thought, the theism, for
example of Descartes ... was superfluous to Christian faith."
He notes that Descartes would doubtless have considered
Bonhoeffer an atheist (as we do) and Van Buren himself suspects
that Bonhoeffer wished to go beyond saying that Christian faith
did not commit one to such theism and assume instead the
stronger statement that the Christian should specifically
reject it. If this is, indeed, at least a part of what
Bonhoeffer intended with the cryptic sentence, Van Buren
85
clearly finds agreement with him.
Also during this time, Van Buren suggested that we consider
"the possibilities of the hypothesis of a limited God within a
8*f. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, pp. 180-181
85. Ibid., p. 111; pp. 114-115
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pluralistic universe," and he tells us that what he has
called "the dissolution of the absolute" resulted in his
recognition of "a pluralistic society and a pluralism of values
87
and understandings." Again, he develops the idea that it is
"certain men's sense of limitation which gives rise to language
about God" in that they "are struck by the ordinary, whereas
88
most find it only ordinary." These men have had difficulty
speaking of God "not because God was beyond this world and
experience, but precisely because they were speaking of this
world of human experience" which they knew "in such a way that
89
words failed them." This kind of speechlessness, Van Buren
suggests, may be a greater boon to theology than another
90
doctrine of God.
Van Buren's book The Edges of Language, took up the
problem of God with a singlemindedness which reversed his
treatment of it in his first book. He continued to argue
against regarding God "as a name for the object of awe" because
as he now puts it, that use "depends upon too limited a view of
91
language." He tells us that "'God* as a discrete concept
regardless of context is simply not the same word 'God' that
occurs in religious discourse" where it is "at the center of a
complex linguistic pattern and the role it plays is related to
92
everything else that the religious person wants to say."
86. Ibid., p. 125
87. Ibid., p. 38
88. Ibid., pp. 168 and 170
89. Ibid., p. 181
90. Ibid.
91. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, p. 135
92. Ibid., p. 70
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Van Buren does not see himself alone in this treatment of
God, and he tells us that he wants to argue "that while there
have certainly been Christian theists, there has also been at
the least an important, at the most the central, strain of
Christianity which has consistently refused to allow the use of
the word 'God' like that presupposed in the argument between
93
theists and atheists." In fact, Van Buren sees the ability
to circumvent the issue of theism versus atheism as one of the
advantages to his linguistic analysis which shows "that it is
9lf
of no particular concern to a Christian."
Still, Van Buren is more critical of theism than those
statements \*ould suggest, for he calls it "an unlikely possibi¬
lity for educated Christians today" and describes it as "open
to serious accusations of conceptual confusion" which, even if
they were met, would result in "a religious fundamentalism that
95
3eems scarcely worth the battle." In the same vein he
describes as "the most widespread misuse" of the word "God"
that use which makes it "a word which is supposed to refer to,
96
or name its object."
In The Edges of Language. Van Buren speaks of "God" as "a
word marking the outer edge of language" and one which is
uttered "when one wants desperately to say the most that is
possible" so that "its use is the final speech act at the limit
97
of language." This use relieves the word of the need to
93. Ibid., P- 133
9^. Ibid., PP . 3-
95. Ibid., P. 33
96. Ibid., P- 137
97. Ibid., P. 133
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"stand the tests of coherence" which rules what Van Buren calls
98
"the great central plains of our talk." Thus, the attributes
of God become "the subjects about which the Christian tries to
99
say more than our ordinary linguistic conventions allow," and
to say that everything depends upon God is to acknowledge the
centrality of the word to every other feature of our "religious
discourse."^®
In acknowledging this use of "God," Van Buren admits that
we are given "a largely absent presence, an unmentionable name
of what is neither to be imagined, nor pictured, nor otherwise
re-presented," and that faithfulness to this God must be
measured "by how a man lives and walks ahead in life" rather
101
than by the development of some inner state. "Finally,"
Van Buren says, "this God is not a finished, fixed or identifi¬
able figure, person or concept" but rather "a future coming to
102
meet men" which "waits somewhere out ahead of man."
In none of these affirmations does Van Buren open the door
for any transcendent or "wholly other" deity which someone like
Gabriel Vahanian would not only not close the door to but
indeed for which he would prop the door open with his methodo¬
logical atheism. Van Buren's atheism is thus that of Category
I. It is a simple atheism, albeit one which grows from the
simple rejection of the use of the word "God" to a complex
linguistic analysis of its use designated to vindicate its place
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., p. 139
100. Ibid., pp. 70-71
101. Ibid., p. 75
102. Ibid., p. 76
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in religious discourse without obligating one to traditional
theism. Thus despite the intricate meanings which Van Buren
links to the word, especially in The Edges of Language, he
consistently denies that it designates any reality beyond that
inhabited by man linguistically,
5, William Hamilton
William Hamilton is one of those who has experimented with
a wide variety of ways of speaking about the problem of God and
who has himself assumed positions over a wide spectrum of
attitudes about it. Thus we find him first of all confessing
that "if there are men today who can do without God, it still
seems to be true that we cannot do so," and that he himself,
103
and men like him, are afraid of themselves without God,
Hamilton also speaks of the experience of the death of God
radical theologians as "not a simple not-having, for there is
an experience of loss," which for some is painful, for others
10^f
not, but "is loss nonetheless,"
Hamilton has given considerable attention to the painful
aspect of the problem of God, speaking predominantly in terms
105
of knowing God as only "a pressure and a wounding," We
know a little of what divinity means also "because of its
106
wounding presence in our hearts" he says, and similarly, he
describes God as "there when we do not want him, in ways we do
107
do not want him, and he is not there when we do want him,"
103, Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, p, 6k
10^, Hamilton, "American Theology, Radicalism and the Death
of God" (subsequentlyj "American Theology"), Radical
Theology, Altizer and Hamilton (editors), p, 6
105. Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, p, 164
106. Ibid., p. W
107. Ibid., p. 63
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Ivan Karam^zov is an example of this awareness for Hamilton,
who describes the character from Dostoevsky's great novel as
experiencing far more agony by the possibility of the existence
*108
of God than he could ever experience from his non-existence.
As indicated by Hamilton's analysis of Ivan Karamo.zov as
testing God "on the basis of a standard of justice" and finding
109
that God fails the test, his own failure to arrive at a
satisfying theodicy lies behind some of Hamilton's early
difficulty with God. He believes that this difficulty is not
his alone, however, as "the problem of suffering has become a
110
major barrier to faith for many sensitive believers."
It was in the context of this earliest stage of his
atheism that Hamilton followed Bonhoeffer in speaking of the
111
suffering of God. He felt that God's suffering must be affirmed
112
and chose the impotence or weakness of God over God's power.
Likewise, he felt that some men need to rebel against God,
accusing him "of injustice or impotence or irrelevance, in
113
order to know who he is," and he forsees the emergence of
114
"the impotent God, suffering with men" in such modern
religiousness. At one point he declared Bonhoeffer*s statement
that "man is challenged to participate in the sufferings of God
at the hands of a godless world" as "one of the most inexhaus-
115
tible, significant, and hopeful sentences written in our time."
108. Hamilton, "Banished from the Land of Unity," Radical
Theology, Altizer and Hamilton (editors), p. 63
109. Ibid.
110. Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, p. 42
111. Ibid., p. 92
112. Ibid., p. 91
113. Ibid., p. 135
114. Ibid., p. 52
115. Ibid., p. 152
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However, from the first there was an equivocation in
Hamilton's attitude over the image of God's wounding presence
with its related images of the unjust suffering in the world
and of an impotent and himself suffering God. He senses the
"abdication from the world" which the usual theology of God
would represent, and speaks on the one hand of being led "to
reject it, not to welcome it at all," as it comes in the
form of a wounding presence. Yet, contrary to that rejection,
he had also spoken of the need for God even should he be
117
known only in this manner. Thus we find Hamilton stranded
between a sovereign and omnipotent God who must be interpreted
to have abdicated from the sufferings of men who know only his
wounding presence, and the impotent and suffering God who
offers no relief but the challenge of participation in
suffering.
In this dialectic between abdication and presence, omnipo¬
tence and impotence, is also inherent the dialectic between the
presence and absence of God. One can feel the tension between
the two in The New Essence of Christianity, but just as he will
later assert that "absence has won a decisive victory over the
118
presence" in the death of God, he will opt to speak in
decisive, non-dialectical tones which reject such terms as
"absence^" "disappearance," "eclipse," or "hiddenness," precisely
because they "still live quite comfortably within the classical
tradition of the dialectic between the presence and absence
of God."119
116. Ibid., p. 87
117. Ibid., p. 64
118. Hamilton, "The New Optimism," Radical Theology, Altizer
and Hamilton (editors), p. 168
119. Hamilton, "The Shape of Radical Theology," op. cit», p. 73
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Thus Hamilton evolves into a "harder" atheism from this
first stage which shared so much in common with Bonhoeffer.
Ved Mehta may have caught him in the process of entering into
that more decisive period when Hamilton said to him in the
course of an interview that he was "still waiting and hoping
for God to rise up again" but that he was "beginning to feel
that the time has come • • • to put up or shut up, . • • to be
120
an in or an out." With this shift, Hamilton enters enthu¬
siastically into the use of the phrase "death of God" which he
tells us he uses "as a metaphor describing something that is
happening to a particular group of modern Western Christians
121
today."
Specifically Hamilton speaks of what is happening as "the
deterioration of the portrait of the God/man relation as found
122
in Biblical theology and the neo-orthodox tradition." Also
he describes it as the realisation that "God is not in the realm
of the necessary at all • • • • He is one of the possibilities
123
in a radically pluralistic spiritual and intellectual milieu."
As such he is, however, a possibility rejected by those who speak
of the death of God.
Hamilton says that when he speaks of the death of God, he
and the others who use the phrase, speak "of the death in us of
any power to affirm any of the traditional images of God" by
which they intend to assert that "the world is not God and that
124
it does not point to God." This early representation of a
120. Mehta, The New Theologian, p. 50
121. Hamilton, "The Shape of Radical Theology," op. cit., p. 73
122. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
p. 35
123. Ibid., p. 40
124. Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, pp. 86-87
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later more explicit and hard atheism, is naturally buttressed
by his evolution to a point of asserting that "it is really
that we do not know, do not adore, do not possess, do not
125believe in God." In this he seems to be trying to avoid any
hint of equivocation whatsoever.
Interestingly, Hamilton's attitude became more optimistic
as his atheism became more specific and the early problems of
suffering ceased to be central. Instead he cites optimism as
12.S
one of the characteristics of an "emerging radical theology"
asserting that!
By optimism I do not mean insensitivity
to suffering and tragedy, and I do not
mean inevitable progress. Nevertheless
radical theology is both describing and
relating itself to a new feeling of hope
and optimism . . . , a conviction that
substantive changes in the lives of men
can and will be made. This new optimism
is trying to discipline itself to say Yes
to the world of rapid change, new tech-
nologies, automation and the mass media. '
Again, a few months later, he wrote an article entitled
"The New Optimism" in which he identified three areas in which
a change of sensibility from pessimism to optimism was occur¬
ring; The social sciences, art and the civil rights movement.
Oddly, he chose "for the fun of it," January kt 1965 as a date
for the change of sensitivity—the date, he tells us, of T. S.
Eliot's death and Lyndon Johnson's State of the Union message.
He speaks here of an optimism "that even the really intractable
125. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
pp. 27-28




problems that have marked our civilized period can be overcome,
12
problems as apparently irreducible as war and mental illness#"
In this development we catch the clearly implicit
assumption that man can do better without God than he did with
God for as Hamilton sees it "the new optimism is both a cause
and a consequence of the basic theological experience which we
129
today call the death of God." Also there seems to be
something of a reaction against his earlier emphasis on suffer¬
ing when he tells us that if he has seen the new mood of
optimism rightly:
... then we might be able to conclude
that tragedy is culturally impossible, or
unlikely# We trust the world, we trust
the future, we deem even many of our
intractable problems just soluble enough 1
to reject the tragic mode of facing them.
In the various attitudes and beliefs of Hamilton's
expressed thus far, it is hard to determine immediately those
which might have initiated Thomas J. J. Altizer into what he
called "the possibility of a consistent kenotic Christology"
131
and for which he gave credit to Hamilton# However, in The
New Essence of Christianity, Hamilton wrote of "a God with¬
drawing from all claims to power and authority, and sovereign¬
ity and consenting to become himself the victim and subject of
all that the world can do," with the net result that "the af¬
flicting God" becomes "the afflicted God" and divinity "consents
to abide in the world and allow the world to have its way with
128. Hamilton, "The New Optimism," op. cit., pp. 159-160
129. Ibid., p. 168
130. Ibid., p. 169
131. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 11
132. Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, pp. 86-87
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Also Hamilton attempts Christologies which emphasise the
image of Jesus as "a place to be, a standpoint" and identify
133
that place as alongside the neighbor; or, alternatively,
134which speak of discerning Jesus "beneath the worldly masks,"
He relates this to theology by suggesting that Jesus as a place
135
may be the meaning of his divinity and Jesus in the world
may be, as "our way to our neighbor" and "our way to Jesus
Christ," also "the place for the waiting for God,"''^^ Thus
through Christology, Hamilton attempts to locate some meaning¬
ful divinity in the world and it is not wholly surprising that
the context of such an enterprise is that of his "softer"
atheism in which such a phrase as "waiting for God" is not out
of place.
Insofar as there is some "kenotic theology" in these brief
developments, it is nevertheless neither conscious of itself as
such nor consistent. Still, such developments present the
possibility of seeing God, through Jesus, in a process of
revealing an entirely new image of divinity—an utterly worldly
and immanent divinity. This thread, visible here and there in
Hamilton's writings, could easily be taken as representative of
Category III atheism which derives from a divine process which
divinely destroys the God of classical theism.
All of this only goes to illustrate the breadth of
Hamilton's participation in the atheistic treatment of the
problem of God, however, for it is also quite clear that in his
133* Hamilton, "Thursday's Child," Radical Theology, Altizer
and Hamilton (editors), p, 92
134, Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit,,
P. 50
135* Hamilton, "Thursday's Child," op. cit,, p, 92
136, Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
pp, 41-42 and 48
"hard" statements which became more dominant as the 1960*e
progressed, Hamilton at least attempts to assume a clear-cut
and straightforward atheism of the Category I variety which
simply denies that theism is a true position. By the same
token, when he speaks of our Iosb and the breakdown of the
dialectic of absence and presence, and certainly when he speaks
of "waiting for God," there is the recurring theme of a
Category II atheist who feels that something is happening to
man but seems unshakable in the implicit faith or hope that
divinity itself is untouched.
That these themes should not lend themselves to easy
isolation and clear distinction from each other, and that
Hamilton should be found giving expression to attitudes and
beliefs consistent with, for example, Category II atheism, in
the same article in which he also gives expression to attitudes
137and beliefs consistent with Category I and Category III, is
perhaps the aspect of most singular importance to Hamilton's
role in and contribution to this area.
6. Thomas J. J. Altizer
Altizer's first book, Oriental Mysticism and Biblical
Eschatology, recognised modern man's alienation from the
sacred—the reality of faith—and "the very abyss of faith in
138which we must live." Likewise it recognised "a chasm ...
between the deepest reality of the Christian faith and the
137* cf. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op.
cit.:
p. 28 "We do not believe in God" Category I
p. k8 "waiting on God" Category II
p. 50 "Jesus beneath the worldly masks" Category III
138. Altizer, Oriental Mysticism and Biblical Eschatology,>
(subsequently: Oriental Hyaticism). p. 9
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expression of that reality in Western history and civilisation."
That chasm resulted, Altizer then believed, because Christianity
140
had put on the mask "of a world affirming form of faith,"
and had evolved "a religious path that made the Christian at
141
home in the world." Originally, however, it had been
142
founded "upon a radically world-denying religious way," and
represented "the ultimate form of rebellion against 'reality,*
143
as 'the will to nothingness pronounced holy.'"
This position would be, on some counts, exactly reversed,
however. He would continue to believe that man had become
alienated from the transcendence which, in that first book he
had called "religious reality." He tells us that the awareness
of this—the "certainty of the death of God in modern history
and experience"—was something to which he came as early as the
1Mf
Summer of 1955- His attitude toward this would shift from
one of criticising this characteristic to affirming it, however.
Likewise, he would now affirm Christianity's own world-
affirmation and its "making the Christian at home in the world,"
thus retaining his earlier analysis but reversing his evalua¬
tion of it. These changes represented a realisation "that there
is no possibility for us of reversing our history and that our
only hope lies in moving through our radically profane cons¬
ciousness to a new and yet Christian coincidence of the radical
145
sacred and the radical profane."
139. Ibid., p. 10
140. Ibid., p. 156
141. Ibid., p. 157
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid., p. 112
144. Altizer (editor), Toward a New Christianity, p. 301
145. Ibid. " "™ " """ ——
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Thus what does not change is Altizer's diagnosis of man's
loss of the experience of God, of the worldly form of Christ¬
ianity which had evolved, and of the need to rediscover the
sacred—albeit in some unexpected form. What does change is
his condemnation of man and of Christianity (its world-affirming
character) which becomes acceptance and development of these
facts of modern life. Also the rediscovery of the sacred
remains a goal, but now it will be sought in our own reality
1^6
and not in some final "absolute negation of the Given."
In Altizer's earlier understanding of man's difficulty
with the sacred, he blamed a theology which had grounded its
understanding of God in an understanding of being which
produced at best a partial and fragmentary grasp of God as "the
147
religious reality." He felt then that "the Christian must
148
come to know the Nothing as the higher side of God," and
become totally immersed in the religious reality so that "all
149
awareness of the world is either suspended or dissolved."
By his second book, Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the
Sacred, Altizer was well into the shift which reversed this
theology and sought not to abandon the profane in favor of the
sacred but to seek the sacred in the profane. Thus he sees the
crucial factor to be "the positive religious significance of
150
modern man's choice of the profane." This he feels forces us
to "face the full dialectical implications of a radical nega¬
tion of the sacred," and while he accused Eliade here of
146. Altizer, "The Sacred and the Profane," Radical Theology,
Altizer and Hamilton (editors), p. 144
147. Altizer, Oriental Mysticism, p. 194
148. Ibid., p. 197
149. Ibid., p. 174
150. Altizer, Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred
(subsequently: Mircea Eliade), p. 103
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refusing to follow, Altizer forges ahead, grasping "the
possibility that an ultimate coincidence of the opposites could
151
reconcile the radical sacred and the radical profane."
This then, is the basic format for Altizer*s theology: A
dialectical move negating a former transcendent sacred which
stood in opposition to and in judgement on a profane reality
which is now affirmed, and will lead to the ultimate attainment
of a coincidencia oppositorum of that sacred and profane.
Within this format Altizer places specifically Christian
imagery and materials, although in such novel arrangements and
meanings that many have refused to call the result Christian.
The first principle of Altizer's theology is the death of
152
God, by which he refers to "a final and irrevocable event."
Understanding the meaning of this event is perhaps, he suggests,
153
"the greatest theological problem of our time." In his own
interpretation the meaning is surprisingly direct and leaves no
"God above God or a Godhead lying beyond the God who appears in
15/f
history or religion." Rather it is precisely that transcen¬
dent which man has in the past encountered as alien to him, as
155
awesome and uncanny, which is now dead.
Altizer dares to call this message "good news," a designa¬
tion which suits his description of that now dead reality as
Satan. The classical deity could easily be understood as "the
power enclosing energy and stilling movement, the power of
darkness standing over against and opposing all light and life."
151. Ibid.
152. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 126
153. Ibid., p. 124
154. Ibid., p. 134
155* Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 96
156. Ibid., p. 97
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This results naturally when it is subjected to a mystical
awareness of the void implicit in the unrelenting claims of the
divine attributes. It is this that Altizer has seen and now
divines as dead and names, following William Blake, as the arch
157
enemy of man and of man's reality—that is, as Satan.
Altizer refers back to his own previous theology when he
points out that "the Christian God can be manifest and real
only by means of a faith engaging in an absolute world and life-
negation, a negation that must occur wherever there is energy
158
and life." Now perceiving this and accepting the implica¬
tions of his own choice of the profane, he sees God's death as
liberating man "from every alien and opposing other" which,
Altizer believes, will make possible "the final coming together
159
of God and man."
The death of God however, is not just an event but also a
process by which the Word or Spirit moves "more and more fully
4j gQ
into the body of the profane." This occurs by virtue of God's
self-negation in Christ, a development which results in the
Christian God becoming gradually "more alien and beyond,
receding into a lifeless and oppressive form, until it finally
appears as an empty and vacuous nothingness." That Altizer
takes this process to have historical literalness is indicated
by his statement that "we are inheritors of a history in which
God was actually present."
157. Ibid., pp. 96-97
158. Ibid., p. 101
159. Ibid., p. 107
160. Ibid., p. 109
161. Ibid.
162. Altizer, "Creative Negation in Theology," Frontline
Theology. Peerman (editor), pp. 80-81
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The time of the death of God is thus the time of God's
absence, of his missing, of his withdrawal, of his presence to
163
us only in his absence. The reverse side of this truth is
what Altizer calls "the forward movement of the incarnate Word"
which is "from God to Jesus" and then continued, always kenotic
in nature, "from the historical Jesus to the universal body of
humanity, thereby undergoing an Epiphany in every human hand
and face,"^^
In Altizer's thought, therefore, the death of God is
meaningless apart from that kenotic and incarnational result—
kenotic because the form of the transcendent God becomes
increasingly empty and alien} and incarnational because the
Word becomes ever more one with man. Thus the crucifixion can
be known both as the "negation of transcendence," and "the
165
embodiment in history and experience of the divine process,"
The ultimate implication of Altizer's formulation is the
incarnation of the sacred in the profane, that "resurrection of
166
the profane in a transfigured and thus finally sacred form"
by which that original quest, begun even before his first book,
is satisfied, Altizer's genius, if 3uch it can be called, is
to give to Christianity a retelling of the myth which affirms
the Christian's atheism, choice of profane reality, and adversion
to the transcendent. It uses a dialectical method to destroy
the tension and opposition of the basic categories of sacred
and profane, immanence and transcendence, promising ultimately
that even God and man will process into a new unity,
163, Altizer, "Word and History," op, cit,, pp, 13^-135
l6*f, Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p, 83
165. Ibid., p. 120
166, Altizer, "The Sacred and the Profane," op, cit,, p, 155
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In many ways the deep mystical tones and the poles of
negative theology are never absent from Altizer's work through¬
out its stages. Likewise he never abandons his dream of giving
value to both the sacred and the profane in his attempt to
reformulate for modern man a vision which he believes to be
Christian. In his own strange and elusive way he seems as
deeply imbued with piety as did Simone Weil, although, like Weil,
it drove him to a profound and intricate atheism.
Altizer's atheism however makes sense only within the model
of Category III. Man knows God as dead because he has died and
because his death is a deliberate self-emptying. Man does not
suffer from some imperfection which prevents him from knowing a
transcendent deity, nor is it the case that he can make no sense
of theism or the belief that there ever was a reality named by
the word "God." On the contrary, there was a God, and because
that God chose to negate himself—an event of which man is
knowledgeable—man must accept that there now is no God.
Atheism is faithfulness to the divine process it affirms.
7. Dorothee Solle
"The death of God" in Dorothee Solle's opinion, describes
"the historical condition under which the absolute appears
167
today." This constitutes "an event which has taken place
within the last two centuries of European history and which
168
conditions every aspect of life." For many people the
experience is such that it does not lend itself to the usual
167. Solle, Christ the Representative, p. 10
168. Ibid.
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atheism or theism debate, being characterised instead by an
"oscillation between them" and an "inability either to answer
or to drop the question concerning the meaning of existence and
169
the purpose and goal of history."
Sblle thus sees man as unable to arrive at a theistic faith
because he possesses no viable concept of the absolute; but yet
because of the nature of his life as "an absurd situation mid¬
way between meaninglessness and the longing for meaning," she
feels that man must have God represented to him. This latter
conclusion is a non-logical one but one which, under the
170
circumstances, she believes is forced upon us.
In Solle's theology, Christ becomes God's representative
171
and God is described as absent and helpless in the world, so
that in fact he is unable to be in the world immediately and
172
must be mediated into it. Through Christ, God's new repre¬
sentation in the world is "profane and worldly ... established
173in helplessness and suffering." This representation rests on
the need of the "dead" God to be represented and on the provi-
174
sionality of that representation. Thus God has not
abdicated and become finally superfluous, nor "declared himself
fully within the world," but neither, because of the represen-
175
tation, has he lost his place in the future.
This representational Christology of Solle's is thus a
rescue attempt, designed to save the victim of man's present
169. Ibid., pp. 11-12
170. Ibid., p. 132
171. Ibid., p. 150
172# Ibid., p. 141
173* Ibid.
174. Ibid., p. 137
175. Ibid., p. 134
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situation—namely God—so that if and when the situation changes
God can again function for himself. Yet, in speaking of God's
representation as worldly, helpless and suffering, Solle may
appear to provide for a new image of the Divine to emerge. In
Solle's thought however, any process implied would have to be
within man or for man's changing situation and perception. The
God of classic theism seems to be both well protected and
untouched by the language of representation. If there is
radical implication for orthodox theology it is in the doctrine
of the Trinity and not directly in the doctrine of God. Solle
therefore, is a clear example of Category II atheism.
8. Herbert Braun
Herbert Braun is a New Testament scholar whose concern is
that "the New Testament reckons naively with the existence of
a deity" and, insofar as it does so "is thus alienated from us
A ry£
who are no longer able to make such a presupposition." His
solution is not unlike Van Buren's in terms of its technique,
for he looks at those references to God in the New Testament
and analyses their context. What he discovers from this activi¬
ty is that "even according to the New Testament, God in the
final analysis ... is where I am placed under obligation,
where I am engaged; engaged in unconditional 'I may' and 'I
oughtM"177
To Braun this means that God is implied in man's relation
to other men, and thus "every instance of a relation with one's
176. Braun, "The Problem of a New Testament Theology^' Toward
a New Christianity. Altizer (editor), p. 357
177. Ibid., p. 215
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fellow man" which possesses "something of the intimate
178
connection between the »I may* and. 'I ought"' is theistic
in the sense of Braun's interpretation of the New Testament.
His clear Category I atheism implicitly consecrates man's
ethical realm by its elevation to a replacement for the doctrine
of God in New Testament theology.
9. William Mallard
William Mallard defines himself specifically as atheistic
in terms of being "anti-theistic" if Kant's definition is
179
accepted for theism. He rejects therefore, the theism of "a
transcendent, intelligent, and freely active God, present ruler
over the world," because "it does not permit the full Incarna¬
tion of the Divine in which the 'personality' of God is real
only as the actual selfhood of Jesus," and because "it offers a
rationalistic description of the divine essence, disallowing
the full mystery of the Infinite as approached through the via
„180negativa."
These two points not only reveal Mallard's view of the
weakness of theism, but implicitly contain the key to his own
theology. Mallard believes that "the reality of God finds
description in relation to the vital events moving towards,
18 *1
through and beyond the ministry of Jesus." This reality he
has called "the terrible form of the Infinite as the incommen¬
surable meeting of the Void and the Wrathful" which, through
178. Ibid.
179# Mallard, "A Perspective for Current Theological Conversa-
tion," Toward a New Christianity, Altizer (editor),
P. 337
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid., p. 330
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Jesus, "negates its abstract, meaningless form," thereby
actualising a whole series of changes: The transfiguration of
Transcendence and the conversion of Wrathful Majesty into "a
1 82
simple, suffering dignity," among them.
This process is spoken of by Mallard as the Infinite
finding passageway "towards human rebirth in the literal and
anguished death of Jesus," and he speaks of this even as God's
"death," justifying that vocabulary on the grounds that it is
"the only mythologically adequate" way to speak of these
183
realities. For humans the divine "death" signifies
existence's becoming "expressly or implicitly 'secular'" so
that the sacred must be known as "the tension of human freedom
184
toward its secular future."
Thus Mallard shares Altizer's vision of a divine process of
incarnation to which Jesus is the key, marking the death of God
and the infusion of the sacred into the secular and thereby
transforming both. The death of God thus represents "the
vanishing of the Infinite as the abstract, wrathful Abyss of
185
Deity" and "the realisation of this change" in Jesus death.
The mystery is preserved both by virtue of the inaccessibility
of what might be called the pre-death-of-God form of the
infinite in the past, and by virtue of its ongoing, but now
concretised form in the movement of the Divine Kingdom which
came with Jesus "and is always coming."^^
182. Ibid., pp. 334-335
183. Ibid., p. 335
184. Ibid.
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid., pp. 327, 328 and 334
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Mallard, like Altizer, is clearly a Category III atheist.
His summary statement is that "God has become the radically
187
Incarnate Word, or Logos, in man's history," Yet his defi¬
nition of God as "the Infinite that stands at the limit of
188(man's) little structures of knowledge and understanding,"
preserves the priority which he gives to the ultimate mystery
and serves as well at the beginning of that process as at our
own point in it.
Thus Mallard's telling of the myth would seem to reserve
something of a sense of a transcendence so important in popular
theism. Indeed, this seems clear in his own description of his
theology as one in which "God includes, but is more than, all
•things'" by which he "would imply the radical Incarnation of
189
the Infinite, yet its openness towards man's future,"
10, Alistair Kee
"The word 'God,'" says Alistair Kee, "must refer to a
supernatural being not identical with any or all of the
elements of our experience of the secular world . • • , must be
in connection with our experience of the world, but must
190involve something more," Further, he insists that "the
•more' must carry with it the experience of personal encount-
191
er," Yet it is this meaning of God which Kee describes as a
stumbling block to faith in Christianity precisely because many
modern men are unable to believe in such a God,
187. Ibid,
188. Ibid.
189. Ibid., pp. 327, 328 and 33^
190. Kee, The Way of Transcendence, p. 29
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid., p. xix
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Strictly speaking, Kee does not consider such disbelief to
be, usually, atheistic in character, since it is the result of
there being "nothing in their experience which might lead them
to suspect that there is a God," and not the result of
193
theological difficulties. Thus Kee speaks for the atheism
which arises from "the inability to identify at all anything in
19^
experience which could legitimately be called God,"
The significance of this situation—and Kee accepts
Nietzsche's description of it as the death of God—is that a
new basis must be found for human judgements and for building
195
a meaningful life, Kee believes that the way of life which
"came to expression" in Jesus of which he is "the very incar-
196
nation," offers precisely these qualities to the atheist.
Thus he calls his atheistic Christianity "the way of transcen¬
dence," in opposition to "the way of immanence" or the
instinctive way of life into which most people just naturally
fall.1*7
Having once explained the role of Christianity without God,
however, Kee proceeds to develop his thinking in a more orthodox
theological vocabulary than one might expect. Thus he suggests
that the word "God" be used to designate "the content of our
198
ultimate concern" and cryptically suggests that "theology is
on to something when it affirms the infinite qualitative
193. Ibid., p. 26
19^. Ibid,, p, 136
195. Ibid., pp, xxvi and 225
196. Ibid., pp. 211 and 21*f
197. Ibid., pp. xxvii-xxviii
198. Ibid., p. 195
distinction (between time and eternity)" although "we cannot
express it today in terms of the supernatural, nor I fear, the
199
metaphysical."
Kee admits that his use of the words "transcendence" and
"immanence" may be confusing as they are usually used to
designate "two aspects of the being of God," but he specifies
that he uses them to describe alternative options in life, and
to designate that pejoratively "worldly" as opposed to "a
purely secular transcendence.He confuses the issue again,
however when he insists that "theology must not simply concern
itself with man: It must not be reduced to ethics, not even a
Jesus ethic."*^
Kee wants theology to be able to entertain "larger issues
202
too." Theology which does this he calls an "escalating
theology" and as such it goes beyond the discussion about
immanence or transcendence to the question—"the mysterious and
awesome question:" "What kind of reality is it which invites
203
faith in transcendence and then confirms that faith?"
Despite the elusive shadow of bigger and better things to
come in Kee's development, he must be classed with Van Buren
and Braun as a Category I atheist. With them he searches for
new and non-theistic uses of the word "God" or understandings
of the use of that word. In this process there is awareness of
the elusive depths of human existence, and an unwillingness to
let go of them when briefly grasped if not to actively search
199. Ibid., p. 195
200. Ibid., pp. xxvii-xxviii
201. Ibid., p. 225
202. Ibid.
203. Ibid., p. 231
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them out. Yet for all its mystery, Kee finds no hint of God in
that existence and asserts only a transcendence which must find
meaning without him.
Summary
In conclusion, we can point out that Van Buren, Hamilton,
Kee and Braun can be seen to abandon theism and turn their
attention upon the world, man and those Christian materials which
are servicable to this activity. They deny God but continue to
show their concern for the affirmations made by others about
the reality to which the word applies or to which they claim it
applies, as well as to show concern for its rehabilitated use in
an atheistic context, Hamilton's evolution and complexity may
confuse his categorisation here, but one clear direction of his
thought firmly lodges him with the other Category I atheists,
Vahanian, Solle, and, in a qualified sense, Weil and
Bonhoeffer, represent an awareness that man's condition imposes
atheism. For Vahanian and Solle this results from a situation
in culture or the Zeitgeist which makes the old theism impossi¬
ble, Weil sees man as ontologically incapable of possessing a
God to believe in and Bonhoeffer sees man as having established
conditions which make God irrelevant and provide no place for
him, both agreeing therefore with Vahanian and Solle's diagno¬
sis but Weil for a different reason than the other three,
Altizer and Mallard reflect the dynamism of process
thinking to some degree in their visions of a divine change
actualising atheism metaphysically, Bonhoeffer must be willing
to assert change in God also, to sustain the implications of
his themes that God is making man live without him and has
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himself become a suffering and impotent reality, although it is
not explicit in his thought in the manner that it is in Altizer
and Mallard. Also, Weil's divine movement represents a process
although one pushing toward final negation rather than the
ontological affirmation of the others. Finally, Hamilton's own
efforts at a kenotic theology which sees God and Jesus in the
world is to be located here.
CHAPTER 2: Religion and the Secular
Being "Christian"
Within the definitions and understandings established for
this study, it is inconceivable, given the centrality of the
doctrine of God in Christianity, that one could use that tradi¬
tion "religiously" (our definition) without responding to that
doctrine in some manner or other. Those whom we have chosen to
consider in this study, responded, as we have seen, by
approaching the problems which the doctrine presents and by
denying that there is in the experience of variously, some,
many or virtually all modern men, anything comparable to the
orthodox and traditional meanings assigned to the word "God,"
We could hardly continue to call them religious atheists
however if the doctrine of God were the only one to which they
addressed themselves and contained the only materials from the
tradition which they used. Such is hardly the case, for all
wander through the broad spectrum of Christian doctrines,
albeit inadequately, superficially and brusquely much of the
time. Some take their Christian identity forgranted, such as
Bonhoeffer and S'dlle, only occasionally expressing a note of
defence in their presentation of their thoughts and perspectives,
Vahanian, who also usually appears quite sure of himself, is
probably reflecting only a momentary insecurity when he
insists that it is not sacrilegious to speak of the death of
God.1
Some, however, speak specifically to the issue of
Christian identity for the atheist, or for themselves.
1. Vahanian, "The Future of Christianity," op, cit,, p, 255
Simone Weil, for example, once said: "I do not consider myself
outside the Church as a source of sacramental life, but only
2
outside it as a social reality." Elsewhere she wrote: "I am
not a Catholic, although ... nothing that is Catholic,
3
nothing that is Christian, has ever seemed alien to me,IK
William Hamilton speaks of the "bewilderment and fury"
which meets radical theologians who have lost the God of the
Christian tradition but nevertheless persist in calling them-
if
selves Christian. He also notes that such a theologian does
persist because "he has an overwhelming positive sense of being
in and not out; that even in his unbelief he is somehow home
5
and not in a far country."
Sometimes a specific Christian belief is used to identify
the thinker as Christian. Hamilton tells us that all radical
theologians "are aware that some means must be found to stake
out our claim to be Christians" and that "attention to Jesus"
does that for him. Altizer on the other hand, believing that
"it is precisely the mediation between faith and history that
lies at the center of the Christian faith," insists that
"insofar as a Christian is undergoing a full encounter with
7
history he can by no means be judged to be non-Christian."
Altizer even goes to the trouble of defending the
Nineteenth Century vision of Nietzsche, Hegel and Blake "even
in its most atheistic expressions," as "a strange but radical
2. Weil, Seventy Letters, p. 172
3. Ibid., p. 105
k. Hamilton, "American Theology," op. cit., p. 6
5. Hamilton, "Thursday's Child," op. cit., p. 92
6. Hamilton, "The Shape of Radical Theology," op. cit., p. 73
7. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 133
form of the Christian faith" —an opinion consistent with our
definitions. Also, Altizer takes the offensive on the issue,
insisting that it is the proclamation of orthodox theology
which "is closed to the contemporary reality of the incarna-
9
tion." To Altizer, any faith vfhich cannot exist in history is
10
no longer Christian.
Despite the efforts—or lack of them—to apologise for
themselves, we consider the subjects of our study to be
Christians because they are religious in terms of the Christian
tradition. It is Christian myths, symbols, images, vocabulary
and so on which they use in their quest to arrive at an under¬
standing of themselves and their world. Thus, both to
demonstrate this further, and at the same time to show some of
the wider implications of their theology, we will look at a
number of related areas of Christian thought.
Religion
It must be recognised from the outset that what "religion"
means to the individual Christian atheist of this study in no
single case explicitly follows the meaning which we have
designated for it. The general development of thought along
this line has not, indeed, cohered into a common understanding
of the word among the Christian atheists either. As a result,
it is important to look at the meaning of "religion" and
"religious" as we find it in the subjects of the study both for
the sake of clarity (to avoid confusion between their use and
our own) and for the greater understanding of their positions.
8. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 20
9. Altizer, "Creative Negation in Theology," op. cit., p. 84
10. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 133
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1. Weil
Simone Weil spoke of the mystical and the overt or
institutional form of the Christian tradition as two separate
11
religions "within the same organism" indicating that her
understanding of religion, whatever else it might emphasise,
does not rely on those traditions one indicates by "the great
religions of the world" for definition. Positively, she tells
us that the promises of God concerning the performance "with
desire" of rites and liturgy which are a form themselves of the
12
"recitation of the name of the Lord," constitute religion.
Weil is, in other words, interested in the "soteriological"
properties of certain actions performed in a certain manner and
where the.se combined reveal the virtue of "saving" their
devotees, she is willing to regard them as religious (though it
should be noted that Weilfs concept of salvation is highly
personal and will be explained later). Clearly, however, she
does not intend religion to be a crutch for getting through
life for she asserts that "insofar as it is a source of
1
consolation, (religion) is a hindrance to true faith." ^
The effectiveness of the soteriological properties which
Weil considers to be the core of religion, varies from tradi¬
tion to tradition. All religious traditions "pronounce the
lif
name of God in their particular language" but some may be too
imperfect or their native surroundings too corrupt, or,
"through special circumstances" love for the religion either
11. Weil, Letter to a Priest, p. 69
12. Weil, Waiting on God, p. 117
13* Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 10*t
14. Weil, Waiting on God, p. 117
may never have been born or may have been killed, so that "the
15
adoption of a foreign religion is legitimate."
Weil's understanding of religion did not prohibit her
adding the adjective "true" to the description of religious
traditions. Those religions which conceive God's renunciation,
voluntary distance and effacement—"his apparent absence and
16
secret presence here below"—were those which were "true."
Here she is not referring to that validity which would relate
to whether or not a soteriological property were present in
them, but to the correctness of their portrayal of God. Impli¬
citly, this is but another way in which Weil shows that she
conceives no necessary connection between salvation and one's
position on the issue of God. However ineffective and untrue
the religion one uses, if it serves as a ladder to "the
highest realms of spirituality," it is natural that it will be
loved.1''
Weil believed that identifiable in the great religious
traditions of the past was "one identical thought ...
expressed very precisely and with only very slight differences
of modality." However, while she saw Jesus as "a perfect and
consequently a divine expression of it," she felt that it had
been almost destroyed throughout the Roman Empire and thus
"today requires a modern and Western form of expression." This
was the thought of a hidden and impotent God as against a
18
manifest and omnipotent deity.
15. Ibid., p. 119
16. Ibid., p. 88
17. Ibid., p. 119
18. Weil, Seventy Letters, pp. 159-161
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Religion for Weil, then, has to do with man and God, and
thus is atheistic in her sense of being atheistic, when it is
most valid or true. This matter of validity and verity however
would seem to imply that religion could display the full
spectrum of variations in this regard, as well as the possibi¬
lity of one person's individual actualisation of that religion
coming higher or lower on the scale than the religion as a
whole.
2. Bonhoeffer
Dietrich Bonhoeffer contrasts "religiosity" which seeks
"the power of God in the world" at times of human distress,
with a worldly interpretation of Christianity which directs man
to a "powerless and suffering" God by contrast. He thus sees
other religions representative of the former approach and only
Christianity pointing toward the latter. A Christian suffers
with God and "that is what distinguishes him from the heathen,"
19
Bonhoeffer insists.
Bonhoeffer would seem to be saying that religion has to do
with a God who by his power and domination, steps in and
corrects, alters or directs things when they have gone wrong
and man is in distress. This parallels Simone V/eil's own
insistance that religion should not offer consolation. Both
reject religion as offering a Deus ex machina. In Bonhoeffer's
thought here, Christianity when it is rightly itself is thus
20
not religious but worldly. Simone Weil does not reject
religion, on the other hand, but would regard what Bonhoeffer
19» Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 122
20. Ibid.
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considers worldly and not like religion, as a form—in fact by
her estimation the correct form—of religion which, whether
good religion or bad is still religion,
Bonhoeffer also discusses the religious act which he
believed was "always something partial" whereas "faith is
always something whole, an act involving the whole life," and
consistent with this he sees Jesus as calling men not to a
21
religion but to a new life. It is especially clear here that
Bonhoeffer has a very low regard for religion and that he would
seem to use the word to describe the practice of periodically
using materials or reverting to concepts connected with one of
the recognised traditions about God which offer him as a force
to be used in avoiding distress and bringing about an intel¬
ligible, secure and pleasant world. At one point Bonhoeffer
speaks of stages in the religiousness of man and the danger in
the challenge to man's autonomy of substituting one such stage
22
for Christ himself. Clearly Christ's present will and man's
autonomy have progressed beyond all past forms of religiousness
and, taking Bonhoeffer's over-all view, beyond even
religiousness.
At any rate, Bonhoeffer felt that Christianity had little
to do with religion. To be Christian is to be a man—not a
homo religiosus, he declared, and by this implied an acceptance
of and participation in the world which religiousness pre-
23
eluded. To Bonhoeffer, religion was metaphysical and
21. Ibid., pp. 123-12*+
22. Ibid., p. 108
23. Ibid., pp. 123-12*+
individualistic while Christianity has rested upon the
"religious premise" and "has always been a pattern—perhaps
24
a true pattern—of religion," but he felt that it was "more
or less the case already" that man had reached "the stage of
25
being radically without religion." He was not sure what all
the implications of this would be for Christianity but he was
sure Christianity was not to be identified by religion—it
could be religionless.
Despite this dominant anti-religious theme, Bonhoeffer
twice suggests that there may be a place for the preservation
of a "secret discipline" which would preserve from profanation
"the mysteries of the Christian faith." Such a secret
discipline he suggests would reflect "degrees of perception and
degrees of significance" or "the distinction ... between the
penultimate and ultimate." This begs identification with
Bonhoeffer's concept of participating in the suffering of God
by living fully in the world as it suggests a distinction
between those who understand that meaning of life and those
—still Christian but not religious—who have become oblivious
to it in an irreligious world even though they themselves may
actualise it.^^
3« Vahanian
Vahanian distinguishes between man's natural anti-theism
or idolatry and the phenomenon of religion. Thus he states:
"Whether he be religious or not, man always tends toward
27
idolatry." He thus concedes a non-religious idolatry but
24. Ibid., p. 94
25. Ibid., p. 91
26. Ibid., pp. 92 and 95
27. Vahanian, No Other God, p. 23
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also speaks of religion's own idolatrous character or
20
tendency. Especially with the death of God, Vahanian
believes religion is more conducive to religiosity than to true
religiousness,
Christianity in this situation, must either "overcome its
present cultural estrangement" and thereby become truly
29
religious, or "become an esoteric mystery cult" and thus only
a form of religiosity. If it becomes the latter he forsees its
becoming increasingly a private religion either on an individual
basis, or collective but spiritually segregated basis, "in the
suburbs of life,"^® However, Vahanian himself hopes that the
Christian church will become "the avant-garde of society" and
"the axis of culture" thus assuming the role properly played
by religion which would represent its success in overcoming
31
that cultural estrangement.
Our contemporary idolatrous religiosity "would preserve of
its heritage only its cultural aspects," Vahanian says, which
is why he considers the problem of God "the primary problem of
32
theology." Western religiosity in this present state appears
33
as "the paraphernalia of faith in God," and is seen as
gratifying a "sublimated loneliness" by means of "a substitute
34
sense of community, a counterfeit communion," In this state
35
our interest in religion is merely gossipy and irresponsible.
28. Ibid., P- 47
29. Ibid., P. 32
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., P. 99
32. Ibid., P. xii
33, Vahanian, "Beyond the Death of God," op, cit., p, 78
34, Vahanian, The Death of God, pp. 4-5
35, Ibid., p. 3
Thus Vahanian distinguishes between religiosity and
religiousness—the latter having to do with nan's attempt to be
faithful to God, but characterised by a natural inclination to
deteriorate into mere religiosity, which is idolatrous.
Methodological atheism, he implies, will best serve religion
during an era of the death of God.
k. Van Buren
Van Buren speaks primarily of religious discourse rather
than of the phenomenon of religion and in this context
concerns himself with the linguistic behavior and efforts of
those who call themselves Christian. Such men use the word
"God," thus situating themselves in a certain way and saying
36
something "about the sort of world to which one is related."
That men use the kind of religious discourse which Van Buren
calls speaking at the edges of language is, however, a
37
necessary but not a sufficient criterion of religion.
"Religions are similar," Van Buren points out, "in that
7O
they share the feature of language stretched to its limits."-^
Their dissimilarity he sees in their pushing "the borders of
language ... out to the point of near paradox, near nonsence,
and silence," as, for example, at the point of talk about "the
balance of nature," "the self," "a piece of human history" or
39
"talk about law or order." Ultimately however, the issue
raised by religion is that of choosing between "residing
exclusively in language's central plains, and exploring out to
36. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, pp. 69-70
37. Ibid., p. 115




some of its frontiers," Religious discourse as such is
primarily "moral discourse stretched almost beyond
4 1
recognition,"
With regard to the word "religion" itself he states that
it is used "for such a diverse family of cases that no single
l+p
definition, much less one analysis can hope to cover them all,"
Preventing positivism he cites as one of the aims of religion,
1+3
however, and morality and metaphysics he declares are related
to but ultimately distinct from religion. Given this
relationship to metaphysics and an anti-positivism in its
structure, he further believes that the dissolution of the
absolute means that religion must be much more guarded in its
speaking,^
Van Buren attempted to avoid religion in its anti-secular
46
character in The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, speaking of
the Gospel as "found in the areas of the historical and ethical,
47
not in the metaphysical or the religious," However, since
that work he has treated it as something of a sub-category with¬
in the broad secular scene, and not as the opposite of the
secular.
Ultimately, Van Buren portrays religion as proposing "a
48
way of looking at everything we have been looking at already,"
49
Specifically it "gives nature a shape" and "arranges history,"
40. Ibid,, p. 168
41. Ibid., p. 156
42. Ibid., p. 1
43. Ibid., p. 161
44. Ibid,, p, 166
45. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, pp. 41-42
46. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, pp. 17-18
47. Ibid., p. 197
48. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, p. 41
49. Ibid.
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Even when it cannot "provide answers to all life's questions,
it remains an important source of insight into life's problems
and possibilities,"^0
While Van Buren would not seem to see any necessary
connection between the word "God" and religion, it would
perhaps be fair to say that he would expect religious people to
make use of the word, Religion itself is a matter of a style
of mental life and attitude toward expressing how one under¬
stands life and exists in it. It seems to be a certain
predisposition toward life for which Van Buren has high regard
and not something for which secular man need apologise,
5, Hamilton
William Hamilton at one point makes the denial that man's
51
place during a time of "waiting for God" is before the altar,
and he speaks of the radical theologian's alienation from
church and the Bible, writing systematic theology and reading
52
theology in general. Likewise he does not see how the radi¬
cal theologian can take prayer, ordination or the sacraments
53
seriously. Instead Hamilton suggests that we work out "a new
way for men to be Christians in the kind of world we live in
54
today." Theologically he speaks of having only "a collection
of fragments or images not too precisely related to each other,
55
indirectly rather than directly put forth."
50. Ibid., p. 8
51. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op, cit.,
pp. *1-1-48
52. Hamilton, "Thursday's Child," op. cit,, pp. 88-89
53* Hamilton, "American Theology," op, cit., p, 7
54. Hamilton, "The Shape of Radical Theology," op. cit., p. 76
55. Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, p, 13
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These attitudes being considered, it is not surprising
that he suggests "the necessity of rebellion against religion
56
and the church." Ultimately for Hamilton, the radical
Protestant is moving "away from God and religion," and "into,
for, toward the world, worldly life, and the neighbor as the
57
bearer of the worldly Jesus."
When Hamilton defines religion, it is "as the assumption
. • • that man needs God and that there are certain things
that God alone can do for him;" or put otherwise, religion is
"any system of thought or action in which God or the gods
c Q
serve as fulfiller of needs or solver of problems." He
denies that it is thus necessary and insists that such an
opinion is part of the Protestant move from the Church to the
world, admitting to a heavy reliance on Bonhoeffer for help in
getting to "a truly theological understanding of the problem of
59
religionlessness."
This getting freed from religion is, for Hamilton, "post-
Oedipal, Orest^ean theology," and he defines Orestean theology
as "the end of faith's preoccupation with inner conflict, of
the struggle of faith, of the escape from the enemy God, of the
careful confession of sin."^ His definition of the Church as
"present wherever Christ is being formed among men in the
61
world," is to no small extent his alternative to religion as
characterised by orthodox theology and the institutional church.
56. Ibid., p. 135
57. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
P. 57
58. Ibid., p. ^0
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., pp. kj-kk
61. Hamilton, "Thursday's Child," op. cit., p. 91
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Hamilton, therefore, is anti-religious in the fullest
sense we have yet encountered. Religion represents to him
activities and values opposed to the move toward full identifi¬
cation with the world. Clearly, he thinks of it primarily as
an outgrowth of Christianity which is now obsolete and a
threat to the future Christian forms.
6. Altizer
Altizer has defined religion as "a quest for the primordial
beginning, a backward movement to an original paradise or a
62
sacred 'center.1" It is religious meaning of this order
which he now feels faith is called upon to negate,^ and to
64
challenge. Such faith is "conceived of as being directed
against 'religion,' against piety, against the interior
65
religious life of the church itself." Pure religion is
guilty because it "knows the sacred as an original, an
immobile, and an impassive reality," while for Christians
reality "is a dynamic, a living, and a forward moving
process.Religion, Altizer warns, "must necessarily direct
itself against a selfhood, a history, or a cosmos existing
6*7
immediately and autonomously as its own creation or ground."
Religion then is the contrary of the secular reality
Altizer theologises. Thus it is not surprising that he is
certain that the church cannot survive the triumph of worldli-
68
ness—that is, the death of God—in its traditional form.
62. Altizer, "The Sacred and the Profane," op. cit., p. 143
63. Altizer, "America and the Future of Theology," Radical
Theology, Altizer and Hamilton (editors), p. 13
64. Altizer, Mircea Eliade, p. 14
65. Ibid.
66. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 40
67. Ibid., p.I7?
68. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 127
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Also, he names the identification of Christ's body with the
Church "from the point of view of radical Christianity," as
69
"the original heresy." Altizer's on-going religious reality
is the Word "that is present upon the horizon of faith," to
which theology is "a thinking response ... and thus it is
neither a systematization or a mythical vision nor a
70
metaphysical or mystical system."
Christianity does not suffer the judgement or fate of
religion in Altizer's thought just as it does not in Bonhoeffer
Altizer cannot accept that this is a post-Christian age, for
the Christian cannot "dissociate the reality of his own time
71
from the presence of Christ." To do so affirms "the
traditional forms of faith (and) becomes a Gnostic escape from
the brute realities of history" because God's presence is gone
and the images of Creator and creation are ones to which the
72
radical Christian cannot respond.
One of the specific forms of religion which Altizer has
consistently condemned, even in his first work, is the non-
dialectical dualism of Gnosticism which isolates flesh from
spirit, light from darkness, sin from grace and the sacred from
73
the profane. This he soys, is "to embark upon a path which
must inevitably lead to a disintegration of every act of
faith."?2f
69. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 132
70. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 122
71. Ibid., p. 136
72. Altizer, "Theology and the Death of God," Radical Theology
Altizer and Hamilton (editors), p. 95
73* Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 12*f
7^. Ibid.
Altizer's treatment of Gnosticism reveals two different
uses which he makes of the word "religion," First he speaks of
religion which negates and reverses the profane in contrast to
75
a Gnosticism which isolates it from the sacred, but secondly,
he also declares Gnosticism to be "the religious danger of our
time,"^ In the latter "religious" stands for that general
"religion" which is opposed to Altizer's kind of radical world-
affirming vision; in the former it is used specifically of
religion which is backward moving, attempting to return to a
primordial sacred in the primordial time,
Altizer then, associates religion with the desire to
escape the present existence and seek the vision of some other
kind of place to which man might belong. It denigrates the
reality which man has in favor of a hypothetical reality which
he does not have. Obviously Altizer can only reject all
religion as world-negating, for by definition he makes it such,
7, Others
Dorothea Solle feels that religion has to do with "the
longing for meaning and purpose in life, the longing for
personal identity and for the kingdom of identity;" and she
77
believes that this cannot be satisfied by society. Thus
religion must at least partially transcend society and Sblle
would appear to approve of it as she considers her own theology
a contribution to that need.
Recognising that religion has various forms, however,
Solle notes that while older forms of religious experience than
75, Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p, 77
76, Altizer, "America and the Future of Theology," op, cit,,
P« 19
77, Solle, op. cit., p. 132
79
the present day death of God continue "tenaciously both within
and outside the church," they can be expected to diminish in
power and influence "the more man's social and natural ills are
78
eliminated," Thus the experience of the death of God does
not make religion based on other forms of experience super¬
fluous but does render them "merely the survival of something
79
man no longer needs,"
While Herbert Braun does not speak directly to the
question of religion, he does speak of discovering anew from
the New Testament "a definite type of relation with one's
fellow man" which would be "God" as he suggests the word be
80
used. This would seem to allow for many of the functions we
associate with religion: Biblical study, teaching, reflection,
ethical endeavor, V/e cannot therefore assume that he
possesses a categorical disapproval of it nor understands it
in another manner significantly different from this.
Mallard recognises that religion can be a force which
perpetrates "weird distortions" and he thus calls the Ghurch
"to be simply and courageously human," Although he speaks of
the Church's worship and sacraments he seems not to think of
them~when they are what he understands they should be—as
specifically religious and defines the Church itself as
ocurring "whenever men, in full awareness of their real or
potential danger to one another, nevertheless relate themselves
in the wisdom of faith," Activities specific to that Church,
he suggests, are valid if they "dramatise her secular existence"
78, Ibid,, pp. 141-142
79, Ibid.
80, Braun, op. cit., p. 215
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and signify the acceptance "of the conditions of life and
death that are given us,"^
A sharing of the rejection of religion as an anti-worldly
structure would seem then to underlie Mallard as well as Altizer,
with almost identical character, except that Mallard is
clearly trying to establish a wholly new interpretation of
Christian living. Thus while religion seems to be recognised
as a highly dangerous form from the past which can militate
against the crucial affirmation of life and the world, it also
has a potential proper form quite the opposite of that improper
one,
Alastair Kee tells us that religion has to do with "God"
and "God" has to do with a transcendence which is experienced
as "a personal encounter," thus if one does not believe in a
82
personal God, one is not religious. Yet, somewhat paradoxi¬
cally he speaks of a "new interest in religion" which "is not
a revival in theistic belief" but in the use of techniques
developed by religion for the exploration of the unknown
83
depths of one's own nature,
Kee also speaks of the fact that with the loss of
Christianity as a religion not only is there the loss of a
supernatural being, but a "loss also of every moral landmark
84
and every aesthetic point of reference," Thus he would
preserve all but the supernatural being and thus transform
Christianity from a religion to a "faith,Religion in his
81. Mallard, op, cit,, pp, 340-341
82. Kee, op, cit,, pp. 29-30
83. Ibid., pp. 220-221
84. Ibid., p. 117
85. Ibid., p. 34
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thought is thus clearly as undesirable as the supernatural
being who is the critical aspect which makes it religion.
Other aspects of religion may be of value and can be detached
from it without bringing their "religious" characteristic with
them.
Summary: Religion
We may say in conclusion then that Altizer and Kee are the
most unequivocal in their antagonism to religion, Bonhoeffer
deviates from this with his allowance for an informed and
conserving remnant; Hamilton deviates with his concept of the
Church as being wherever Christ is being formed among men in
the world (which seems to be a perpetuation of a religious
♦
reality thus formulated)} and Mallard deviates with his own
concept of the church as men's inter-relation in faith despite
knowledge of the dangers, Braun's theology must be considered
a variation on a concept much like these latter two despite his
failure to be specific here.
Van Buren, as we saw, came to an understanding of religion
which made it valuable and important. Similarly, Vahanian and
Solle recognise that religion may be good or bad, relevant or
irrelevant to society; and Weil recognises that it may vary
according to its validity; but all of these latter three also
accept and affirm a certain kind of religion.
Regarding what religion is about only Well and Kee link it
specifically to God, and although this idea occurs in Hamilton
it is not a major theme there. Despite their agreement on this
matter, Weil and Kee take diametrically opposed views as to the
resultant religion's desirability, Bonhoeffer, Hamilton,
Altizer and Mallard accept the traditional form of religion as
82
man's attempt to escape his real world# Vahanian, Van Buren,
Solle and Braun affirm its possible contribution to human life,
primarily because of the understanding of that life which it
offers#
The Secular
Weil is unique among our subjects in her antipathy to the
sort of attitudes which lead to an enthusiastic secularism and
thus it is not surprising to find her blaming "secularisation
and humanism" as the causes of Christianity without the super¬
natural and, in turn, asserting that such a Christianity can
86
only cause "the errors of our time." Nevertheless it should
be noted that her personal life shows deep involvement in areas
which would generally be recognised as secular—as, for example
the hardships of the labouring class—and her religious vision
requires such attention for the world one encounters,
Bonhoeffer's "religionless Christianity" built on man's
autonomy and the world's godlessness is precisely what later
theologians will designate as "secular Christianity#" His
general rejection of religion coupled with his affirmation of
this world and his denial of a deliverance from death, argue
for the belief that he should pose the secular opposite to the
religions in a dialectical structure, aligning himself with the
first against the second. For him it is the words "worldliness"
and "religionless" which bear the meanings usually assigned to
87
the word "secular#"
86# Weil, Gravity and Grace, p# 104
87# Bonhoeffer, op, cit,, pp# 125, 109, 120
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A basic distinction between secularity and secularism is
insisted upon by Vahanian who gives considerable attention to
this area. The former he believes is demanded of faith for it
"is the realm in which religion can show its relevance" while
the latter, secularism, "is a form of religiosity for which the
present and immanent are invested with the attributes of the
88
eternal and transcendent," Thus secularity is "the only
religious mode of being" but it is characterised by the
attitude of living "tanquam in aliena" ("as in a foreign land,"
Hebrews 11:9)—an attitude which is exactly the opposite of
89
that which characterises secularism,
Vahanian's development does not deny an authentic
worldliness which faith realises for the world by desacralising
90
the world or dedivinising nature. Such worldliness must
always in Vahanian's thought, however, be realised to be wholly
other than the transcendent creator and thus, while authentic,
and perhaps epistemologically autonomous, it is not ontologi-
cally autonomous. Therefore, when he calls for the consecration
91
of the world by culture he is seeking to avoid secularism
while desacralisation of the world seeks to avoid pantheism.
The mean toward which the two processes move is secularity.
One must not suppose that Vahanian's "secularism" is the
opposite of either religiousness or religiosity, for he denies
that true non-religion can be "an empirical datum of the
sociological or historical order," relegating it as a
88, Vahanian, The Death of God, p. 67
89, Vahanian, No Other God, pp, 8 and 18
90, Ibid., p. W
91• Vahanian, "Beyond the Death of God," op. cit., p. 11
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possibility only to the eschaton. Thus we must assume that
a Bociety can display religiosity and secularism at the same
time—and indeed it is precisely this combination which he sees
in our current cultural phenomenon of the death of God which
"marks the birth of secularism as a vector of the new
93
religiosity." ^
In The Secular Meaning of the Gospel. Van Buren tends to
treat secular and religious as opposites as we have noted,
94
preferring the secular and condemning the religious. This
changes however as he comes to recognise a valid religiousness.
Nevertheless, the definition of secularity in the first work as
"certain empirical attitudes," "interest in questions of human
life this side of the beyond," and "a lack of interest in what
95
were once felt to be great metaphysical questions," does not
necessarily shift. Thus even later we find Van Buren using the
word"secular" to denote "this-worldly experience and
96
conceptions."
Van Buren also recognises a pejorative use of the word
"secular," however, which designates men's impatience with any
questions except "those which admit of clear answers," and which
97
thus views man "as the problem solver, not the problem poser,"
—a view which he finds clearly inadequate. Secularism is also
taken by Van Buren as "a loose designation of a reaction to the
98
idealism of the last century," and as "the features of
transience, plurality, relativity and autonomous human
92. Vahanian, No Other God, p. 32
93. Ibid., p. xi
94. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, pp. 17-18
95. Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv
96. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p. 164
97. Ibid., p. 7
98. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, pp. xiii-xiv
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responsibility that mark contemporary Western culture." The
latter characteristics may apply as well to the Christian as
anyone. Van Buren insists.100 Thus, while early Van Buren
might be inclined to say one is either secular or religious,
later Van Buren would be more likely to think of men who were
secular qualified by a religious aspect, and men who were
simply secular.
William Hamilton follows Bonhoeffer in speaking of
worldliness and religionlessness and in affirming this as
meaningful and proper for modern man. Thus he speaks of "a
movement away from God and religion," but more importantly, the
movement "into, for, toward the world, worldly life, and the
101
neighbor as the bearer of the worldly Jesus." In Hamilton
therefore, secularity is the opposite of religion—"man's
arrogant grasping for God," and is clearly at one with the
autonomous and worldly man he saw Bonhoeffer describing and
102
affirming. Secular man in this context could not, by
definition, be either a theist or one deeply engrossed in a
search for God, yet he could be Christian by virtue of the
nature of his worldly life.
The secular and the religious dichotomy does not so much
apply to Altizer whose tendency is always to speak of essen¬
tially the same distinction in terms of the 3acred and the
profane. These two concepts represent aspects of our reality
which are in the process of becoming one as the sacred moves
99* Van Buren, The Edges of Language, p. 168
100. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, pp. xiii-
xiv, and 81
101. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
P. 37
102. Ibid., p. kO
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"more and more fully into the body of the profane." While
in the past these represented two existential choices, Altizer
forsees "a reconciliation of the sacred with the profane, an
10^-
ultimate dialectical synthesis." The reconciliation however,
is more properly seen as "the ever more fully dawning power of
the reality of the profane" so that the Christian "must finally
look forward to the resurrection of the profane in a trans-
105
figured and thus finally sacred form."
Altizer's vision is unquestionably world-affirming as is
Bonhoeffer's and Hamilton's but unlike their's he attempts, by
dialectical means, to bring the sacred into the dawning
worldliness. Even from his first book—from which he later
differs critically in other respects—his aim to identify the
sacred from which man has become alienated, does not change.
Thus if, ultimately, "the world is to be found here and nowhere
106
else," it is not without the sacred which has become
incarnate in it.''0'''
From the point of view of the issue of the secular, Solle's
theological development appears in some ways closer to ortho¬
doxy than the others, for her entire development serves the
purpose of preserving a place for God in this time of his
"death" and explaining the advantages of his temporary repre¬
sentation as weak and suffering. No explicit adjustment
appears to be made in the theology of man or his world and no
radical re-evaluation of the secular is undertaken by her.
103« Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 109
10^f. Altizer, Mircea Eliade, p. 103
105* Altizer, "The Sacred and the Profane," op. cit., p. 155
106. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 126
107. Altizer, Mircea Eliade, p. 18
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Christology and the doctrine of God are the explicit content of
her concern in Christ the Representative.
Nevertheless, there are implicit echos of far-reaching
effects in Solle's insistence that other religious experiences
than those of God's death and representation as weak and
1 08
suffering are no longer necessary. It means that man's
autonomy is at least temporarily allowed and accepted and that
man's natural capacity for belief (or lack of it) suggests a
format for the gospel presented to him. Thus, like Vahanian
she admits an epistemological autonomy even if ultimately in
some presently unknowable way there is no ontological autonomy.
Herbert Braun's article suggests that he too accepts the
mind and views of modern men with their inability to believe in
God or understand at all many of the New Testament affirmations.
Such a stance must be taken as "secular" although, as in
Van Buren's thought, by no means disallowing such religious
life as we have already indicated.
Again, Mallard develops a theme almost exactly like
Altizer's. For him too, secular existence is the context "in
109
which the issues of faith are realised." Ever since "the
110
world and its 'other' ... met in a dialectical coincidence,"
this has been so. Thus "with the Divine 'death,' existence
became either expressly or implicitly 'secular' knowing the
•sacred* as now specifically the tension of human freedom
111
toward its secular future." The result is the secularisation
108. Solle, op. cit., pp. 1^-1-1^2
109. Mallard, op. cit., p. 3^0
110. Ibid., p. 328
111. Ibid., p. 335
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"of all actual abstraction." In neither Mallard nor
Altizer therefore is the sacred cast off or rejected. Rather
it is integrated into man's continuing, but now a newly formed
and consecrated, secular reality.
Kee accepts the concept of "secular" Christianity also,
with Bonhoeffer and Hamilton, and with the correlated theme of
113
the abandonment of its religious overtones and form. Again,




We thus get a pattern of Van Buren and Braun providing for
something "religious" existing naturally within the overfall
"secularity" of modern men and, largely because atheistic, in
no way hostile to their frame of mind. Bonhoeffer, Hamilton,
Altizer, Kee and Mallard opt for a Christianity more clearly
characterised by its secular form than any religious form of
the past. Vahanian and Solle still recognise Christianity as
having to do with religion—properly— while granting a
validity to secular aspects of modern man. Weil alone defends
a religion opposed to a secular.
112. Ibid.
113. Kee, op. cit., p. 189




Simone Weil tells us that she "never wondered whether
Jesus was or was not the incarnation of God; but in fact • . .
was incapable of thinking of him without thinking of him as
God." Yet Jesus' crucifixion always seems to be, in her
thought, much more a cosmic image than an historical fact, and
the role of that image is a facet of the Divine. Insofar as it
is an event, the crucifixion represents an abandonment charac¬
terised on the part of both God and Jesus as "an abyss of love,"
so that Weil is inspired to say: "There we have the real
2
proof that Christianity is something divine."
As the crucified one, Jesus presents a link between the
awesome Creator and creation relationship under which we our¬
selves stand, and the mysterious Father and Son relationship
which constitutes the whole of a dynamic divinity.'* The
resurrection would destroy this link, but "those who have the
immense priviledge of participating with their whole being in
the Cross of Christ," may pass to the latter pair (i.e. Father/
Son as opposed to Creator/creation) and thus into "the secrets
k
of God Himself."
Thus Weil's crucified Jesus performs a crucial function
for man but is as well essential to the wholeness of divinity,
for he is, put otherwise, one end of the "infinite distance
1. Weil, Waiting on God, p. 22
2. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 79
3. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, pp. 195-196
4. Ibid.
90
between God and God"—-the furthermost point from God the
5
Father. As the "infinite distance" between the two points is
also "the totality of space and time" and as we are "a tiny
g
segment of this line," this vision could be designated as
panentheistic. This distance is however, a tearing of God, and
7
thus a cosmic and truly divine crucifixion. Christ is God in
the self-crucifixion known as creation by which he goes to the
infinite distance and furthermost point of his divine self-love,




Bonhoeffer came to believe that "the key to everything is
the 'in him,'" and thus "all that we rightly expect from God and
pray for is to be found in Jesus Christ." The difficulty
arises however in that "the God of Jesus Christ has nothing to
do with all that we, in our human way, think he can and ought
to do." In order to arrive at the God of Jesus Christ,
therefore, "we must persevere in quiet meditation on the life,
9
sayings, deeds, sufferings and death of Jesus."
Yet in his thinking about man's new autonomy, Bonhoeffer
faces the problem that man does not expect anything from God,
thus has no place for him and the problem becomes that of
10
reclaiming the world now come of age for Christ. Thus there
are two problems raised by the reality of Christ: How
5. Weil, Waiting on God, p. 68
6. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p. 197
7. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 81
8. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 28$ Waiting on God, p. 68
9. Bonhoeffer, op, cit., p. 130
10. Ibid., p. 115
91
autonomous and non-religious man might encounter Christ, and
when he is encountered, how to see in him the true God and the
valid expectations of that God which man might have.
so
J
Bonhoeffer's development around these themes is suffi¬
ciently incomplete that one has to follow him through many
unexpressed connections. Yet it seems clear that he saw
Christ's significance in offering a way to participate "in the
11
suffering of God in Christ." Thus Jesus does not offer "a
12
last refuge in the eternal" but a challenge to "watch with
13
me one hour"—to position oneself "with God in his suffering."
In such a theology Bonhoeffer's Christ, not unlike
Weil's, actualises the divine suffering, incarnates it and
demonstrates it, while autonomous man's lack of need for God is
thereby made irrelevant by virtue of the fact that a weak and
suffering God does not do anything for man but in Christ does
create a way of life for man which participates in that
suffering.
3« Gabriel Vahanian
Vahanian insists that "the Trinity ... was no shortcut
to God through the deification of the man Jesus—much less was
it, therefore, a shortcut to Jesus," and this, he adds,
"amounts to saying that one cannot talk about Jesus without
14
first talking about God." This is the opposite of Bonhoeffer's
point that one understands God by meditation on Jesus, yet it
could have been predicted, given Vahanian's belief in the
11. Ibid., pp. 123-124
12. Ibid., p. 112
13. Ibid., p. 122
14. Vahanian, No Other God, p* 34
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cultural collapse of the concept of God, for to Vahanian the
death of God, "rather than liberating Jesus from mythological
and supernatural fetters • • • delivers him up to historical
15
anonymity and alienates him from us irretrievably,"
Thus Vahanian has little to say about Jesus being
concerned, one must conclude, with the problem of God which
precedes direct attention to Christology, He does, however,
hypothesise that "the meaning of the New Testament insistence
on the necessity of Jesus Christ for God's accessibility to
man" is to be found in the Bible's way of speaking "of the
transcendence of God almost always as though it were an
16
'empirical' phenomenon," To him this connotes the truth that
"the word of man is man's access to the word of God: No man
can speak it, nor does any man speak who does not speak the
17
word," Such a truth, it should be noted, is an aspect of
that epistemological autonomy which characterises man.
In this latter context, Vahanian could possibly rely on an
incarnational concept of some form, but the reference is too
fragmentary to detect a Christology—if indeed he even has one—
in it. In speaking of the need to talk about God before
talking about Jesus however, he pointed out that even talking
about God could not be done "without being asserted at the same
18
time as a man of a given situation," and since we are situa¬
ted in the time of God's death and speak of it, one cannot see
how Vahanian could find a basis from which to speak of Jesus,
15. Ibid., p. 30
16. Ibid., p. 41
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 34
4. Paul Van Buren
In Van Buren's first book, The Secular Meaning of the
Gospel, written at a time when he avoided speaking of God at
all, he laid heavy emphasis on the belief that "questions
about •God* will receive their only useful answer in the form
19
of the history of (Jesus)." He credits this point to
Bonhoeffer, which we have shown is appropriate, and later
symbolises it through the analogy of an answer to a question
about the spirit of New York which is made by "telling about
20
the man whom we regard as the true New Yorker." Even later
when Van Buren writes directly about the word "God" and its
uses, Jesus seems to fill this role of signifying the fullest
potential meanings of man's life—some "whole" no other
individual ever quite achieves. Thus in The Edges of Language
he notes that "this man's life and death were said to have
eternal and universal consequences" in contrast to "almost any
historical occurrence which can be said to have consequences"—
but only normal consequences.^
If throughout his later development, Van Buren continued
to emphasise Jesus as a man about whom the most extensive
claims could be made, it remains true that we find the fullest
development of this in The Secular Meaning of the Gospel which
was written before Van Buren's growing interest in the word
"God" displaced it into a related, but no longer central
concern. In this work, Jesus is considered "fully man and in
19» Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p. 148
20. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p. 1j50
21. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, p. 124
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no sense 'more* than a man," but nevertheless "not to be
22
confused with other men." His uniqueness is seen by-
Van Buren in the fact of his being "the one man who truly
existed for others" and who was called "to be the one for the
many whereas the calling of all other men is to let him be that
23
for them: The way, the truth and the life." Also, Van Buren
notes that Jesus was obedient to this calling whereas others
are not obedient to their own, which constitutes a further form
2k
of his uniqueness.
This "existing for others" was described by the word
"freedom" and specifically, freedom "from anxiety, and the need
to establish his own identity" and "above all (freedom) for his
25
neighbor." Van Buren believed that this word best "summed up
the characteristics of Jesus" and unlike other words such as
"faith," "does not lead us so easily onto the slippery ground
26
of the nonempirical." Despite this latter sober concern,
Van Buren attempts to relate "the language of the Goapel" with
its "exclusive claims" and "universal aspect," to his view of
Jesus.^
Easter becomes the decisive event in the search for the
secular meaning of the Gospel which Van Buren undertook. For
the disciples it was a "discernment situation" in which Jesus*
freedom "became contagious" or, put otherwise, it became the
occasion of their suddenly realising fully the significance of
Jesus* life and death and, as a result of that realisation, of
22. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p. 3k
25. Ibid. *
2k, Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 123
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 139
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gaining themselves something of that freedom which Jesus had
23
shown." It v/as this post-mortem event in the lives of the
disciples which guaranteed that "the etory of Jesus could not
be told simply as the story of a free man who died," and
resulted in its becoming "the story of the free man who had
29
set them free."
"After the fact" the disciples saw Jesus' whole life and
his death as indicative of his freedom and naturally spoke of
his death "which was the consequence of his freedom to be
related to men ... as death 'for us.'"^ Also Van Buren sees
the nativity stories as representative of "the language of
thanksgiving, awe and joy over the fact of the coming into
being of this man," but as in no sense factual—an interpre¬
tation which, he suggests, would "threaten the doctrine of the
31
full manhood of Jesus.Nevertheless Van Buren allows that
speaking of Jesus life as a free man is the context for the
doctrine of his "human nature" even as speaking of his
"contagious freedom" and of "discernment situations" is the
32
context for speaking of the doctrine of his "divine nature."-^
5. William Hamilton
William Hamilton, like Van Buren, in his early stage,
turns to Jesus in place of an empty theism. Thus in The New
Essence of Christianity he portrays Jesus as "true man, man as
33
he ought to be," while also, like Bonhoeffer and Van Buren,
28. Ibid., p. 134
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 151
31. Ibid., p. 156
32. Ibid., p. 168
33. Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, p. 115
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he concedes only a "God as known in Jesus the Lord,"^
insisting that "if there is divinity apart from Jesus it is a
form of divinity that Jesus as suffering Lord corrects,
35
destroys, transforms."*^ While Van Buren would speak of Jesus'
divinity in terms of his unique and continuing effect on man
(i.e. discernment situations and contagious freedom), Hamilton
would speak of it as "God withdrawing from all claims to
power and authority, and sovereignity, and consenting to
become himself the victim and subject of all that the world can
do."*5
Hamilton therefore, sees Jesus as God's "full consent to
37abide in the world,"*^ and this is consistent with the image of
Jesus as suffering Lord, an image not without the tensions of
38
exaltation and lowliness, presence and absence. Hamilton
attempts to resolve these tensions by speaking of "two forms of
Jesus' lordship over the world:" The one "a lordship of
humiliation," and the other "a lordship of victory and power,"
the first being contemporary but the second being "a lordship
39
that is to come, or that we are to come to."
In later treatment of the meaning and significance of
Jesus, Hamilton becomes more secular and less decisive. Thus
we find him claiming "that the New Testament Jesus can in fact
be known, that a figure of sufficient clarity is available to
us so that discipleship to him ... is a possible center for
34. Ibid., p. 99
35. Ibid., pp. 86-87
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 81
39. Ibid., p. 109
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Christian faith and life}" and then lamenting that "the
theologian is sometimes inclined to suspect that Jesus Christ is
best understood not as either the object or ground of faith,
and not as person, event or community, but simply as a place to
If1
be, a standpoint." He even attempts to develop the concept
Zf?
of Jesus as to be discerned "beneath the worldly masks." At
the time of this latter development he directs men not to
"look for Jesus out there in scripture, tradition," but rather
Zf3
to "become Jesus."
Throughout the variable ways of speaking about Jesus which
Hamilton develops, however, there is a repeated theme of the
neighbor and being alongside him or being for him, or finding
44
our way to him. This ethical emphasis in Hamilton's most
secular moments seems somehow to crystalise something of what
Jesus means to him with, or without God, but it is not feasible
to construct a Christology or even a clear and full "Jesusology"
from these fragments.
Still, frustrating as it may be (much like his inability
to settle finally into a single clear atheism ) Hamilton
insists on the importance of Jesus at one moment as the means
46
by which he stakes out his claim to be Christian; at another
"because there is something there ... that I do not find
47
elsewhere;" and at another because "our way to our neighbor
40. Hamilton, "The Shape of Radical Theology," op. cit., pp. 73-74
41. Hamilton, "Thursday's Child," op. cit., p. 92
42. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
P- 50
43. Ibid.
44. Hamilton,"Thursday's Child^'op. cit., p. 92; "The Death of
God Theologies Today," op. cit., pp. 41-42
45. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
p. 48 (for example)
46. Hamilton, "The Shape of Radical Theology," op. cit., p. 73
47. Ibid., p. 75
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• . • is mapped out • . • by Jesus Christ and his way to his
neighbor." Even when the most that he can say about Jesus is
that he is "a place to be, a standpoint" he feels inclined to
reach back into his more orthodox vocabulary and suggest that
"this may be the meaning of Jesus' true humanity and it may
even be the meaning of his divinity, and thus of divinity
itself."2*9
The curious thing about Hamilton then, is that many clues
indicate a greater and greater movement from orthodox,
transcendentalist and pietistic Christianity, but throughout
this his involvement with the images and possibility in the
Jesus materials of Christianity remain firm. More than for any
other, they are in fact therefore, the basis for our categor¬
isation of him, even in the later stages of his work up through
the mid-1960's, as "religious" according to our definition
(which carries with it the adjective "Christian" by virtue of
Christianity being the tradition the materials of which he
uses) and simply "Christian" according to his.
6. Thomas J. J. Altizer
Altizer is yet another theologian who "will admit nothing
of what either the Bible or the Christian tradition has known
50
as God apart from Jesus Christ." In Altizer's thought this
is because of the "forward movement of the incarnate word from
God to Jesus, and ... from the historical Jesus to the
universal body of humanity, thereby undergoing an epiphany in
48. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
p. 48
49. Hamilton, "Thursday's Child," op. cit., p. 92
50. Altizer, Toward a New Christianity, p. 12
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51
every human hand and face." That movement signifies the
death of God—the God now identifiable with Satan—through the
52
vehicle of Christ's crucifixion# This "radically kenotic
55
Christology" Altizer states was begun with Bonhoeffer but it
was William Hamilton who first introduced him to the possibility
5k
of a consistent development of it.
Altizer's Christ is "the kenotic Christ who has finally
55
emptied himself of Spirit in wholly becoming flesh," and in
his new epiphany is "a Christ who has not descended from 'above,'
56
but who is wholly and fully incarnate in our midst.As such
57
he "is the fullness of time and the world," and thus he "can
never appear in a moment of lost time, nor ... be truly
58
present in any form of innocence."
"Incarnational theology" is another way in which Altizer
speaks of his unique vision, thereby emphasising the importance
59
of Jesus and the event of the crucifixion. It should be
noted here however, that such theology does not center on the
birth and conception events, but again on the crucifixion, for
"only ... in the death of the Word on the cross, does the
Word actually and wholly become flesh,"^° so that "God is
61
Jesus" because "God has become the incarnate Word." Incar¬
nation then, is a process realised in the death and not the
birth of Jesus.
51. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 83
52. Ibid., p. 101
53. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., pp. 135-136
5k» Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 11
55. Altizer, "Creative Negation in Theology," op. cit.,
pp. 83-8^
56. Altizer, Mircea Eliade, p. 18
57. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 156
58. Ibid., p.~5T
59. Ibid., p. 82
60. Ibid., p. 5k
61. Ibid., p. kk
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This theolpgy requires the repudiation of the resurrection
and ascension dogmas which would place Christ "into a
celestial and transcendent realm," and in their place affirms
^ p
a dogma of a descent "ever more fully into darkness and flesh."
In place of a discussion of Christ's resurrected body, Altizer
sees Jesus' new form as so radically different that "to the
extent that we imagine Jesus in his traditional Christian form,
63
we are closed to his contemporary presence." He does,
however, refer to Nietzsche's Zarathustra as "the resurrected
Jesus" in the same context in which he asserts that "Dionysus
6k
and Christ are one," thus using myth to give meaning to his
new conceptualisations.
As follows this "incarnational" and "kenotic" theology,
the process will lead to a point where we can no longer detect
the identity of Jesus. Thus Altizer does not give much
significance to the question of the present meaningfulneas of
Jesus. Rather he suggests that the contemporary Christian "is
perhaps now losing his ability to speak the name of either
'Jesus' or 'Christ,'" but Altizer insists, "even if the Word
has become unnameable it is not unspeakable, for we speak the
65
Word when we say Yes to the moment before us."
Still, Altizer himself is able to speak to "the uniqueness
of the original event or person of Jesus," just as the process
has not left him without a vision of the emptied transcendent
and kenotic movement of the sacred into the profane. This he
62. Ibid., p. 120
63. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 125
6k, Altizer, Mircea Eliade, p. 198
65. Altizer, "Creative Negation in Theology," op. cit.,
p. Sk
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says, "must in some sense lie in the fact that here and only
here a sacred event deeply and decisively affects the concrete
process of history, embedding itself in a particular and
contingent movement in such a way as to be indissolubly
identified with the actuality of its occurrence, thereby
abandoning the universal or eternal form that otherwise is
invariably present in sacred events.
Thus Altizer's Jesus takes on a significance of cosmic
dimensions, affecting the very form of the sacred. His own
historical reality seals the reality of the death of God in
historical time and likewise the reality of the incarnation of
the Word, resulting in the fully incarnate body of Christ in
67
which the Christian now lives liberated from transcendence.
Now "the names of Jesus and God are ultimately one" and God "is
Jesus as the expanding or forward-moving process who is becoming
,,,68•one man.'"
7. Dorothee Solle
In Solle's theology Christ is in every sense central, for
he stands between man and God, playing the role of a represen¬
tative in both directions during a time of the absence of God.
This "playing God's role in the world" as his representative
69
"is what incarnation means," she asserts. It is, however,
70
the role of "the God who is helpless in this world" and
requires a "doctrine of Christ's continuing representative
suffering" which depends upon the centrality of the Cross
66. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 57
67. Ibid., pp. 111-112
68. Ibid., p. 75
69. Solle, op. cit., p. 1^-1
70. Ibid., p. 150
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rather than the resurrection as the basis of the Christian faith
—the latter being regarded as "an anticipatory sign of hope"
71and not "God's final victory over his enemies."
Jesus* representation is interpreted as his having "kept
72
the future open for God," but this clearly eliminates "a final
Christ—a replacement who perfectly and completely secures for
73
us the reconciling grace of God." Thus Christ's representa-
7 If
tion is temporally incomplete, provisional,' and for God
75
"identity is still to come." In other words, Solle offers
Christ in place of God to men existing in the time of the death
of God, but not as an ultimate replacement since God is really
still living. Instead it is as a representative of God, a
theme which categorises Solle with those who argue that one can
understand Christ without first understanding God and be
related to God through Christ.
Solle's knowledge of God's absence does contribute to her
conception of Christ as representative, however, and Christ as
representative does not so much show us God (as Bonhoeffer's
Christ does) as keep a place for God. In these two senses her
theme varies somewhat from the others who turn to Jesus in the
face of the death of God.
8. Herbert Braun
Herbert Braun notes that in the world of the New Testament
"all the designations of dignity which the community applied to
Jesus in confessions—Messiah, Son of Man, Kyrios, Soter,
71. Ibid., p. 125
72. Ibid., p. 134
73. Ibid., p. 109
7^. Ibid., p. 107
75. Ibid., p. 134
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Logos—fit for the Jew at that time, as well as for the
religious person in Hellenism, into a firmly outlined system
of coordinates." Thus the question for them was not the
validity of the titles, but the validity of their application
to Jesus as opposed to other men. Such is not the case for
modern men who do not accept the validity of the titles
applied to any living persons. Thus, Braun says, if we
attempt to answer the question "Do you hold Jesus to be the
Messiah, the Kyrios," neither a yes nor a no can have "the
meaning which is, on the surface, attached to it in the New
Testament." Thus Jesus simply is a man, albeit one involved in
76
the same obligations as we.
9. William Mallard
Mallard is concerned to establish the difference between
"the passing features" of Jesus* ministry and "its true
significance" which he believes "lies in the Kingdom of God and
77
the truth and love that manifest the Kingdom."'' Thus he saw
Jesus as "a Jewish apocalyptic prophet" who "saw the world about
to be transfigured into the everlasting aeon of God's manifest
78
reign." This event did happen "but the outward form that it
79
assumed was unanticipated even by Jesus himself."
That form temporally is located in Jesus* crucifixion
which, by reason of his affirmation of "the meaningful
continuance of struggle," reversed the movement or direction
76. Braun, op. cit., p. 207
77. Mallard, op. cit., p. 326
78. Ibid., p. 32^
79. Ibid., p. 33^
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of the dialectic of existence from one toward resolution "into
the motionless Beyond," to one of the Kingdom of God*s movement
QA
"into the turbulent stuff of our physical existence." Thus
at his death Jesus did not return into nothing, but rather
"Nothing entered into him" and he "was carried forward
universally into the selfhood of the concrete human beings that
81
succeeded him on earth."
Mallard therefore can view Jesus as "the Incarnate
meaning of things," and his death and resurrection as the
Infinite negating "its abstract, meaningless form to become the
wonder of Christ-for-us in each moment of our free and decisive
82
striving." There is therefore a "twofold situation" in Jesus
crucified: The death of God which is the movement of the
kingdom negating the void and wrathful aspects of the trans¬
cendent; and thereby the actualisation of the human element by
reversing its passage into Nothing and by carrying Jesus
Q 7
forward into that human element.
10. Alistair Kee
In Alistair Kee's thought, Jesus replaces God as the one
who is personally encountered as a challenge-presenting reality
to the way of life which Kee calls the way of transcendence.
The Christian faith is basically the affirmation of this
8L
situation for Kee. Jesus becomes "the measure of all things,"
Q r
and "the very incarnation of the way of transcendence," not
by virtue of time having become cosmically fulfilled but
80. Ibid., p. 327
81. Ibid., p. 328
82. Ibid., p. 335
83. Ibid., pp. 327-328
84. Kee, op. cit., p. 143
85. Ibid., p. 211
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because, "on the contrary, ... of what came to expression
when he appeared" which Kee tells us was "the whole history of
86
revelation of transcendence" coming to fulfillment.
Kee sees Jesus therefore as the supreme representation of
the way of life and this way of life as one intended for
87
everyone. By the same token, he speaks not only of Jesus as
"of the utmost significance" but also of the necessity that
88
this fact be recognised if one is to be considered Christian.
Thus he affirms the traditional Christian confession that
"Jesus is Lord" insofar as it "is not primarily an ascription
of divinity to Jesus but a statement of intent to live the
89
life commanded by Jesus*1"
That one can point to Jesus and say "God is like
90
that" rather than the other way around, seems to be a
concession in his formulation which Kee makes for the theists
who enter into the Christian faith but it also indicates his
alignment on the issue of whether or not God can be known
through Jesus or Jesus must be known through God. The only
crucial issue in the Christian faith which Kee accepts,
however, arguing that it was the only issue "under debate so
far as the early Christians were concerned," is this: "Is 'the
way, the truth and the life' for men definitively revealed in
91
Jesus Christ?" The substance of Kee's theology is his
affirmative answer to this question.
86. Ibid., P. 214
87. Ibid., P* 135
88. Ibid., P» xviii
89. Ibid., P. 141
90. Ibid., P. 211
91. Ibid., P« XX
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Summary
It is clear that, with the exception of Vahanian and
Braun, Jesus represents an absolutely central symbol to the
Christian atheists. In Weil, Bonhoeffer, Hamilton, Altizer and
Mallard this importance represents their deepest interpretations
of the meaning of human existence. But the theme of Jesus as
an ethical model is strongly tapped by Van Buren, Hamilton and
Kee. Braun too may recognise the New Testament Jesus as a
prime example of right relations between men, but he does not
emphasise it so decisively as these three. Also, it should be
noted that while the ethical emphasis is less abstract than the
virtually cosmological aspects of Jesus for Weil, Altizer and
Mallard (and less so, for Bonhoeffer), it too bears deep
theological significance.
Hamilton's early use of Jesus is predominantly ethical,
it can be noted, but the later use has more in common with
Altizer and Mallard. Solle, of course, is most interested in
the theological role she assigns to Jesus and is thereby closer





Traditionally in Christian theology transcendence and
immanence were used to designate two aspects of God, the one
that aspect of God wholly beyond man's world and the other
the aspect of God which man encounters. In contemporary
thought this use has been undermined by a tendency to regard
transcendent as referring to God's realm and immanent to man's.
This shift in perspective is related to a reaction against
Divine isolation and therefore it is not surprising to find it
underlying much of the thought in Christian atheism,
Simone Weil, thinking of transcendence in the classical
Western sense, recognised that the concept seemed to be
contradictory in that transcendence "can be known only through
contact since our faculties are unable to invent it" but that
to speak of experiencing the transcendent is to qualify its
1
transcendency, A satisfactory definition of transcendence
would thus appear to be impossible to her, yet Weil does not
hesitate to use the concept, as for example when she speaks of
2
"the transcendental correlation of contradictories,"
Whatever precision and logical consistency such use may
lack, we can hypothesise on the basis of what we know of Weil's
thought that she regards all the Divine life as "transcendent"
except in its aspect of creation (which from our point of view
is worldly reality) which could be more properly regarded as
"immanent," The terms refer then at the same time to two
1, Weil, Gravity and Grace, p, 110
2. ibid., p. 89
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aspects of God as well as to two realms: That of man and that
to which man as man is not immediately related. Only, of
course, in some non-theistic system (pantheistic, panentheistic
or atheistic) could these thus meet and man's realm be an
aspect of God.
Bonhoeffer, when he spoke of "the 'beyond' of God" tells
us that this "is not the beyond of our perceptive faculties"
for, in his view, "epistemological theory has nothing to do
3
with the transcendence of God." He contented himself with
summarising this truth as: "God is the 'beyond' in the midst
if
of our life." Transcendence in Bonhoeffer's thought, there¬
fore, would seem to be interwoven with man's existence,
bringing something from outside to that existence, but not
remaining meaningful in terras of its "from outsideness."
One is inclined to say that Bonhoeffer really has a two-
faceted transcendence, the one facet responsible for "the
»
•beyond' in the midst of our life" where the emphasis rests on
a characteristic of human existence, and the other that "beyond"
itself in our life where the emphasis rests on that which
gives this characteristic human existence.
It would seem however that Bonhoeffer holds some of the
same antipathy for the concept of a transcendent reality which
he holds for religion. Thus when he studies the men in his
prison, to see if they still have any belief in transcendence,
he detects three notions: "1) People say 'Cross fingers' ...
5
2) 'touch wood,' ... 3) 'you can't run away from fate.'"
3. Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 93
k. Ibid.
5. Ibid., pp. 79-80
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He suggests Christian interpretations for these "as a
recollection of intercessory prayer and the Church, of the
wrath and grace of God and of divine providence."^ If his
rejection of an epistemological transcendence is matched to the
image of God present in these interpretations—a God of
authority who directs man's affairs and rescues him in his
difficulties—one has a fair representation of the opposite of
the God of suffering and weakness toward which he is moving,
Vahanian makes much of the move toward radical
iramanentalism in Western culture and believes a fundamental
anti-theism on man's part lies behind it so that it is in fact
interpreted by the rule "to kill God is to become god
7
oneself," An immanental God can only be an idolatrous
creation even as the true God by Vahanian's formulation can
only be a transcendent, wholly other, since Vahanian recognises
g
the formula: "Finitum non est capax infiniti,"
Nevertheless, Vahanian accepts what he calls "the Biblical
notion" of transcendence and insists that God's reality "must
be attested in the world and its empirical phenomena through
the structures of human existence, of man's works and his
9
word," He thus clearly faces the same difficulties as Weil and
is equally unconcerned with their ultimate logical resolution.
Van Buren, as one might predict from only a superficial
knowledge of his thought, shows no inclination to UBe or
6, Ibid,
7. Vahanian, The Death of God, p, 230
8. Vahanian, "Beyond the Death of God," op, cit., p, 12j
The Death of God, p, 231
9, Vahanian, No Other God, p. V?
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justify the concept of transcendence. On the contrary, he
rejects it because it suggests God is "beyond this world and
experience" when it is rather the case that words sometimes
fail to express what is known of precisely the ordinary world
10
of experience. Van Buren is one who cannot conceive that
e
ultimately in our use of language and experience we are either
omitting anything of which we can say something or that we are
11
leaving anything out.
William Hamilton critises an "otherworldliness" which
poses a geographical problem because "we fear, perhaps, that it
commits us to a belief in the existence of some space beyond
the known space of this world, and this we find hard to
12
believe." His own commitment is increasingly to immanent
reality however, despite the fact that he followed the above
opinion with an expression of his wish for an "otherworldliness
13
stripped of its geographical problems." Thus we find him
denying that any of his atheism is based on "the usual
assurance that before the holy God all our language gets broken
14
and defracted into paradox." Accepting no transcendent God,
affirming the imminent world, transcendence itself can hardly
be a problem for Hamilton.
For Altizer, process governs the problem of transcendence
for he declares that "transcendence has been swallowed up by
immanence," so that "no heaven can appear above the infinite
10. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p. 181
11. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, pp. 66-67
12. Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, p. 110
13. Ibid.




stretches of a purely exterior spaciality." "Absolute
transcendence" he tells us again elsewhere, "is transformed
into absolute immanence; being here and now ... draws itself
into all those powers which were once bestowed upon the
16
Beyond." The transcendent thus either becomes embodied in
17
"an absolutely immanent totality" or is "a power withholding
18
us from a total affirmation of the world." Ultimately
therefore, Altizer can regard transcendence only as an alien
19
power, now emptied and darkened.
While SiSlle is not explicit on this subject it is clear
that transcendence must Suffer the fate of the absolute to
which it is logically akin, and that therefore it must be
granted that it has slipped beyond the ability of modern men to
grasp and affirm it. Christ's representation saves us from
having to come to grips with transcendence by providing an
immanent substitute for the time being. Solle can affirm the
immanent and let transcendence go because of the function of
representation which holds its place in holding God's.
Braun clearly possesses no theistic transcendence with his
quite straightforward atheism, yet one wonders with his
emphasis on men's relations if he would not follow Kee in
speaking of what is essentially a form of self-transcending
behaviour. In principle however, while he might speak with
great inspiration of the right kind of relations his fundamental
15# Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 128
16. Altizer, "Theology and the Death of God," op. cit., p. 98
17* Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 153
18. Ibid., p. 155
19. Ibid., pp. 111-112
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approach militates against a use of the concept of transcendence
which would set it in opposition to immanence.
Mallard, like Altizer, as we have seen, envisions a
20
transfiguration of transcendence following upon the death of
God in Jesus* crucifixion, but he also summarises his view as
a panentheism in which God includes, but is more than-, all
21
things. Presumably Mallard's transcendence after transfigura¬
tion is still represented by the phrase "more than" for he does
not speak of the total loss of pure transcendence as does
Altizer. This would suggest that the divine process which
Mallard identifies, utterly reforms its immanent aspect but
it does not utterly abandon something of that indeterminate
aspect which theists associate with the transcendence of God.
The title of Kee's book alone is enough to give an
indication of the importance which he assigns to the word
transcendence, yet as we have already noted he rejects most
explicitly the meaning which it usually carries in a theistic
22
context. One would expect Kee to parallel Hamilton and
Van Buren in an avoidance of the term however, and the fact
that he doesn't should emphasise the context with which he does
supply the word, for Kee's use is ethical and ametaphysical.
Thus rather than referring to different realities or even
different aspects of God, it refers to different psycho-socio
patterns which form two opposing categories. That one which he
favors he regards as "transcendent" because it somehow requires
20. Mallard, op. cit., p. 33*t
21. Ibid., p. 338
22. Kee, op. cit., pp. xxvii-xxviii
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of those who attempt to integrate themselves into it a
conscious and sustained effort which the other, more natural,
category does not#^
Of course, in speaking of transcendence as Kee uses it,
one cannot forget his reference to that reality which invites
2k
faith in transcendence and then confirms it. In the end his
transcendence must mean more than ethics if we are to take this
final hint seriously, though one must assume there is such
consistency in even this that he does not, by it, readmit a
transcendent reality beyond man's world.
Summary: Transcendence and Immanence
The use made of the concepts of transcendence and
immanence by the Christian atheists is extremely complex.
Vahanian, Solle and Weil reflect the belief that the transcen¬
dent is utterly unavailable to man but Vahanian and Solle
provide an immanent aspect as the Word in the world or Christ
the representative, whereas Weil's immanence, man's world, is
an aspect of God. In this sense Weil's structure is rather
like Mallard's in that Transcendence includes but extends
beyond (though not in an utterly alien manner) the immanent.
Bonhoeffer, Hamilton and Altizer regard the world as
immanent reality to which transcendence, whatever it means, is
not alien. Thus one might say that immanence is the imminent,
real world and transcendence is its special quality or aspect.
Van Buren, Braun and Kee represent an ever further weakening
of the original use of "transcendence" for in their thought it
23. Ibid., p. xxvii
2k. Ibid., p. 231
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merely describes something special in the human experience of
reality and could not be used in a metaphysical sense at all.
Faith, Belief and Doubt
Belief for Simone Weil, is something she demands the
freedom to withhold, implying that belief is an intellectual
activity manipulated at will and unessential if not sometimes
25
even undesirable to the proper activities of the human mind.
Likewise she speaks of unbelief as something which is verbal
26
and does not penetrate the soul, and warns those who do
believe that the ability to do so is like mathematical skill—
"a mechanical effect of nature" not to be attributed to the
27
work of Grace. In other words, belief is not necessarily
something to be developed and, when being self-disciplined
about intellectual investigations, should not be engaged in.
On the other hand, Simone Weil believes that a comparison
of religions can only occur "through the miraculous virtue of
sympathy" which transports us to the souls of other men; and by
faith which transports us "to the very center" of the religion
we study—and she tells us that here she uses faith "in the
23
strongest sense." Faith would thus seem, with regard to
religious materials, analogous to the function of sympathy
toward men, and a device which aids the search for understand¬
ing. What faith grasps—its dogmas—"are not things to be
affirmed" but rather things "to be regarded from a certain
25. Weil, Waiting on God, p. 35
26. Ibid., p. 140
27. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 26
28. Weil, Waiting on God, pp. 117-118
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29
distance with attention, respect and love." Ultimately
Weil would seem to be giving us a principle of contemplation
30without affirmation with which to approach religious
matters.
Because of the indefinable boundary between fate and
providence, submission and resistance, Bonhoeffer speaks of a
31
faith which demands an "elasticity of behaviour." Thus he
regards certain actions as free of judgement or valuation when
we find faith fails to distinguish between what is providence
and thus to be accepted and what is fate and therefore to be
resisted. Faith, like God, is not the solution to all man's
problems. Nor is religion to be a pre-condition of faith,
32Bonhoeffer insists, so that religious dependence on a Deus ex
machina cannot be confused with Christian faith. This faith is,
in Bonhoeffer, something which a man may have but not something
which he may use as a crutch in the affairs of life. It is a
way in which he encounters life but not a book of insight or
inside information which will reveal to him life's purposes or
hidden meanings.
Vahanian makes much of the fact that faith and doubt are
co«-ordinates in the Christian tradition and that the Christian
33
faith properly provides for unbelief. One characteristic of
that religiosity condemned by Vahanian is that in it "faith is
no longer contingent upon unfaith," largely because faith and
and doubt have been severed making faith unessential to unfaith
29. Weil, Letter to a Priest, p. 48
30. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 117
31. Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 74
32. Ibid., p. 110
33. Vahanian, The Death of God, p. 7
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and doubt immune to faith. Thus the Biblical pattern of the
35
believing unbeliever and justified sinner collapses. ^ Both
not to doubt and to doubt in isolation from belief have the
same negating effect upon the Biblical pattern.
Faith thus has a role of mediation in Vahanian and this is
seen even more clearly when he speaks of faith as reconciling
"the two dimensions of existence—personal and impersonal,
36
internal and external—without unifying them." Also, faith
"attempts to define man in terms of a synthesis or as the locus
of a polarity and a tension between the absolute and the
relative, the universal and the particular, the world and the
37
self." Ultimately faith means "man does not live by logical
consistency" but rather, through it man comes to "the kind of
38
self-understanding" for which authority is a symbol.
Van Buren sees an embattled faith having lost the
justification of "classical Western theism" so that it "must
39
live by faith alone.With the dissolution of the absolute
it is challenged to a willingness "to see things in a certain
way without feeling obligated to say that this is the only way
ko
in which they can be seen." Belief likewise, should accept
the limitation of not telling us there is something other to
if1
see but only to propose a way of seeing. In our age, be¬
lieving is, Van Buren says, "a matter of behaving in certain
if2
ways, walking ahead with a certain lamp to guide one's feet."
34. Ibid., pp. 12-13
35. Ibid., p. 12
36. Ibid., p. 165
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p. 77
40. Ibid., pp. *f1-^2
41. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, p. k2
*f2. Ibid., p. 7Z
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Hamilton too describes an embattled faith, suggesting that
rebellion against God "may be the only way religious faith can
43
come," lamenting that we have not "enough faith or enough
44
truth to satisfy us|" and confessing that "our knowledge and
45
our faith are in bits and pieces." In a somewhat later
period he even denies that the radical theologian has any faith
at all but he does this in the context of describing such a
theologian as one who has willed to lose a faith with the hope
that his faithfulness will one day be transformed into an even
46
better faith.
Hamilton has defined faith as "the way the Christian
affirms the past and appropriates the meaning of certain past
47
events deemed to be significant," but he does not see this as
characteristic of the radical theologian. He has also said,
however, that faith is the hope that God "will no longer be
48
absent from us" and is "a cry to the absent God." Finally,
Hamilton relates faith to doubt which he sees as a way to faith
used by many and as something never finally overcome by faith,
although he also insists that "these are two places, not one,
49
and a choice must be made between them" —a view Vahanian
would ascribe to religiosity if Hamilton pushed it too far.
Faith cannot, according to Altizer, survive the triumph of
50
worldliness in its traditional forms, and he assigns to it
43. Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, p. 135
44. Ibid., p. 25
45. Ibid., p. 31
46. Hamilton, "Thursday's Child," op. cit., p. 91
47. Hamilton, "Thursday's Child," as in original version:
Theology Today, January, 1964, Vol. 20 No. 4, p. 487*
This passage deleted from reprint in Radical Theology.
48. Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, pj 62
49. Ibid., p. 59
50. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 127
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the new role of identifying and affirming the death of God.
Yet it is difficult to arrive at a clear understanding of
faith in Altizer, perhaps because as he himself says, "a faith
that is truly open to the world can never be wholly or purely
52
•faith.*" Thus he conceives of it as independent of any
given "ecclesiastical tradition or . . . doctrinal or ritual
form," and as even existing without ''any final assurance as to
what it means to be a Christian, or what comprises the community
of faith, or what are the signs of Christian witness in the
world."55
54
Faith is neither unchanging nor confined to one form,
therefore, and the fact that "a whole new form of faith" is
being demanded by a movement of the Spirit which "has passed
beyond the revelation of the canonical Bible" to a whole new
55
revelation, supports this. This new form is essentially
Altizer's Gospel of Christian atheism: The affirmation of the
death of God, as we have seen, and the affirmation of the here
and now as the site of the incarnate V/ord.
Solle recognises that a theology of representation makes
Christ dependent on us and "we may even say that he puts his
God at risk, for he makes the truth of this God depend on our
56
assent." Yet she assumes that modern man can possibly give
his assent to this meaning of Christ whereas he could not to an
absolute God. It is clear in this that Solle recognises the
social and cultural form of belief, the fact that it exists in
51• Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 96
52. ibid., p.-TS
53. Ibid., p. 27
Ibid., p. 18
55. Ibid., p. 27
56. Solle, op. cit., p. 123
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a milieu and if belief is expected for something, that
something must be consistent with that milieu.
What modern man cannot believe and the cultural aspects of
that situation, are clearly recognised by Braun also, as when he
refers to the problem of the titles of respect which the New
Testament applies to Jesus. Yet he recognises a network in
which belief must function in the experiences of obligation and
relation and in redirecting our understanding of "God" along
these lines he is attempting to meet the situation in a manner
not unlike Solle.
Mallard would seem to make faith a kind of confidence
when he urges faith that life and death "find a significance in
57
the coming Kingdom of Christ." Also he urges an "acceptance
of the Cross and Resurrection" which is "an articulate,
intellectual act of •belief*" in its expression but a "trustful
confidence" in its essence which makes the acceptance a
58
"discipleship."^ Mallard's belief would seem to be the
ability to accept that the dialectical nature of existence has
a meaningful future. This would all seem to suggest that the
matter of faith and belief is a matter of will to reflect an
attitude of optimism and affirmation about life as it is
encountered.
Kee places much emphasis on a distinction which he makes
between faith and belief. The former, faith, he suggests
characterises our age and is something which one may choose to
59
have or not. Belief on the other hand, comes with our culture
57 • Mallard, op. cit., p. 341
58. Ibid., p. 339
59. Kee, op. cit., p. ix
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so that we cannot decide to believe, and as ours "is an age
without religious beliefs" and "in particular, belief in God
has disappeared," Kee finds it "tempting to suggest that
Christian faith might be presented today without belief in
God,"^ The Christian faith to which he refers here, is
defined by Kee as "commitment with ultimate concern to that
61
which came to expression in Jesus Christ" —namely what Kee
calls "the way of transcendence,"
Summary: Faith, Belief and Doubt
The most notable thing about our subjects is that none of
them treat belief as the acceptance of doctrine or dogma—
i.e, the catechetical approach. All of them retain a fluidity
which seeks to root itself deeply in the contemporary
experience of reality, either to draw its understanding of a
living faith from that or to discover the mode for interpreting
the traditional content into the new format. In any case,
while all are alive to the needs of commitment and involvement
there is no horror of contemporary unbelief and atheism, but a
determined will to respond to it, in it and even with it,
Han and His Proper Life
The self, for Simone Weil, is "only the shadow which sin
and error cast by stopping the light of God" and that shadow
62
she takes to be "being," • Here, as in other statements with
different images but the same point, she makes it plain that
man is not, in her view, ontologically autonomous, and that
60, Ibid,
61, Ibid., p. 193
62, Weil, Gravity and Grace, p« 35
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such "being" as he has is neither authentically his own nor
63
authentic being. Thus the only free act she grants to him is
6b
"the destruction of the 'I.,M The "I" is destructible
precisely because "in the ego there is nothing whatever, no
psychological element, which external circumstances could not
65
do away with."
The soul, however, is at least partially identified by the
love within it which is "divine and uncreated"—in fact, "the
66
love of God for God which is passing through" the soul. Weil
thus understands that to be a channel or medium which provides
for the flow of God's self-love is the sole purpose of our
6*7
creation. Man therefore must cause the fading and alienation
of all that he considers himself and must consent to being only
68
"a point through which God's divine love for self passes."
Weil refers to the process of man's willful abandonment of
his "being" as "decreation" by which he makes "something
69
created pass into the uncreated." She urges therefore both
the full denial of oneself and detachment—even from
70
salvation. Man's task is "to empty desire, finally of all
content, to desire in the void, to desire without any
71
wishes." Her view of man therefore is a view of an
ultimately unreal and inauthentic being which properly empties
63. Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 8?J Intimations of
Christianity, pp. 197-198
6b» Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 23
65. Weil, Waiting on God, p. 152
66. Ibid., p. 76
67. Ibid.
68. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, pp. 197-198
69* Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 28
70. Weil, Waiting on God, pp. 76 and 148
71. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 13
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itself of what it discovers itself to be so as to allow God's
self-love to flow without obstruction#
It is crucial to recognise however, that man does this by
himself loving both God, and also the world as utterly subject
to necessity, even though in the one case he therefore loves
what does not exist for him and in the other case what seems
most unloveable# In her language of negation Weil does not
allow men to turn their backs on the world in exchange for the
72
security of the divine but demands precisely the contrary#
Bonhoeffer speaks of being a Christian in terms of a
"plunge . • • into the life of a godless world" and "partici-
7X
pation in the suffering of God in the life of the world#"
Such a man does not use religion "to gloss over" the world's
ungodliness, nor is he Christian by virtue of some religious
7k
act. Rather, Bonhoeffer feels, the Christian man is worldly
in terms of "taking life in , . . stride with all its duties,
and problems, its successes and failures, its experiences and
helplessness,1^ He cannot become arrogant in success or led
astray in failure if, by living in the world, he is
76
participating in God's suffering#
As we have said, man is autonomous according to Bonhoeffer,
and a part of man's autonomy for which Bonhoeffer speaks is his
77
freedom from guilt —doubtless the same modern characteristic
78
as Vahanian makes note of and calls "the ethic of innocence."
72# Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p# 32^-
73* Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 123
7k, Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., p. 125
77. Ibid., p. 73
78. Vahanian, The Death of God, p. 193
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Men do not understand their difficulties in terms of sin and
forgiveness. Nor, Bonhoeffer suggests, was Jesus one who
brought people to an awareness of their sins but rather to a
79
vision of reversed values. With this emphasis Bonhoeffer
buttresses his opposition to inwardness—the great crime of
So
religious internalisation. There is no value in a ftyper
self-awareness yet an emphasis on 3in invites this condition.
Again Bonhoeffer would emphasise: Man is a whole and religion
tends to ignore this or to break down the unity by reason of
its characteristic reaching of only parts of human existence.
Salvation, Bonhoeffer sees, must apply to men in this
world for the whole which they are is a worldly entity. Thus
salvation is not a salvation from the world. The Christian
hope of resurrection "sends a man back to his life on earth in
a wholly new way," unlike a mythological hope which promises
removal from earth; and redemption is "redemption on this side
of death." Bonhoeffer thus suggests that it is improper to see
Christianity as a religion of salvation. He would prefer to
develop a Christianity without salvation as it is generally
understood, but with the possibility of attaining a situation
by drinking "the earthly cup to the lees" in which "the
crucified and risen Lord" is with him and he is "crucified and
risen with Christ." Whatever this cryptic formula implies, it
is not a preference for eternity over history or escape from an
8?
existence of suffering.
79. Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 115
80. Ibid., pp. 117-118
81. Ibid., pp. 112-113
124
Vahanian's "ethic of innocence" designates the attitude of
post-Christian man who pleads innocence "with respect to evil
and injustice" but who lives by "an atheistic ethic of respon¬
sibility and decision designed to establish the initial percep-
82
tion of innocence." This attitude is accompanied by one
which "so apprehends and construes this world that it is not
83
innately endowed with a religious or divine dimension."
Despite the changes which brought man to his post-Christian
phase, Vahanian sees his fundamental quest as unchanged, being
a quest "for peace and security, tranquility and prosperity,
84
both corporal and spiritual." Ke concedes that the means and
the goal have changed, however, with the shift of directions
85
from transcendental to immanental.
Vahanian's vision of correcting the present situation
which leaves man abandoned to atheism, religiosity or idolatry,
is one of cultural change spearheaded by the Church as the
86
"avant-garde of society, as the axis of culture." At
present the Christian faith is culturally estranged because of
8?
the death of God and it will not "survive or develop without
a • • . cultural reality manifest in all realms of the spirit
from theology to art and literature as well as on all levels of
88
life from morality to economics and politics." Just as we
were forced to a methodological atheism by the loss of the
cultural concept of God, we cannot return to theism without a
82. Vahanian, The Death of God, p. 193
83. Ibid. ~~ "
84. Ibid., pp. 190-191
85. Ibid., pp. 183 and 190-191
86. Vahanian, No Other God, p. 99
87. Ibid., p. 32
88. Vahanian, "The Future of Christianity in a Post-Christian
Era," op. cit., p. 265
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new, valid (i.e. transcendent) cultural concept. For Vahanian,
man's proper state is inextricably bound up with society.
Van Buren picks up on Bonhoeffer's opposition to
inwardness and religion's private character and portray's
faithfulness to "God" as "living by law, not in developing some
89inner state." He also speaks of the Christian as one "con¬
cerned for man" whose concern Van Buren calls a "humanism"
90defined by Jesus and his contagious freedom. Such a man has
a way of life containing "elements of wonder, awe, and worship"
91(he will also put it as seeing the ordinary as extraordinary )
which "is bound up with a basic conviction concerning the
world and man's place in it which bears directly on decisions
92
and actions." With regard to Jesus his relationship is one
of obedience and of letting Jesus be the way, the truth and the
life for him."^
Van Buren, in looking at man, is clearly most impressed by
the fact that man is a "linguistic being in a linguistically
92+
apprehended world," however. This is so true for him that he
even insists that "if there is anything beyond language ...
95it is unsayable and therefore unknowable." Also he is
fundamentally convinced of the fact that Christians are first
96
and foremost men, and men of our culture—thus also secular.
Van Buren's Christian is distinguished only by the fact that he
89. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, p. 75
90. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p. 160
91. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p. 170
92. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p. 101
93. Ibid., p. 5IT~
94. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, pp. 159-160
95. Ibid.
96. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, p. 168} The Secular
Meaning of the Gospel, pp. 81 and 1765 "On Doing Theology,"
Talk of God, Royal Institute of Philosophy, p. 61
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tends to see things in a certain way, he has been struck by
98
the Biblical story, or he belongs to a community which tells
99
a story of its past and looks forward to a particular future.
Still, he is always a man of this world and of this world only,
and his Christianity in no way changes that.
In The New Essence of Christianity, Hamilton sketched an
ethical spectrum stretching from rebellion and activism which
seeks to transform the world, to resignation, passivity and
suffering in the world—the whole of which was open to a
Christian from which to choose a style of life,"^^ He experi¬
ments with many other ways of understanding the Christian life
subsequent to this book, however, and that the subject seems to
be one of the major areas of theology for him is seen both by
his concentration upon it and by his belief that "ability to
shape new kinds of personal and corporate existence" may be the
101
crucial test of a theology in its own time.
One of Hamilton's developments centered on the concept of
a continuation of the movement, begun with the Protestant
reformation, from the cloister to the world. It is a movement
away from God and religion to the world and Jesus in the
102
world. Christian life in this development is characterised
as "discernment of Jesus beneath the worldly masks • • • (and)
103
as becoming Jesus," This theme is characteristic of
97, Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p, 156
98, Van Buren, "On Doing Theology," op. cit., p, 59
99, Ibid., p. 62
100, Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, p, 1^6
101, Hamilton, "American Theology," op. cit,, p, 7
102, Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
PP. 36-37
103, Ibid., p. 50
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Hamilton's attitudes and values which consistently place
ethics and men's relationships with each other in the center of
his thought# It seems the case, ultimately, that this is
precisely what Christianity is all about to Hamilton.
Altizer envisions the birth of "a new and liberated
104
humanity." Such a humanity wills the death of God as part




possible a yes-saying to human existence," loving the worl
in "a total affirmation of an actual and immediate present."
This love for the present finds "redemptive meaning" in the
symbol of Eternal Recurrence which provides us with a portrait
107
of "a new totality of bliss." Such a totality is absolutely
immanent yet embodies "in its immediacy all which once appeared
1 08
and was real in the form of transcendence." This totality
the Christian can name "as the present and living body of
Christ."109
It follows from this that Altizer can express himself in
terms highly reminiscent of Hamilton and speak of seeking
110
"that Christ who is real here and now for us." Likewise,
realising the radical nature of his view, he can speak of an
ultimate choice which the Christian must make between "the God
who is actually manifest and real in the established form of
faith," or the confession of the death of God and "a quest for
10^. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, pp. 20 and 111
105. Altizer, "Theology and the Death of God," op. cit., p. 98
106. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 155
107. Ibid., p. 153
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Altizer, Toward a New Christianity, p. 11
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a whole new form of faith," Altizer does not actually
grant validity to a form of Christianity which chooses the
first, as we have already seen. The new form of the Christian
faith of which he initiates an extensive portrayal becomes the
new form of valid human existence and self-understanding.
The critical issue about man for Dorothee Solle, is
portrayed by the problem in "the idea that the individual is
112
irreplaceable," As she states, "the heroic conception of
113
irreplaceability cannot survive the test of reality," for
114
men are irreplaceable only to those who love them. Thus she
develops the synthesis of the individual as irreplaceable yet
115
representable. This concept functions not only in Christ's
role as God's representative but also in Christ's role as our
representative, holding God's place for him on the one hand
during this time of what is from our point of view the death of
God, and representing us to a God who is absent on the other
, , 116
hand,
Solle uses the factors of personality and provisionality
to prevent representation from becoming replacement, and to
distinguish magical and technological representation from that
117
which is part of a personal transaction. The uniqueness of
the individual personality in such situations and the temporary
state of the arrangement, are sufficient guarantees in Solle's
111. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 1^7
112. Solle, op. cit., pp. 15-16
113. Ibid., p. 51
11^. Ibid,, p. H6
115. Ibid., P. 50
116. Ibid., p. 137
117. Ibid., p. 65
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opinion, that nothing of value is permanently lost in the
solution which she offers to man's ultimate problem—that of
his relationship to God.
It is clear that Braun, like Hamilton, would emphasise the
ethical, and the subtleties of men's relations with each other.
Braun expects that man can and will discriminate between what
he may do and what he is under obligation to do. With the help
of the New Testament and attention to these variations in
experience, Braun suggests that it is precisely in this aspect
of human existence that man encounters the most awesome
possibilities and meanings available to him.
Mallard reflects themes from Hamilton when he writes that
"the finding by man of his own Cross and Resurrection" will
result in Christ Jesus being "formed" in his interpersonal
*1 *18
relations. Mallard also affirms, like Bonhoeffer, man's
wholeness as a "totally existing creature, an 'animated body,'
119
not an 'encased soul.'" He asserts that "his existence must
be affirmed—the mystery of his birth, the contradictoriness of
his life, the reality of his death—if he is to know his
120
promise as creature." Thus in Mallard's view it is proper
to call anything sin "which in any way alienates a man from
decisively dealing with the issues of his existence in faith,"
and such a thing will be rooted in either "dreaming innocence
121
or despair."
Kee, like Vahanian, notes that the modern atheist may be
the possessor of a rigid and strict ethic, wholly as responsible
118. Mallard, op. cit., p. 339




as any, so that "it is far from clear that religious belief is
122
an advantage in moral matters," He thus speaks of two ways
of life, one "to which we hardly need to be drawn" and which
"seems to be the most natural life for man" so that it is not
so much that we choose it as that we simply find ourselves with
it "when we are old enough to realise that it is not the only
possible lifef^ and the other a way of life "by which we trans-
123
cend our 'nature,'" As he goes on to say, however, the
latter "may ultimately prove more natural, since in it we find
fulfillment."12^
Specifically, Kee believes men tend to be concerned with
"having a good time" and guarding their standard of living
125
rather than with "helping others, fighting for their rights."
He sees Jesus as a norm for this latter way of life, the way of
*12.S
transcendence, Kee suggests men reject this way because it
requires effort, and he uses the word "sin" to describe a
127
failure to accept Jesus as normative for their life style.
Yet, optimistically, Kee sees a growth of interest in the way
of transcendence in our age.12^
Summary: Man and His Proper Life
All the Christian atheists see man as being challenged by
and left with this life and only it in order to fulfill his
purpose, Weil's vision that man must love life corresponds to
the urgings of the others that man accept himself within the
122. Kee, op. cit., p. xxv
123. Ibid., p. xxvii
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid., p. 219
126. Ibid., pp. 218-219
127. Ibid., pp. 143-144
128. Ibid., pp. 219-220
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context of the world. Solle, Altizer and Mallard may hint that
human life possesses some meaning or significance not readily
understandable in light of its finitude but even they do not
formulate it as a "life after death."
Indeed, the significance of being Christian is
consistently developed in terras of what it signifies for man
living in the world. Hamilton, Braun, Kee and the early
Van Buren formulate this predominantly in terms of ethics.
Otherwise, as in later Van Buren, Vahanian and Solle, it has to
do with the verbal and thought structures man develops and by
which he then attempts to live. We see this in Bonhoeffer too,
although it is difficult to know what ethical meanings he may
have wished to be read into his vision of man "suffering with
God." In Weil, Altizer and Mallard, these structures are of
such magnitude as to be virtually metaphysical.
132
CHAPTER 5: Summary of Christian Atheism
The Way of Negation
There can be no question that Simone Weil constitutes
a class by herself. Her theology leads one into deeper and
deeper negations even amid the descriptive and affirmative
language and images. The tone, tension and direction of her
thought roots itself in the consistent ontologically negative
language of the mystics. As Altizer says, "no-saying has
surely been given a contemporary voice in Simone Weil,"
Yet insofar as this is true it is surely novel too for it
is a no-saying which does not oppose this earth in an embrace
of the divine unity. Rather man's proper relationship to God
is one founded on world-love, self-negation, abandonment of all
which one really is, Weil's no-saying is of the kind which
sees this world and this life as a facet of the divine life
but from man's point of view as the arena of detachment from
desires for the unearthly.
The Secretly Sacred World
Bonhoeffer began the line in which we place Hamilton,
Altizer and Mallard, This line urges the unrestricted affirma¬
tion of the world and human life and condemns anything or any
idea which would shift man's utter commitment from the present
existence which he does have. They write of this world and
this existence as somehow reflecting the values which in the
old theism were reserved for God, and they do this by speaking
1, Altizer, Toward a New Christianity, p, 105
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of God or Christ in the world in some manner which itself
utterly and unqualifiedly affirms what it finds there. Thus
affirming the world is faithfulness, not unfaithfulness to the
reality previously understood to be distinct from the world.
Qualifications are necessary. Insofar as he may have
understood that worldliness with only the presence of a
suffering and impotent God available is merely the condition of
fledglings having been pushed from the nest by a still trans¬
cendent and omnipotent God, Bonhoeffer might still be called a
theist. However, incomplete as his thought may be in Letters
and Papers from Prison, Bonhoeffer does not seem to be
adjusting the theology of God's immanent form only but of the
whole God/world view of theism. Thus Steeman can assert that
2
Bonhoeffer's adulthood of man lies behind modern atheism and
Schideler can suggest that if one wishes to see what the death
3
of God means one should go to Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer may be
less explicit in his atheism than one would wish for clarity,
but many have seen it there in what he wrote.
When: we include Hamilton here, we have in mind those
themes of Christ in the world and Jesus as a place to be, which
we recognise with Ogletree as having special importance in
if
Hamilton's later writings. It is impossible to tell the extent
to which such images contained a dynamic view of a divine
process such as Altizer develops with his kenotic theology but
2. Steeman, "Psychological and Sociological Aspects of Modern
Atheism," op. cit., p. 28
3. Schideler, "Taking the Death of God Seriously," The
Meaning of the Death of God, Murchland (editor), p. 110
k. Ogletree, The "Death of God" Controversy, p. 32
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it is certainly possible to see in them the seeds of such
developments-, and some sort of qualification on viewing
Hamilton as reflecting a progressively straight-forward and
hard atheism such as seemed to stand out at times in that same
period of his life.
Understanding Life Atheistically
Van Buren, Braun and Kee share in common a somewhat more
"demythologised" or "secular" approach to explaining the world
than any of the others. They are deeply concerned with the
pattern or style of man's life, although in Van Buren this has
a decidedly linguistic emphasis and in Braun and Kee an almost
solely ethical one. Something about life drives all three to
speak in the language of religious assertions and they display
a willingness to use the word "God" for that which strikes them
as most significant.
Certainly some would want to include Hamilton in this
category and Hamilton himself says nothing which would make
this unreasonable, and much, especially in The New Essence of
Christianity, which argues for it. We have accepted Altizer's
interpretation which suggests that Hamilton meant something far
more symbolic and mythical like Altizer himself, because
Hamilton does not deny it but goes to the trouble, rather, of
discussing how he differs from Altizer, and does so in a manner
suggesting that by-in-large he identifies his thought with much
5
of Altizer's tone and technique, although not with all of it.
5. cf. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
and Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 11
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Theism in an Ocean of Atheism
Vahanian and Solle share the distinction of believing that
the social and cultural climate does not permit a true theism
and that therefore some technique must be developed to see man
through this period. They develop a method which allows that
natural atheism to run its course and still preserve the
possibility of a return to theism with its absolute and divine
transcendence.
General Comparisons
Certain not insignificant generalities may be expressed at
this point. Weil, like Altizer and Mallard, discovers a
process in God which explains her condition of being without a
God. Weil, however, will choose precisely that which Altizer
and Mallard regard with horror and, in their theologies, from
which they will seek liberation: The negation of immanent
reality's ontological ground and autonomy. Thus in Weil's
thought God's movement of self-emptying and withdrawal demands
her atheism (setting aside here the further aspect of his
non-existence which also demands it); in Altizer and Mallard,
God's incarnation demands their atheism. In Weil the movement
of the Divine in relation to man is away fromj in Altizer and
Mallard it is a movement into. For all the net effect is the
same: "there is no objective deity upon the horizon of man's
reality and existence.
Van Buren, Braun and Kee are men whose atheism is quite
matter of fact, but whose view of human existence finds many
complexities in it and many aspects of it which lend themselves
to the challenges of the Christian faith apart from its
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theism, Hamilton would, at times, seem to want to assume a
straightforward atheism comparable to that of these three but
this aspect of his writing is not sustained or adequately
univocal to be accorded more than status as one of several
positions which he assumes. Like Van Buren and Kee, however,
he does give considerable time to demonstrating Jesus' unique
significance to modern men as a model,
Bonhoeffar and Vahanian make an interesting contrast,
Bonhoeffer sees God in Jesus, Vahanian denies that Jesus can be
available when God is not, Bonhoeffer affirms the full
autonomy of man and his world, Vahanian affirms man's ultimate
ontological dependence upon the transcendent even if he
recognises a necessary epistemological independence, Bonhoeffer
would see the end of Christianity's religious form but
Vahanian hopes the church as the vanguard of culture will lead
our civilisation back to a valid religious form,
A worldview which sees this world under the influence of
a transcendent one is essentially denied by Bonhoeffer,
Van Buren, Hamilton, Braun and Kee, Bonhoeffer's implicit
belief that man has not always been mature enough for God to
make him live without God's help is troublesome here and
raises the question that must also be raised with Altizer and
Mallard—namely the question of "when" or "how," Certainly
with regard to Altizer and Mallard the process of which they
speak constitutes an end of transcendent influence but not the
utter denial of itf insofar as past stages are concerned and
insofar as the incarnation of the Spirit or Word is a process.
In terms of this issue it is probably best to include
Bonhoeffer, as we have done, because the relevant qualification
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is not explicit in his writings; and it is probably best to
exclude Altizer and Mallard because a recognition of a process
originating in the transcendent is so explicit in their thought#
Weil, Vahanian and Solle share in common a sharp
distinction between recognising an absolute autonomy such as
Altizer formulates with special clarity, and recognising a
specifically epistemological autonomy. Because man cannot
know the reality on which he is ontologically dependent man is
thrown back upon the world as his source of everything and his
sole environment as man. They do recognise an autonomy for man
and the world but it is of a certain kind and its status is
conditioned in a manner man cannot participate in and is thus
irrelevant to him as such.
Vahanian and Solle, in sharing the problem of providing
for both the transcendent and the immanent realms, solve it
differently. Vahanian looks to culture, spearheaded by a valid
religious body, the Church, to lead men again to a place where
they will know and accept the transcendent with iconoclasm
rather than methodological atheism. Solle conceives of Christ
in his role as representative providing the mediation necessary
during a temporary period of the transcendent's absence or
apparent absence to men. Sometimes also in Hamilton we catch
this theme of a God, still out there somewhere, however incon¬
ceivable, whom we must try to reach by some process or "holding
action" until he becomes newly available—but the theme is
again inconsistent and in this case overshadowed by the finally
stronger ones of God's permanent loss and a new mundane identity
of Jesus.
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PART I: GENERAL SURVEY
B. Buddhism
CHAPTER 6: Preliminary Comments
Introduction
There are two closely related reasons for giving a
summary of the teachings of Buddhism in a thesis such as this.
Provided, of course, that it is a personal summary and not Just
a series of extractions from others' "Introductions," it will
reveal both the position of the author on controversial
matters and it will reveal the personal biases, attitudes and
approaches of the author. There is serious danger of under-
emphasising these, the effect of which could not be overem¬
phasised in a study of this nature.
Nor would it be wise to assume that the content of
Buddhist "doctrine" is clear and shares a consensus which would
silence all but the most argumentative interpreters. The
problem which Christians have always had in giving a simple
answer to the supposedly simple question of "God" is a superb
example of the innate difficulties which characterise the most
fundamental formulations and symbols of religious traditions.
Any interpreter of Buddhism who believes that the words which
he puts on a page are adequate to the fluid depths of religious
concepts in that tradition must be guilty of the most profound
misunderstanding.
Even where the English equivalent to the original
languages is relatively straightforward and reflects a long and
well documented history, one must be aware of the fluidity of
that word within its own cultural context and in the minds of
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those scholars who have accepted it. How much more so is that
the case when the tradition is one of utilising the foreign
word or words because no equivalent exists in our language?
Furthermore, such facile generalisations as "Buddhism is
atheistic" or "Buddhism is a world-denying faith" must expect
to encounter challenge from the scholars on many fronts who are
all too aware that a movement with a history of two and a half
millennium which has been given multi-cultural and multi-
linguistic development is not likely—indeed can never be—
monolithically one thing and not another.
An entirely separate reason for such a summary as this
should be understood to exist in precisely the need to expound
on the matter of whether or not, and if so in what sense or
senses, Buddhism is actually atheistic. On the surface it
should be simple enough to establish this matter, even if one
cannot assume a position regarding it on the basis of a
precursory view of Buddhist teachings. Indeed, most students
of Buddhism if simply asked if it is atheistic, would not
hesitate in giving an affirmative response.
Yet, by the same token, few students of Buddhism on
reflection would wish to leave that response unqualified. We
would even hazard the guess that most, having once begun to
express the qualifications, would end in frustration with the
question and the manner in which it poses the problem. At any
level other than the most superficial, which would be wholly
inadequate and undesirable in this context, everything said
about Buddhism and everything which it is claimed Buddhism says,
is debatable.
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A personal summary must necessarily be included therefore,
and it should reflect the author's own preferred language for
speaking about Buddhist things, understandings of the doctrines,
interpretations of the symbols, etc., and evaluation of the
variations within it. This is not a denial that there can be
an "objective" summary but it is a decided assertion that what
would be meant by an "objective" summary of Buddhism should not
be allowed to hide a certain inevitable and desirable
subjectivity.
At most an objective summary would reflect a wide base in
its sources, a respect for consensus and suspicion of highly
singular treatments (which should be accepted only if one is
prepared to offer a thoroughly formulated argument on their
behalf), and a caution born of the knowledge that no single man
can master all the materials belonging to a great tradition
such as Buddhism. It would by no means remove the inherently
subjective character of a sensitive and involved study such
as must be allowed if not sought in religious philosophy.
Finally, it must be stated that a summary of the basic
teachings of Buddhism is necessary here because Buddhism has
been considered with very specific questions in view, which
means that to some extent it is a specialised interpretation of
Buddhism. These specific considerations at the back of our
mind in the review of Buddhist teachings are the thoughts of
the Christian atheists, the difficulties Christianity is
presently undergoing which may have provoked or largely
accounted for those thoughts, and, admittedly, the possibility
of finding something in Buddhism as yet unseen and unexploited
which might add to the analysis and solution of these problems.
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Before beginning our summary, it is probably desirable to
emphasise a point already made. Our study of Buddhism was a
"book study." It was the result of neither direct personal
contact with many Buddhists or a Buddhist culture, nor of
primary sources. It depends on translations, interpretations
and observations of others. Finally, however, it also became
its own thing, reflected in what follows.
Two Systems
In contemporary Buddhist studies and translations
available to the linguistically limited Westerner, much is made
of the difference between the two major systems: Mahayana and
Hinayana or Theravada. Indeed, generally this division is
treated as absolute and the categorisation of the various
schools according to it is taken to be a matter of great
significance in understanding them. Although these two
divisions are represented by such diversities among the
various schools today that one wonders if the distinction is as
clear as it once may have been, the attempt is almost always
made to describe the two systems in terms which emphasise the
differences between them.
For the purpose of this thesis too, an account of each
system will be undertaken, but not so much for the purpose of
isolating and identifying schools and sects as for the purpose
of presenting some perspective on Buddhist thought which can
function for comparisons and contrasts in the study of
Christian atheism. We will therefore follow this two-fold
division, largely ignoring the Yogacara attempt at synthesis
and the substantive Tantric developments which are so highly
1^2
individualistic as to perhaps deserve, in some wider treatment,
analysis as a division beyond that of Mahayana and Theravada,
It will be noted also in the process that we prefer the
term "Theravada" to that of "Hinayana" because of the deroga¬
tory nature of the latter. It does seem likely that the
present day Theravada sects possess a tradition born in the
ancient Theravada school, but our choice of the name is not
intended as an argument for this theory which is likely to be
finally and fully demonstrated only with advanced archeological,
textual and linguistic evidence.
1^3
CHAPTER 7j Theravada General Teaching
The Theravada system relies fundamentally on the Pali
canon which is broken down into three divisions: The rules for
monastic discipline, the teaching of the Buddha and his monks
(which is subdivided into five collections), and the seven
books of later development containing philosophical,
1
scientific and psychological ideas. The Theravada possess
ancient traditions as to the source of these writings, but as
with Christian scripture, these have come under attack as a
result of the discoveries in modern scriptural criticism and are
generally rejected by Western scholars. One very practical
result is that it has become virtually impossible to be certain
that any of the strata of materials in the Pali canon
represent direct and accurate quotations of the Buddha (Gotama).
This is most important to the Theravada because they claim
to represent the oldest and most accurate form of Buddhist
teaching. In turn it is also important to Western studerts of
Buddhism because the Pali canon, and with it this bias,
represented the first tradition to gain a strong foothold in
the West which occurred prior to the full impact of modern
textual criticism with the result that to some extent Western
students of Buddhism have had to reorient their understanding of
Theravada development even as have the Theravada themselves.
In many of the older studies this bias is deeply ingrained and
must be met with the greatest caution.
1, Schumann, Buddhism: An Outline of its Teachings and
Schools (subsequently: Buddhism), pp. 3b-37
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The First Truth
Despite these difficulties there remains a body of
teachings extracted largely from the second division of the
Pali canon, called the Suttas, which is treated as the
teaching of the Buddha. This "Truth" which the Buddha taught
may be called the Dharma—a word which serves many purposes
as we shall see. The Dharma can be summarised in many ways,
but in the Theravada tradition, one of the most popular is
based on what is believedto be the first sermon of the Buddha
after his enlightenment (according to tradition). In this
sermon he described the world, or "samsara," as characterised
by "dukkha." The significance of this latter word in this
context is not easily grasped, yet it is fundamental to the
basic teaching with which we are concerned here. Most often
it is translated as "suffering," but one also encounters such
meanings as "pain," "a disquieting struggle," "unsatisfac-
toriness."2
In human terms, dukkha is embodied in birth, disease, old
age, death, union with the disagreeable, separation from the
3
agreeable, frustration in one's desires and goals. Lama
Govinda suggests that it is to be seen as "a part of our self-
created being, and not as a quality of the external world or
Zf
the effects of an arbitrary power outside ourselves." Thus
he can say:
2. e.g. Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit
Literature, pp. 156-157; Murti, The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism, p. 344; Nyanatiloka, Guide Through the Abhi-
dhamraa-Pitaka, p. 30; Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I,
P. 7
3. Dayal, op. cit., p. 157
4. Govinda, The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhism,
PP. 51-52
1^5
The suffering which Buddhism is essen¬
tially concerned with is—I might say-
cosmic suffering, the suffering
implicit in the cosmic law which chains
us to our deeds, good ab well as bad,
and drives us incessantly round in a
restless circle from form to form. In
short it is the suffering of bondage
The total understanding of this illimitable suffering is
interwoven with the two other "marks" or characteristics of
reality with which it is usually associated: The utter imper-
manence of everything and the ultimate soullessness of
everything—"anicca" and "anatta" respectively. The three are
really only different views of the same insight, and when all
three are spoken of with the intent of specifying suffering,
impermanence and soullessness, dukkha can serve to capture their
combined essence, so extensive is its meaning.
A brief look at anicca and anatta will readily reveal this
close relationship to dukkha and the inter-meshing of the three.
Anicca, as we have said, is the assertion that reality is
characterised by impermanence. Change is all-pervasive, "thus
things are different every moment; difference of time is
difference of thing, at no two moments is a thing identical."
The force of the teaching of anicca is directed at "the
illusion that there was an eternal, unchangeable, static
7
reality either in the visible or ideal areas of experience."
In adopting this as a mark of reality, the Buddhist is proclaim¬
ing that "if change is to be accepted as real, the abiding
q
permanent element must be discarded as unreal."
5. Ibid., p. 51
6. Kurti, op. cit., p. 71
7. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, p. 38
8. Murti, op. cit., p. T>2.
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Such a basic truth is utterly critical to man, for if he is
ignorant of the fact that "no phenomenon is permanent— nothing
abides;" then:
• • • his proclivities nurtured
accordingly, a man lives out of harmony
with himself, his fellows, his world.
He suffers.9
Anicca accounts for man's inability to hold on to and possess
any thing—even himself, and that inability is the source of no
small amount of man's physical and psychological suffering
whenever he engages in attempts to preserve or protect things
in his world. To say that ultimately nothing is permanent is
to recognise the inevitable pain of loss wherever pleasure is
caused by attachment to or desire for something. Thus anicca
and suffering mirror each other. To look into suffering is to
find impermanence, to look into impermanence is to find
suffering.
Anatta follows naturally. If everything is impermanent,
not only is man impermanent but all that he signifies, every¬
thing of which he is composed, all that he believes himself to
be is impermanent too. There is, in other words, no immortal
soul, no eternal and unchangeable entity in which he might take
sanctuary from anicca. This teaching is the sea], of the
consistency and totality of anicca, for it insists that "the
so-called personality consists of a congeries of ever-changing
elements, of a flow of them, without any perdurable and stable
10
element at all." There is no soul, there can be no soul
9. Welbon, The Buddhist Nirvana and its Western Interpreters,
p. vii
10. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. JE, p. 4
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and thus insofar as man desires to continue he is doomed to
the pain of frustration because of his own impermanence.
Treated even more broadly, anatta means that man too is
dukkha even as he is anicca. Thus in that first sermon the
Buddha makes the statement that "the five Groups of Grasping
11
are suffering," in reference to the parts of man which are
themselves undergoing perpetual change yet which never cease
to reflect man's instinctive grasping for permanence and being.




4, Mental Phenomena (e.g. forces,
drives, volitions)
5, Consciousness 12
This list constitutes one of the traditional ways of the
Buddhist to view himself, for in the functioning of each can be
observed the principles of dukkha, anicca and anatta. They are
devoid of soul and permanence and they receive and engender
suffering.
Further, they inspire the false notion of the self as
something essential, so that men think such things as:
This skandha [body, etc^} is I,
I_ have this skandha.
This skandha is the essence of me.
The essence of me is this skandha, 13
Properly seen, the skandha should help man understand that
"there is no soul at all, but the personality consists of
14
these groups and nothing more,"
11, Mahavaga 1, 6, 19; Schumann, op. cit., p. 39
12, Ibid., p. 42
13* Avadana-Cataka ii, 75, Ilff.; Dayal, op. cit., p. 73
14. McGovern, A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, Vol. JL, p, 83
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In this view of man, as Stcherbatsky points out, the
Buddhist discovered:
• . • a world consisting of a flow of
innumerable particulars, consisting on
the one side of what we see, what we
hear, what we smell, what we taste and
what we touch} and on the other side—of
simple awareness accompanied by feelings,
ideas, volitions, whether good volitions
or bad ones, but no Soul, no God and no
Matter, nothing endurable and substantial
in general. 15
As is explicit here, the impetus of dukkha, anicca and anatta is
toward a straightforward atheism. The three marks of the world,
summarised in the First Truth which the Buddha taught--that all
the world is suffering—present an understanding of man and of
reality which denies any eternal being whatsoever. Those who
see in the world the mark of any unchanging, personal being
would have to be, by this view, mistaken.
The Second and Third Truths
It is not, however, the end of the matter from the
standpoint of living beings to say that they are impermanent
and soulless, possessing only an empirical but not an essential
16
self. V/hile it is true that there is no "immutable, non-
composit, unconditioned, noumenal, absolute substance, exempt
17
from the law of change and causality," the Buddha proclaimed:
To believe that the doer of the deed be
the same as the one who experiences its
result (in the next life): This is one
extreme. To believe that the doer of the
15« Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I_, p. 5
16. cf. A Dictionary of Comparative Religion, Brandon (editor),
p. 7& (contribution by T. 0. Ling); Stcherbatsky, The
Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 21-22; Schumann, op. cit.,
p. 44
1?. Dayal, op. cit.., p. 74
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deed, and the one who experiences its
result, be two different persons: This
is the other extreme. Both these
extremes the Perfect One £the Buddha]
has avoided, and taught the truth that
lies in the middle of both • • • • 18
At issue here is the Buddhist teaching about rebirth, karma and,
in general, the way in which the effects of one lifetime are
perpetuated with some kind of continuity into subsequent
lifetimes.
The Buddha, in the scripture quoted directly above, dealt
with this issue by propounding the"paticcasamuppada," usually
referred to as the formula of dependent origination or
conditioned origination. This is the series of states which
follow each other, one after the other, in an endless cycle,
the twelfth becoming the predecessor of the first. Thus:
Conditioned by (1) ignorance are the
(2) karma-formations; conditioned by the
karma-formations is (3) consciousness;
conditioned by consciousness is (4) mind-
and-body; conditioned by mina-and-body
are (5) the six sense fields; conditioned
by the six sense fields is (6) impression;
conditioned by impression is (7) feeling;
conditioned by feeling is (8) craving;
conditioned by craving is (9) grasping;
conditioned by grasping is (10) becoming;
conditioned by becoming is (11) birth;
conditioned by birth there come into
being (12) aging and dying, grief, sorrow,
suffering, lamentation and despair. Thus
is the origin of this whole mass of
suffering, ^9
The Buddhist describes the relationship indicated by the
"conditioned by" as a case of: "This being, that becomes; by
18. Nidana Samyutta of Samyutta Nikaya, 46; Nyanatiloka,
op. cit,, p, 173




the arising of this, that arises." So long as the chain
remains unbroken, just so long will it continue to produce
itself, and it is the perpetual continuation of this chain
which constitutes the rebirth cycle.
As a comment oh the rebirth cycle which attempts to
illuminate how it is that both rebirth and anatta are true
(remaining faithful to the principles of anicca and dukkha at
the same time), the paticcasamuppada serves the limited
purpose of providing a conceptual structure for a type of
sequential continuity deprived, even as are the skandhas, of an
essential unity such as that designated by the term "atta"—
soul. In doing this the teaching of the paticcasamuppada also
illuminates the second and third truths of the Buddha's first
sermon: The truth that "tanha" or craving accounts for dukkha|




Tanha, also translated as "thirst" or "desire" as well as
x> w
22
"craving" is the eighth in the list of the paticcasamuppada,
and by focusing on it in the manner in which the second and
third truths do, the entire cycle of rebirths is seen as
resulting from the fact of craving—"craving for lust, craving
23
for becoming, craving for destruction." The second truth
therefore serves to focus the attention of the Buddhist upon
one link in his chain of rebirths while the third truth affirms
that to destroy it would be to end the entire cycle.
20. Udana I, 1; Udana and Itivuttaka, Woodward (translator),
p. 1
21. Nyanatiloka, op. cit., p. 159
22. e.g. Dayal, op. cit., pp. 239-2^2; Govinda, op. cit., p.
60; McGovern, op. cit., p. 175
25. Schumann, op. cit., p. 55
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The Eightfold Path
There remains of course, the manner of how tanha is to be
ended and this constitutes the fourth and final truths The
eightfold path. Thus the Buddha taught that samsara is dukkha,
tanha perpetuates that dukkha, to end tanha would therefore be









These are broken down into the three categories of wisdom (1
25
and 2), morality (3 through 5) and meditation (6 through 8)
—the three traditional areas in which the Buddhist understands
he must develop. In them the Buddhist finds the rule by which
he is to live just as the first three truths explain the need
for this rule and the purpose it serves.
The effect of the fourth truth of the eightfold path is,
necessarily, utterly pervasive throughout the entire life of
the Buddhist. Thus the significance of his religion goes far
beyond the acts of devotion represented by prayers, rituals and
ceremonies. The eightfold path sets before him an ideal,
internal and external, which he will attempt to realise insofar
as the circumstances of his life allow.
In matters of wisdom he will progress with the growth of
his understanding of the four truths and all that they entail,
2k. Ibid., p. 68
25. Ibid.
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although of course his knowledge and acceptance of the
principles of dukkha, anicca and anatta in some preliminary way
are prerequisites for they are the foundation of what the
Buddhist believes is the right view of the world. Nor can he
make the resolution implicit in the third and fourth truths (to
end tanha and thus dukkha by means of the eightfold path)
apart from his apprehension of the compelling reasons for that
resolution, as seen in the first two truths.
The ethics summarised by right speech, right action and
conduct, and right livelihood are guided by five basic laws:
1. Ahimsa, or the law against the taking
of life (all sentient beings are
included),
2. The law against taking what is not
given,
3. The law against sexual misbehaviour,
4. The law against all ill-mannered or
unnecessary speech,
5. The law against liquors which cause
mental inefficiency or deterioration.
The monk must further abide by the rules of the Order (Sangha)
and also must abide by an extended list of ten rather than
five laws of abstinence and read the third law as a prohibition
27
against all sexuality,
Buddhist ethics however are not ultimately delineated by
commandments so much as by the law of karma, a law of the
physical universe with moral implications. Thus while the
personality breaks up at death, the stream of karmic propen¬
sities flows on, bringing about new birth with its new
26, cf, Dayal, op. cit., pp. 199-204; Obeyesekere, "Theodicy,
Sin and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism," Dialectic
in Practical Religion, Leach (editor), p, 27; Nyanatiloka,
op, cit,, p, 44; Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p, 46
27. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p, 46; Dayal, op, cit,,
pp. 199-204
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personality and an environment somewhat the result of past
karma; and ensuring that possibilities in the lifetime ahead will
be effectively determined by that karma.
It should be remembered that the paticcasamuppada cites
ignorance as the condition for karmic formations. The Buddhist
also names as the cause of karma, three phenomena or three
"roots" ("hetu"): "Lobha" or greed; "dosa" or hatred, and
"moha" or delusion. These in effect are the most fundamental
conditions of karma, and karma, as we have seen is the
fundamental condition of the succeeding conditions which
account for the cycles of rebirths. This teaching parallels
that in the four truths, for it serves as another focus for
breaking the cycle of rebirths, indicating that the Buddhist's
path must eliminate these three "roots" or "hetu" of existence,
and in so doing "root out" the causes of conditioned existence.
Karma insures the inevitability of justice being done, for
all effects of all acts must, sooner or later, make their
appearance. As effects can be good or bad, Buddhists speak of
those which will result from good actions as merits and those
which will result from bad actions as demerits. The implica¬
tion of merit and demerit is twofold, however. In the
strictest sense merit cannot of itself break the chain of
karmically conditioned rebirths and thus it serves no final
purpose to pile it up endlessly. On the other hand the
achievements which will produce the Buddhist's final purpose
may be unattainable until by virtue of his merit he is able to
28, Govinda, op, cit,, p, 163
15^
gain advantages which will make them easier to attain. Thus
the Buddhist may seek to create merit and decrease demerit
despite the fact that such an endeavour is only indirectly
29
related to his ultimate goal.
Karma then, emphasises the personal nature of merit and
demerit as well as its imperishability,^ underlining the
continuity of each stream of rebirth cycles. Also, looked at
from the other side, karma minimises the characteristics
peculiar to this lifetime by placing the continuity in that
which, strictly speaking, transcends the immediate individual.
Egoism is therefore undermined, but responsibility is
reinforced.
Despite the apparent inherent tendency toward determinism,
the Buddhist does not believe it is implied by the law of karma,
for it is not that one's karma determines onefe behaviour, but
that one's behaviour determines one's karma, which is
31
important. Nor is karma "the exclusive determinant of one's
32
life-fate" even insofar as one is the recipient of past
effects. Responsibility more than anything else is indicated,
and thus Stcherbatsky can speak of "Buddhist free will" as "a
33
freedom inside the limits of necessity." Karma is a
determinant, but the teaching of the law of karma does not
constitute a determinism.
29. Spiro, Buddhism and Society contains a lengthy discussion
of the shifts in understanding and application of karma
teaching, cf. especially p. 79
30. Dayal, op. cit., p. 190
31. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. U-jk
32. Ibid., p. ^35
33« Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. 1^, p. 13*f
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Thus ethically, the Buddhist is guided by the abstentions
of the general moral laws, but theoretically he understands
that his behaviour with regard to his speech, action and
livelihood, must be based on the task's nature; The removal of
the root causes of existence. He must eradicate all greed,
hatred and delusion, thus eradicating in the process all
craving, ignorance, and ultimately, all karraic effects and
propensities. Clearly, this is not just a rule of behaviour
then, but a fundamental reformation of his deepest nature—a
conversion of the very structures and forces which produced him.
Meditation
Not surprisingly therefore, the final category of the
eightfold path commends meditation as a crucial aspect of
Buddhist development. Right effort, right awareness (or mind¬
fulness), and right meditation have to do with the Buddhist's
use of his mind—not just for the avoidance of misuse but more
significantly as an invaluable, essential and potent tool for
his task. As the Buddhist is the first to realise, "truth is
no easy thing to see," and thus the four truths and the
teachings contained in them may be a beginning point as
providing an initial right view and right resolve, but they
must be fully integrated and understood experiencially as well.
In the latter sense they represent not only material which is
cognised but a path for exploration of all the combined powers
of the mind.
3^. Udana VIII, iij Udana and Itivuttaka, Woodward (translator),
p. 98
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It is here that the issue of faith in Buddhism must be
resolved, for while faith may constitute a significant part of
the initial acceptance of the Buddhist's view of reality and of
the resolution to undertake the task, its role should decline
as meditation illumines and supports what was initially
35
accepted with the aid of faith# Thus we are told:
Well taught has the Lord the Dharma, it
is verifiable, not a matter of time,
inviting all to come and see, leading
to Nirvana, to be known by the wise,
each one for himself# 36
Conze suggests that a Buddhist may accept the following things
by faith:
1# The belief in karma and rebirth#
2. The basic teachings about the
nature of reality#
3# Confidence in the three "refuges,"
the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha#
*f# Belief in the efficacy of the pre¬
scribed practices and in Nirvana as
the final way out of all difficulties.-^'
These can be objects of faith, however, only because they
are propositions which "are founded in the fact that the
universe is the expression of certain laws" the truth of which
38
one can ultimately prove to oneself. As the fourth item
indicates most clearly, acceptance of these involves the will
and resolution to engage in the activity of verifying them—
that is, to follow the eightfold path with its emphasis on
meditation# Faith cannot finally be isolated from the process
of certifying the truth and validity of its objects, therefore#
35. Ling, Buddha, Marx and God, p# 3^
36# Visuddhimagga vii, 685 Conze, Buddhist Meditation, p. ^9
37# Summarised from a passage by Conze in his Buddhist Thought
in India, p. A-8
38# Ling, Buddha, Marx and God, p. 18
157
Necessarily meditation is far more than just the consider¬
ation of reasons and reflection on convictions arising from
those reasons, for that kind of activity "is placed on the same
footing on epistemological grounds as faith, authority, or
39
purely subjective considerations like likes or dislikes,"
Rather in meditation, the mind becomes a laboratory for the
testing of certain postulates—it becomes the context for the
empirical verification of the truths taught.
The actual practice of meditation requires effort and
discipline if it is to have the one-pointedness and other
characteristics which will produce its most important effects,
and it is to this fact that the fourth truth testifies when it
speaks of right effort, mindfulness and meditation. Initial
teaching therefore provides the structure for attaining the
skills desired.
The task is twofold in learning to meditate. It is first
a task of learning to use all the powers of the mind and it is
secondly, a task of then using them toward full enlightenment.
Typically the exercises reflect both aspects. Thus, as Ling
points out J
An important part of the Buddhist
practice of meditation is a relentless
analysis of whatever has an appeal to
the senses, and this harshly realistic
attitude strikes one at first as
providing a sharp and perhaps welcome
contrast to the flattery and seduction
of the senses,""®
39. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p, 276
40. Ling, Buddha, Marx and God, p, 19
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While disciplining the mind and its ability to concentrate and
work, this analytical activity also sheds light on Buddhist
theories about the person and the components of his existence.
Likewise the Buddhists devise lists of desirable objects
of meditation and analysis, such as 26 aspects of the four
truths, nine types of corpses (in various stages of decay), the
four elements (earth, eater, fire, air) and the colors (blue,
yellow, red, white, light), or even something so abstract as
ifl
"enclosed space," Such meditations must always involve more
than mental control and activity, for as Bloefeld points outs
• , • well-meant efforts will avail
the adept nothing; either he succeeds
in going some way toward negating the
ego and breaking down the obstructions
to the flow of intuitive wisdom, or he
does not, ^
If the meditation is not productive of this progress, it has
failed in its purpose and no justification for it can be given.
Meditation is not engaged in for ethical reasons but for
epistemological and metaphysical ones.
Meditation is nevertheless ethically helpful, for it
illumines the three bad roots and the way to their opposites.
It also assists man in the control of his insatiable craving by
bringing the full comprehension of its result to the fore, and
thus inspires the resolution to end the cycle of rebirths. Due
to his meditative achievements the Buddhist understands more
deeply what his condition is, how it is to be ended and why? and
such understanding forms the foundation of his external
existence—speech, action and livelihood,
*f1, Conze, Buddhist Meditation, pp, 14 and 1^3
bZ, Bloefeld, The Way of Power, p, 172
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Clearly, this is the level where ethics and meditation do
meet, for ethics are concerned not just with acts, but with
1+3
desires which instigate them as well —or precisely with that
vrhich meditation can reform. However, meditation is primarily
the producer of enlightenment, verifying the verbal and
conceptual forms from the vast reservoir of experience which it
provides, Secondarily meditation is part of the conversion of
the Buddhist which takes place progressively as he follows the
eightfold path. Thus one might say that the purpose of
meditation is scientific and the result is of both a theoretical
and practical nature*
It would be natural at this point, however, to ask after
the more general, social aspect of the Buddhist's conversion,
for the net effect of our discussion of ethics and meditation
and belief have made no mention thus far of what, in the West,
has come to be called "our social responsibility," It must be
apparent that the principles entailed in that phrase are not
absent from the Buddhist vision of his task and life style, yet
more specific aspects exist.
Meditation should ultimately result in behaviour which
embodies the ethical laws and concerns, not just in doing good
and living as intended, but in willing and desiring and
reflecting certain profound psychological states (for they are
more than what our term "attitude" generally connotes). Thus
the Buddhist seeks to reverse his fundamental greed, hatred and
delusion. Reversed he will see the world and himself as they
h~3+ Spiro, Buddhism and Society, pp. ^7-^8
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are and live in accord with that vision, devoid of grasping
desire, and embodying love.
Absence of desire, craving, grasping—greed—is what
Buddhist detachment is all about. Detachment is never ethical
indifference. On the contrary it is an ethical requisite. It
is, most simply, the abandonment of all senses of ownership,
the original delusion. Thus the Dhammapada says:
"These sons belong to me, and this
wealth belongs to me," with such
thoughts a fool is tormented. He
himself does not belong to himself}
how much less sons and wealth, ^
Or we have the exclamation: "Let us live happily then, though
45
we call nothing our own," In its fullness such an attitude
pervades everything in the Buddhist's existence and all of his
relations—within himself and to what is outside of himself.
Thus we are taught:
"He abused me, he beat me, he defeated
me, he robbed me,"—in those who
harbour such thoughts hatred will never
cease,
"He abused me, he beat me, he defeated
me, he robbed me,"—in those who do not
harbour such thoughts hatred will
cease.™
As the latter quotation makes plain, there can be no lack
of the ideal of love in the detachment of the Buddhist's
renunciation of all ownership and all claims to his special
relationships. Both love and non-ownership are to be paired to
each other, for the Buddhist ideal of love allows no "special
44, Dhammapada V, 62; The Dhammapada, Babbitt (translator),
p. 12
45, Dhammapada XV, 200} Ibid,, p. 32
46, Dhammapada I, 3-4; Ibid*, p. 3
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relationships," envisioning rather the perfect, universal love
such as the Christian "agape." The Buddhist sees this
manifested in three forms: "Metta," a loving-kindness or
"generalised friendliness for all creatures;" "karuna," a
compassion or pity for those who suffer (which indeed, all
existent beings do as declared by the truth of dukkha); and
"mudita," an empathetic joy or pleasure felt for the happiness
47
of others.
Thus Buddhism teaches not only that all sense of
possession engenders hatred, but that love is a necessary
counteraction: "For never does hatred cease by hatred here
48
below; hatred ceases by love; this is the eternal law." If
one has no special attachment to anything, one cannot hate the
cause of its eventual (and inevitable in one way or another)
loss; just as one's love for all things will reflect one's
deepest empathy with their dukkha—their own suffering,
impermanence and non-possession of even themselves.
Ultimately, the combined operation of the principle of
detachment and love means that:
The only thing that Buddhism can never
be is a private affair, since in the
Buddhist view there are no private
individuals. The aim of Buddhism is
inherently social in its concern; it
is to bring all men to nirvana; this
objective concerns society as a whole.^9
This is true of the whole of Buddhism despite the very different
ways that it found expression in the various forms of the
47. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 48
48. Dhammapada I, 5? The Dhammapada, Babbitt (translator),
P« 3
49. Ling, Buddha, Marx and God, p. 83
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religion, for it is the implicit fruit of the eightfold path,
becoming explicit and inevitable on the higher stages of that
path.
Needless to say, the Buddhist fully understands the
seemingly unattainable nature of this ideal and vision. The
end of the eightfold path where all eight are one; where
beliefs, understandings, convictions, behaviour, lifestyle and
all levels and facets of mind and consciousness are fully
integrated, is not after all, the result of one lifetime of
effort. Therefore we are told regarding the Dharrna we have
been discussing:
Just as , , , the mighty ocean flows
down, slides and tends downward
gradually, and there is no abrupt
precipice, so also in this dharama-
discipline the training is gradual,
the procedure is gradual; there is
no abrupt penetration of knowledge.
Nirvana
Nirvana—that which lies at the end of the eightfold path,
inevitably proves to be more problematic than the other
principles of Buddhism thus far. Partly this is because
nirvana cannot be the simple goal of the path, A goal is
something for which one strives out of desire and nirvana is
rather the result of the achievement of what is more properly
the Buddhist*s goal: The destruction of ignorance and craving,
the ending of the stream of rebirths, the eradication of greed,
hatred and delusion. These are the things which properly must
be done. To treat nirvana as a goal would be to make rt the
50, Udana V,v; IJdana and Itivuttaka, Woodward (translator),
p, 65 (Ohamma is the Pali form of the Sanskrit Dharma)
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object of desire and craving, to encourage its being treated as
a reward, to make its occurrence impossible by preventing the
proper conditions for it.
If one asks what Nirvana is then, in the sense of asking
the nature of the result of the Buddhist's achievement, one
would find no satisfactory answer. In the Dictionary of
Comparative Religion we are told that in its original sense and
usage it was connected with the verb "nibbati" which means "to
cool by blowing}" and the past participial form "nibbuta" was
used to describe the Buddhist ideal man: "He who is cooled"
51(from the fever of greed, hatred and delusion). This is
reflected in the following scripture:
As flame blown out by wind goes to
rest and is lost to cognizance*. just
so the sage who is released from
name and body, goes to rest and is
lost to cognizance,52
Perhaps the most famous scriptural references are those
which state:
There is, monks, an unborn, not
become, not made, uncompounded, and
were it not, monks, for this unborn,
not become, not made, uncompounded,
no escape would be shown here for
what is born, has beciome, is made,
is compounded,53
Monks there exists that condition
wherein is neither earth nor water nor
fire nor air; wherein is neither the
sphere of the infinite space nor of
infinite consciousness nor of neither
consciousness-nor-unconsciousness;
51, Brandon (editor), A Dictionary of Comparative Religion,
Item by T, 0, Ling7 p» ^69
52, SuttanipSta 2069-2076} Conze, Buddhist Thought in India,
P. 78
53, Udana 81} Conze, Buddhist Texts Through the Ages, p, 95
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where there is neither this world
nor a world beyond nor both together
nor moon-and-sun, Thence monks, I
declare is no coming to birth; thither
is no going (from life); therein is no
duration; thence is no falling; there
is no arising. It is not something
fixed, it moves not on, it is not
based on anything. That indeed is
the end of ill,5"
If nothing else, these make it clear that nirvana is not part
of that existence characterised by the three marks—suffering,
impermanence, soullessnessr—and this is sufficient to make
Buddhism a soteriological religion offering salvation from
continuance in these conditions. As Ninian Smart has observed,
therefore:
All that is required for the doctrine
of release is the individual's
capacity for release. Thus in the
Buddha's scheme of thought the possi¬
bility of nirvana takes the place of
the self,55
Because of the anatta doctrine it is clear that to the question
"what or who then is saved?" the only answer which can be given
56
is: "Nothing and nobody.""^ Salvation is then an ending of
dukkha, anicca and anatta and allows one to say only that
"there is no measure to him who has gone to rest; he keeps
nothing that could be named," and thus "all paths of speech
57
• , , are abolished,"
Needless to say, as with every retreat into ineffability,
this makes the subject of nirvana most problematic, Welbon's
54, Udana VIII, i; Udana and Itivuttaka, Woodward (translator),
p, 97; cf, Conze, Buddhist Texts Through the Ages,
PP. 94-95
55, Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, p, 38
56, Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p, 45
57, Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p, 79
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excellent work on the efforts of Western interpreters to
understand nirvana is ample indication of this, and he cites
Henry Thomas Colebrooke's statement of 1827:
It has been questioned whether
annihilation, or what other
condition short of such absolute
extinction is meant to be described.53
Of this he says: "For more than a century and a quarter the
question has remained for Western Europeans substantially as
59
Colebrooke framed it."




CHAPTER 8: Specific Theravada Teachings
The Dharma Theory
In the third section of the Pali canon, the Abhidharma, we
have the development of the Theravada pluralistic metaphysics®
Here "Buddhism discloses itself as a metaphysical theory
developed out of one fundamental principle, viz® the idea that
existence is an interplay of a plurality of subtle, ultimate,
1
not further analysable elements of Matter, Mind and Forces®"
These units "unite in the production of one stream (samtana) of
2
events" and it is this which constitutes the whole of our
reality including ourselves® The name which the Buddhists gave
to these "atoms" was "dharmas," the same word as is used for
the truth which the Buddha taught®
The dharma theory does not understand these units as
existing for any period of time® Rather they arise and pass
out of being "in the same instance" so to speak® Stcherbatsky
used the words "point instance" for this "event" which each is®
Thus the stream is composed not of on-going dharmas forming
complex groupings in constant flux and change, but of complex
groupings of dharmas which themselves are in constant flux and
change® As Stcherbatsky puts it:
Thus a moment becomes a synonym of an
element (dharma), two moments are two
different elements® An element
becomes something like a point in
time-space • • . • It, nevertheless,
admittedly represents the smallest
particle of time imaginable® 5
1® Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p® 60
2. Ibid®, p. 8
3. Ibid®, p. 31
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Stcherbatsky also approves one Buddhist formulation that "the
if
momentary thing represents its own annihilation."
Under analysis the dharmas are seen as fundamentally
timeless, spaceless and motionless:
But it is timeless not in the sense of
an eternal being, spaceless not in the
sense of an ubiquitous being, motionless
not in the sense of an all-embracing
motionless whole, but it is timeless,
spaceless and motionless in the sense of
having no duration, no extention and no
movement, it is a mathematical point-
instance, the moment of an action's
efficiency.5
Thus the formula "no substance, no duration, no other bliss
than in nirvana" recognises anicca as applicable to the final
and most basic and specific elements of existence and not just




This theory of Instantaneous Being has, as one might
expect, intricate development which fills volumns. Nevertheless
we shall confine ourselves to three aspects which merit our
attention here. First is the effect upon the interpretation of
the paticcasarauppada. Stcherbatsky writes of "the meaning of
elements' operation together with others" in this way:
This concerted life of the elements i3
but another name for the laws of
causation--the combined origination of
some elements with regard to other
elements. Thus it is that the
fundamental idea of Buddhism—the
conception of a plurality of separate
elements—includes the idea of the most
4. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logid, Vol. I_, p. 95 (from
Santiraksita)
5. Ibid., p. 87
6. Ibid., p. 109
7» Ibid., p. 79
168
strict causality controlling their
operation in the world-process.
The "theory of elements" ... means
that "if something appears, such and
such will follow.""
It is therefore the case that the instantaneous elements
were "linked together in an individual life only by the laws of
- 9
causal interdependence" (paticcasamuppada), and the patieca-
samuppada thus represents immutable cosmic laws which form the
basis of the endless cycles of lives.
The teaching of the paticcasamuppada serves to develop the
nature of the relationships between dharmas and to guarantee an
order to the sequence of dharmas. It tells us what type of
dharmas will occur after a given previous type. This of
course refers to those conglomerates or streams which consti¬
tute sentient beings and a clarification of rebirth can be made
from this development as well as of soullessness. The indivi¬
dual is thus never an individual, but an unbroken succession of
dharmas arising according to predetermined laws in a cycle
which cannot be arbitrarily broken or discontinued. The
dharma theory drives home the pathos of the three marks by the
consistency with which it applies impermanence, soullessness
and the resultant suffering.
The second aspect of development of the dharma-theory
which requires our attention is that of epistemology and
psychology. Dharmas which have to do with what we would call
"mind" are called "cittas" and "are to be regarded as
following upon one another in lightning succession within the
8. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 23-2^
9. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 93
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stream of consciousness;" and as such are a manifestation of a
reaction "to events ... or impressions received from
10
outside." Groups of cittas will form "the bare element into
which a thought complex may ultimately be resolved" and this is
11
called a "cetasika." Cetasikas in turn "are present in
varying numbers and combinations in every one of the possible
12
states of consciousness."
Theravada Buddhists have gone to great length to classify
and describe the states of consciousness, being particularly
interested in such questions as whether they demonstrate greed,
hatred and delusion or their opposites and whether they were
productive of merit, demerit, or were karmically neutral. Some
of these states, it was believed, could arise only on a higher
plane than that at which the ordinary consciousness of man
operates, but all of them lend themselves finally to analysis
13
as a stream of dharmas.
Still, how the states of consciousness condition each
other and are conditioned was a major concern of the Abhidharma
which developed its own method for analysis and the investigation
1 if
of relations. In its epistemological and psychological
speculation the goal and purpose was not forgotten. Thus the
ending of the flow of a stream of dharmas remains always at the
forefront and the result is a particular understanding of the
task in light of the dharma theory. This simply consisted of
10. Ling, Buddhism and a Mythology of Evil, p. 3^
11. Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, p. 237
12. Ling, Buddhism and a Mythology of Evil, p. 3^
13- Aung, op. cit., p. 8; Govinda, op. cit., p. 13*f
1^. Ling, Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil, p. 35
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the conscious production of those states of consciousness which
are karraically neutral or positive. As one might anticipate,
the highest states of consciousness are more advantageous and
can be produced in medilation on the level of ordinary-
existence.
Psychologically then, the task is to control and direct
the states of consciousness which arise, and while meditation
techniques are designed to do exactly this, all reactions to
external stimuli come under the same purpose. The Buddhists
could not confine their attention to the fully developed
cetasika but must understand in the minutest detail the
relationship between the object and subject in sensation and
perception.
Analysis applied to this area resulted in a 6 x 3 fold
division: Six types of objects, six types of sense organs, six
types of resultant sense consciousness. Thus these are:
1. The six types of objects:
Visual, audio, olfactory, taste
producing, tactile, mental.
2. The six sense organs: Eye,
eiar, nose, tongue, body, mind.
3. The six types of consciousness:
Sight, sound, smell, taste, touch
and thought. ^5
Categorisation of the senses and their objects (the first two
groups) in this manner is spoken of as the "ayatana" which
function within the understanding of the skandhas as already
discussed.
13« cf. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 108-109}
Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 13
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If the skandhas are viewed in light of the dharma theory,
they can be seen as "groups of constituent factors" or "a series
of momentary events, each such event standing in a causal rela-
16
tionship to the next." They can also be seen as reflecting
various levels and types of complexity of dharma streams. Thus
one commentator classes the fifth skandha, consciousness, as a
flow of simple, basic cittas—a pure consciousness—and the
second, third and fourth skandhas (sensation, perception and
mental phenomena) as cetasikasj while another commentator will
understand all five skandhas as representing a growing degree
of complexity and thus all be considered cetasikas or even
17
groups of cetasikas.
The third and final aspect of the dharma theory which we
must consider is that of nirvana and the understanding of it
which develops in this system. To understand nirvana in this
way it will help to point out that the dharmas we have dis¬
cussed thus far have been characterised by impermanence and,
when lumped in "composite products of existence," they may be
called "dhatu." This word has been used in three ways:
1. For the macro-composites of
the three planes of existence in
Buddhist cosmology: The kama-
dhatu, the rupa-dhatu and the
arupa-dhatu.
2. The six "mahabhutas" of earth,
air, fire, water, space, consciousness.
3. The eighteen phenomenal elements
(i.e. the six objects, six senses and
six consciousnesses).'"
16. Brandon (editor),_A Dictionary of Comparative Religion,
item by T. 0. Ling, p. 76
17. McGovern, op. cit., pp. 92-93| Murti, op. cit., p. 3^9|
Dayal, op. cit., pp. 69-72
18. Streng, op. cit., pp. 56-57
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Always it represents a related stream of dharmas or the
amassing of inter-related streams into incredibly complex units
of grouping. Some, as one can see from the above listing of
uses, will be of the type empirically known as "matter" and
some of the type known as "mind," Together, they include some
of the most popular and easily grasped analyses of what
constitutes the world, of what goes to make it up.
The dharmas which make up dhatu are, as we have said,
impermanent and conditioned, or "samskrta," and by contrast,
Theravada dharma-theory says, the dharma of nirvana is
19
asamskrta~i,e. permanent and unconditioned. By this theory,
nirvana is a dharma as is everything real, it is "an element,
20 , 21
a thing," and "a separate entity (dharma)," However it is
wholly unlike the dhatu dharmas for it is:
• , , reckoned as beyond these worlds,
• , , to be realised through the
knowledge belonging to the Four paths.
It is the object of those paths, and of
their fruits. It is called nirvSna in
that it is a "departure" from that
craving which is called vana, lusting.
This nirvana is in its nature single,
but for purposes of logical treatment,
it is twofold, namely the element of
nirvana, wherewith is yet remaining
stuff of life, and the element of
nirvana without that remainder. So,
too, when divided into modes, it is
threefold—namely, Void, Signless, and
Absolute Content, ^2
19, Murti, op, cit,, p, jkk. There are in fact three asamskrta
dharmas cited usually: "Space (akasa), nirvana, and the
cessation of elements due to lack of favorable conditions,"
20, Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol, _I, p, 507
21, Murti, op, cit,, p, 35^
22, Aung, op, cit,, p, 168, The Four Paths are the four
conditions known as the Stream-Entrant, the Once-Returner,
the Non-fieturner, and the Saint; having to do with whether
or not and if so how a man will be reborn, cf, Schumann,
op, cit,, p, 126
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When the condition of ^absolute calm," when "all cooperation
[the formation of composites by samskrta dharmasj is extinct
and replaced by immutability (asamskrta = nirvana)," is
23
achieved, the eternal dharraa of nirvana remains,9
t
In Theravada development it is in this context that one
can best understand the term "samsara" which is usually used in
speaking of "the world" in contrast to "nirvana," In posing
these two against each other in this manner however, it must be
remembered that samsara is made up of dharmas and nirvana is
also a dharma--albeit qualitatively different from the dharmas
of samsara,
o
The Theravada dharma theory utilises the vision of each
man, through his own knowledge, behaviour and meditative skill,
working his way toward that point when no rebirth-causing
defilements are to be found in the groupings and groupings of
groupings of dharmas which make him up. At this point the
unique dharma of nirvana is understood to characterise his
achievement. Unlike the dharmas of which a man is composed, it
is not characterised by dukkha, anicca and anatta. Also
nirvana admittedly by virtue of this, qualifies as "wholly
other," but a wholly other which is wholly impersonal, simple,
unrelated and also a dharma.
The dharma theory is realistic, but in much the same way
as an atomic theory is realistic: The dharmas themselves are
real. Things which are conglomerates of dharma streams are not
real ultimately, and their appearance as things real in their
23. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 61
17^
own right is therefore deceptive. Because of, and in the
context of the dharma theory, therefore, the phenomenal world
2b
and man himself can be spoken of as illusory.
The Buddha and the Religious Life
The Buddha, first and foremost, can be portrayed "as a
•saviour1 in the strictly limited sense that he had discovered
the doctrine (dharma) which, if properly applied, must without
25
any doubt lead to salvation." The limitation on the word
"saviour" is thus twofold: First in that the Buddha's aid is
characterised by his discovery which constitutes a human
achievement and secondly in that the Buddha's discovery is*, to
use a Buddhist image, an aid to a "safe crossing" (i.e. of the
"ocean" or "flood" or samsara) which is neither essential to
other's crossings nor unique—theoretically. That is, any man
has the potential by virtue of his humanity "to make a safe
crossing" by his own efforts and discoveries, and it is witness
to precisely this truth that the phenomena of the Buddha's own
safe crossing stand.
This individualism and adequacy of the individual is a
consistent stream in Buddhist thought and the force of the
teaching and belief is best observed in the last words of the
Buddha, when shortly before his death he directed his
followers: "Work out your salvation with diligence." Spiro
puts this principle well when he writes that "everyone, as the
Buddha put it, must seek his own salvation (with diligence)} no
2b» Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I_, p. 507
25. Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p. ^0




one else—not even the Buddha—can save him." It was to this
that Mrs. Rhys Davids addressed herself when she wrote:
The Buddhist sought in his discipline
to attain, not union with a deity,
but supernormal vision and power in
himself. Whether man, and woman,
originally made gods in their own image
or not, the Buddhist—the Indian
generally--hold the human mind and will
to be potentially god-like. Given the
right antecedents and the right training,
to man belonged the powers that had been
projected into deities. Thus do we see,
in the complex ideal of Arahantship, or
nirvana-under-present-conditions, a
super-normal evolution of faculties
combined with, not to say resulting
from ethical purity.
The arahant referred to here is one who has been aided in the
task of working out his own salvation by the Buddha's teaching.
The dynamic of the relationship is demonstrated by the
following lines from Buddhist Scripture:
The Disciple:
Alone, without support, 0 Shakyam,
I am unable to cross the great flood.
Tell me the objective support,
0 All-seeing One,
Leaning on which I could cross that
flood.
The Buddha:
Mindfully discerning the "nothing-
whatever-anywhere,"
Supported by the conviction "it is
not," you will cross
Having forsaken sense-desire,
refrain from talk.
Lock to the extinction of craving
by day and night. '
27« Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 61 (cf. Dhammapada XII,
165-166
28. n. Mrs. Rhys Davids "Introduction" to Compendium of
Philosophy, Aung, p. xx
29. Sutanipctta 1069-1076; Ccnze, Buddhist Thought in India,
p. 77 (the term "Shakyam" is a title for the Buddha
referring to his tribal connections)
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In his feeling that he cannot cross alone the disciple is
confessing his ordinary condition, for in Theravada Buddhism
it is accepted that those who achieve enlightenment without aid
are very rare indeed. Thus even from the context of Theravada
thought, Conze could not be faulted in his analysis of the
Buddha to the effect that:
It is true that to win enlightenment
the Buddha used only resources which
are open to all humans and not beyond
the capacity of human nature as such,
and that his powers are supernormal
merely because they are based on highly
developed moral purification and mental
concentration. But though the Buddha
was a human being, he was certainly a
most extraordinary one.^O
The difference between ordinary and extraordinary thus has
to do with the level of development which the disciple has
achieved and this in turn has to do with the qualities which he
possesses and the life conditions in which he finds himself.
Because of the Buddhist belief in rebirth, personal or environ¬
mental limitations which prevent enlightenment in this
lifetime do not qualify as final and absolute barriers to
enlightenment. Thus the disciple may readily admit that in
this lifetime he has no hope of making the crossing without
help and in that admission not be denying the belief that man
is capable of making the crossing without help or that even
with the help the final fact of the crossing being made is the
result ultimately of the individual's own efforts.
The basic truth of the individual's sufficiency and self-
responsibility is scripturally reaffirmed:
30, Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p, 39
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By oneself the evil is done, by
oneself one is defiled. Purity
and impurity belong to oneself,
no one can purify another. 31
Thus the Buddha is understood as having come to enlightenment
without the assistance of the Dharma, that body of teaching
which he himself formulated after his enlightenment and left to
serve those taking the same path he had followed. As a Buddha
he differs from his followers who achieve enlightenment in this
respect, and that difference is preserved in the different
titles: Buddha and arahant.
The difference between Buddha and arahant is also
preserved in the attitude toward the Buddha, the place accorded
to his memory, and the role which his image plays in the
disciple's own efforts. To recognise this is to pass beyond the
consideration of the Buddha's humanity and the difficulty in,
but potential of, others duplicating his extraordinary
achievement, and to enter that tenuous area of the religious
symbol and concept, of faith and devotion. The basis of this
extention is the result of the belief that the term Buddha
generally incorporates two further differences from the
arahant: 1) In the extent of the abilities and skills developed
and 2) in the use of those powers (including the powers of
insight and understanding by which the historical Buddha
created the body of his teachings) to assist others.
Buddhist "salvation" in terms of the image of the crossing
does not require all the skills and powers which can be
attained in its quest—some being unessential to that
31. Dhammapada XIII, 165j The Dhammapada, Babbitt (translator),
P. 27
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achievement but possible by-products of pursuing it. One who
attains to the minimal for enlightenment and freedom from
rebirth-causing defilements is an arahant but one who goes
beyond to master the whftle, is a Buddha. If the Buddha does
not use these powers to assist others, he is a "solitary"
(sometimes translated "silent") Buddha and if he does use them
32
to assist others, he is a "perfect" Buddha. While the former
does not function as an ideal, Spiro tells us that he found
where "there has been a long tradition of aspiration to
Buddhahood, the aspiration is for [^perfect] , rather than
[solitary^ Buddhahood.
In Theravada Buddhism however, the notion that one might
become a perfect Buddha is a notion which "staggers the
34
imagination," reflecting an almost unimaginable hubris.
Buddhahood is a remote possibility the remoteness of which is
magnified by the humble realisation of the Buddhist that it is
great good fortune and achievement to even have been born as a
human—for "most rebirths occur in the four 'states of woe'
35
(animal, demon, ghost, and hell)." Other rebirths than these
four states constitute the "five rarities" which are: 1)
Becoming a Buddha, 2) hearing the preaching of a Buddha, 3)
becoming a monk, 4) becoming a righteous man, and 5) simply
being born as a human."^
There is then, a tradition that while becoming a Buddha is
possible, it is neither essential nor likely, and the result is
32. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 60
33. Ibid., p. 62
3^. Ibid., pp. 62-63
35. Ibid., p. 67
36. Ibid.
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to maximise the significance of the Buddha's accomplishment and
the meaning of the state he achieved. Most immediately this
means that the Buddha becomes an object of devotion although,
as Conze has pointed out, "a Buddhist's devotions are not so
much petitions to a God, but a means by which he renews his own
37
courage and confidence." In this context the prime signifi¬
cance of the Buddha is that he, as a man, achieved what the
devotee desires to achieve; and even beyond that, the devotee
has the advantage of the Buddha's teachings to aid him on the
path which the Buddha had himself needed to traverse v/ithout
that aid. If there are those moments when even the Buddhist is
tempted to think that the state he seeks is unattainable, the
Buddha is then the guarantor of its reality and feasibility.
Here, of course, we refer to the state of arahantship and not
Buddhahood which incorporates but passes beyond it.
Not surprisingly the Buddhist speaks in the most honorific
terms of Buddhahood and the Buddha, as for example:
The Lord is truly the Arahant, fully
enlightened, perfect in his knowledge
and conduct, well-gone, world-knower,
supreme, leader of men to be tamed,
teacher of gods and men, the Buddha,
the Lord.38
The references here to "gods" denotes the inhabitants of a plane
(or planes) of existence parallel to, above, and differantfrom
our own plane in the same sense in which the Buddhist "hell" is
a plane of existence parallel to, below and different from our
own. The many postulated planes in Buddhist cosmology and the
37. Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p. kO
38. cf. Majjhima NikSya i, 37; Anguttara Nikaya iii, 285;
Visuddhimagga vii, 2; Conze, Buddhist Meditation, p.
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beings which inhabit them are of no theoretical importance at
this point as they all are part of samsara and share the
fundamental characteristics of it, thus requiring eventually
the same salvation or escape represented in the goal which men
seek. Thus the image of the Buddha going to the planes on
which the gods reside to teach them is comparable to the
Christian image of Christ's descent into hell to preach to its
inhabitants.
As an object of devotion, the Buddhist may also engage in
rituals and rites centered on the Buddha, as, for example, the
v/ater libation rite in which water is poured drop by drop from
39
a glass to a vase while a proper recitation is made, or by a
common Buddhist prayer such as the following:
I beg leavel I beg leavel I beg Leave!
By act, by word, and by thought, I raise
my hands in reverence to the forehead
and worship, honor, look at, and humbly
pay honor to the Three Gems—The Buddha,
the Dharma, and the Sangha—one time,
two times, three times, 0 Lord.40
As illustrated by this prayer, the Buddha forms a kind of
trinity with the body of truth Buddhists believe to be his
teaching (the Dharma) on the one hand and the group of men and
women who seek to embody that teaching and to devote themselves
to the path toward enlightenment (the Sangha), on the other.
It is significant that probably the most universally
shared prayer which is also something of a confession of faith
among Buddhists is the simple:
39» Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 213
40. Ibid., p. 210
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I take refuge in the Buddha,
I take refuge in the Dharma,
I take refuge in the Sangha. 41
All three share the status of the Buddhist's source of
strength, encouragement and inspiration, and in their union the
perspective with which each is viewed individually should
become apparent. As Spiro notes, the rituals of Buddhism are
properly "essentially expressive and commemorative in
2f2
character" within the context thus far developed, and this
simple formula—profound in its effect on the devotee seeking
thereby to direct his attention more intently upon the task
before him—captures this.
Theism and Theology
Precisely because Theravada Buddhism is a religious
tradition and not just a philosophy, thus possessing myths,
marvellous beings, and many profoundly symbolic materials which
do not lend themselves readily to logical or reasonable
explication, the matter of its atheism is not perhaps so clear
as our summary so far would suggest. R. F. Gombrich after
observing Buddhism in Sri Lanka, for example, stated that while
a definition of religion "which equates religion with theism"
may be controversial "on the cognitive level," it nevertheless
43
holds on the affective level. In making this point he
intended to follow Spiro who had written:
I would argue that the belief in
superhuman beings and in their power
to assist or to harm man approaches
universal distribution, and this
41. Ibid., p. 193
42. Ibid.
43. Gombrich, Precept and Practice, p. 9
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belief—I would insist—is the core
variable which ought to be designated
by any definition of religion# ^
Several difficulties emerge in this development from the
point of view of this thesis# First and foremost, we have
taken the position that "theism" should be reserved for that
specific theological development represented by orthodox
Christian, Jewish and Islamic belief about God, and should on
no account be confused with the belief in superhuman beings
which might well be designated as "gods#" The Buddha as a man
who achieved nirvana can on no account be equated with the God
of theism, and nirvana, while in some ways reminiscent of
theistic formulations, does not stand in relationship to
samsara as the God of theism stands in relation to the world,
©
Secondly, we would not make the belief in superhuman
beings an essential to the definition of religion, but regard
it rather as one of the types of material which go to make up a
religious tradition# In Theravada Buddhism the belief in the
Buddha might very well be of a nature which does not even see
him as "superhuman" but rather as a highly inspirational
symbol and excellent model#
On the other hand we must agree with John Bloefeld when he
complains that:
The notion of a religion founded by
a human being whose achievements
resulted from his own effort appealed
to Western rationalists and agnostics
of the late nineteenth century, who
seemed to have ignored or failed to
44# Spiro, "Problems of Definition and Explanation," Anthro¬
pological Approaches to the Study of Religion, Banton
(editor), p, 9k
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grasp the other significations of
the word "Buddha" and to have
transmitted an incomplete account
of its meaning#^
Yet if Gombrich tends to equate a theology (belief in gods
herein intended as its classical meaning) with theism, Spiro
tends to equate "extraordinary" with "superhuman." Thus he
describes the Buddha as superhuman because "unlike ordinary
humans, he himself acquired the power to attain enlightenment
46
and, hence, Buddhahood." Doubtless the Buddha was extra¬
ordinary insofar as, according to Spiro, by his Buddhahood:
... he showed others the means for
its enlightenment's attainment.
Without his teachings, natural man
could not, unassisted, have discovered
the way to enlightenment and to final
release.^7
Yet Spiro is wrong to equate this with superhuman and he may be
wrong in not recognising the possibility of unassisted
attainment depending upon what he means by "natural man" (for
such unassisted enlightenment does represent the end of a
phenomenal evolution).
Precisely what the Buddha is believed to be or regarded as
on a deeply devotional level, may vary radically, and even
among Theravada believers such terms as "superhuman" or "god"
may be appropriate. Likewise one might even speak of Buddhist
"theolog^' when considering its mythology of gods and heavens
and of "Buddhology" when speaking of the various meanings which
may be given to the Buddha. One might also regard nirvana as
"the sacred reality" and speak of its attainment as "salvation."
45. Bloefeld, op. cit., p. 63





In the end however, the proper assignment of these words so
common to the study of religion, must be done in such a manner
as to preserve important differences, such as traditional
Buddhist atheism in contrast to traditional Christian theism.
A summary of Theravada belief should help to make even
more explicit the fundamental structural difference between the
two systems. Thus it should be emphasised that the Theravada
Buddhist sees the world—-samsara~as characterised by suffering,
impermanence and soullessness. Man is identified wholly v/ith
this samsara which means that there is nowhere for him to go
and no way for him to be other than in and of samsara.
The Dharma offers the Buddhist an interpretation of
samsara and commends a style of life and set of values consistent
with this interpretation. These are designed to overcome
suffering and ultimately bring to a wholly natural end the
stream of samsaric reality which each man is. In this sense
the system is not world-negating. As samsara is man's sole
reality (there is no "other world" for him to go to) and the
setting for his proper life, it is affirmed. In this sense
man is offered a meaningful way to be a man and one cognisant
of that reality which is not samsaric—nirvana.
The Buddhist, in following the way which the Dharma makes
clear, is given the tools of meditation as a form of empiricism
designed both to help him actualise the recommended way of
being and to validate the original understanding of samsara
expounded. Likewise in his interpersonal relations he is
advised on the most advantageous and proper internal state for
them to be rooted in.
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Indeed, it is probably most correct to think of Theravada
Buddhism as a way for living in the world to the fullest
potential which such a reality contains rather than as a way of
escaping the world. This is clearly demonstrated by the
artistic representations of the Buddha which as often—if not
more often—show him in a teaching position (mudra) as they
show him quietly seated in one of the higher planes of medita¬
tion. The Theravada way of life seeks to absorb, analise,
control and integrate the totality of that reality available to
man rather than to ignore, sublimate or reject that reality.
Nirvana represents first of all the summit of this process
of right understanding, behaviour and self-control. Coinciden¬
tal with its attainment is the cessation of those factors which
would have produced new life forms. Thus nirvana represents
also this cessation or the condition of being free from all
rebirth-causing defilements. Finally, nirvana in Theravada
thought, represents a kind of reality which is not sarasaric and
thus is not characterised by suffering, soullessness and
impermanence.
The situation of the arahant who has attained nirvana is
clearly problematic. He will die—the final actualisation of
his own impermanence and soullessness. He will also, prior to
that death, be subject to suffering. Yet his life in this
state will represent a form of existence which is the aim of
all Buddhist endeavour and which embodies the maximum potential
of samsara and its "marks." In this, something which is just
as real as samsara but is not of samsara and its impermanent
individuals, is also recognisable.
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CHAPTER 9: The Mahayana System
A Fundamental Reworking
Mahayana represents a fundamentally different treatment of
Buddhist materials from that of the Theravada end while its
roots may go back to the earliest divisions in the Sangha, its
later developments so often display such an overt and self-
conscious polemic against the Theravada that it is difficult
not to see it as primarily a later reaction to the fully
developed Theravada system. Such a view is however only
partially correct and must be adjusted through a realisation
that the philosophical differences between the two are accom¬
panied by differences of far deeper roots and far more subtle
nature.
At any rate the Mahayana came to understand even the Four
Truths in an essentially different manner than did the
1
Theravada. Thus suffering come to be regarded as an illusion,
and anatta is formulated in terms of nairatmya—the denial of
substance. The first truth is understood as of the kind of
Absolute Truth, but the remaining three, including the eightfold
path which constitutes the fourth, as of the kind of truth "as
2
conventionally believed in common parlance." This means that
the first truth as a verbal formulation is highly symbolic and
the subsequent three are deprived of the authority and high
regard which they are accorded by the Theravada. Indeed even
such, basic formulas as are represented by the skandha, the aya-
tana and the dh&tu undergo a far-reaching re-evaluation.
1. Schumann, op. cit., p. 91
2. Murti, op. cit., pp. 2^4 and 252
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Sunyata
At the heart of this other system are the prajna-paramita
texts and the works of the M&dhyamika school—especially those
of one Nagarjuna, The key to Nagarjuna's presentation of the
Buddhist truth, and an outgrowth of the prajna-paramita
conceptions which preceeded it, is the concept of "sunyata" or
"emptiness," and this proposition assumed proportions in
Mahayana life and thought as central as was the concept of
dharmas to Theravada.
Essentially, sunyata applies most immediately to the
dharmas. When the Theravada development made these but momen¬
tary—passing out of being even as they came into being, they
already incorporated an insubstantiality and elusiveness not
utterly remote from what Nagarjuna and the Madhyamikas were to
say about them. This was: The dharmas themselves are unreal,
for they are relative and void in their nature, themselves
3
perishable objects which never achieve full being. They are
empty of reality as they are empty of the permanence and
substance beingness would imply. In the final analysis, they
are not, therefore.
However, if the dharmas are siinyata and themselves
ultimately unreal and non-existent, the immediate question is:
What is real, what does exist? To this the reply was
consistent: Everything is shnya (empty). The Madhyamikas
i
"completely denied the existence of the world and the dharmas,"
but in the sense of showing up "their real nature as devoid of
3, of, Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol, I_, p, 537; Murti,
op, cit., pp. 7-13
A-, McGovern, op, cit,, p, 21
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5
essence" rather than as their nullification. Thus the
separate dharmas are "illusory" and like empirical reality must
be accepted as not ultimate.^ Stated simply:
The insight that all things are
"empty" means that things have
phenomenal reality through their
interrelation, and not because
they "express" or "reflect" an
absolute essence of a thing which
exists somewhere. ?
The paticcasamuppada was taken in this light not to refer
to a sequence in the dharmic flow, but to the universal inter¬
relation or, put otherwise, the utter relativity of all
phenomena. It told the Mahayana that nothing was real by
itself because everything was relative to something else and
could never be isolated from and identified apart from those
relations. As Nagarjuna said: "Neither of those things is
established (as real) which cannot be conceived either as
g
identical or different from each other," and as the paticca¬
samuppada prevented such conception by showing that all is
9
relative, everything was sunya.
To press the significance of this, however, is to realise
that there is no simple statement of sunyata. For one thing,
it must be recognised that it assumes an absoluteness, for "it
has to include within its scope, not only all modes of being,
but also modes of value and of speculative thought; it has to
10
include itself too to be consistent and complete." Thus
phenomena are sunya because, being relative, they lack
5. Murti, op. cit., p. 97
6. cf. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 22^-225; Hurti,
op. cit., p. 251
7. Streng, op. cit., p. 1^3
8. Hadhyamika Karikas II, 21 and XIX, 6; Murti, op. cit., p. 137
9. Murti, op. cit., pp. 136-1^0
10. Ibid., p. 356
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substantiality or independent reality, but the absolute is
sunya also because it is devoid of empirical forms and no
11 '
thought category or predicate may be applied to it, Sunyata
is thus all-embracing.
The scope of the teaching runs danger only of underemphasis,
and it is not too much to say thatsunyata "is both the true
understanding of existence and the expression of the true
12
nature of existence which is without an ultimate ground,"
It thus represents both a kind of metaphysics and an episte-
mology based upon a dialectical criticism of reality. In
regard tc the former therefore, we see Mahayana through the
Madhyamikan development, crystalising around what can be
stated in the form of three assertions:
1, That there are no elements (dharmas),
2, That there is one motionless whole,
3, That there is "complete equipollency
between the empirical world and the
Absolute, between Samsara and
Nirvana," ^3
Finally, then, "the Absolute, or nirvana, is nothing but the
14
world viewed sub specie aeternitatis,"
By the same token the universe is "one motionless whole"
because sunyata prevents anything from originating and disap¬
pearing in it, even as it prevented real dharmas in its
recognition that relativity does not allow an ultimate reality
15 '
to the parts, Sunyata effectively reduces Theravada
plurality of dharmas to Mahayana monism. Nirvana is no more a
11, Ibid., p. 3^9
12. Streng, op. cit., pp. 156-157
13* Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I_, pp. 8-10
1*f. Ibid., p. 10
15# Ibid., p. 9
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separate real entity, an eternal dharma, but one form in which
the absolute reality of sunyata appears#
All of this is, the Buddhist insists, "beyond the grasp of
16
intellectual comprehension and verbal expression#" Realising
the emptiness of everything does not lend itself to concep¬
tualisation or description# Ultimately it is a transcendent
and mystical truth which man can only grasp through an intuitive
experience using and reflecting a unique kind of insight-
called "prajna," Sunyata as the basis for a dialectical
criticism of reality may serve to negate all claims to being
which the phenomena inspire, but fully grasping the limitless-
ness of this dialectic, which declares the sunya nature of even
sunyata, lies beyond the rational and intellectual skills of the
thinking mind.
The difficulty is that shared by all monistic systems.
The effective unification of all polarities (e#g# production/
destruction, reality/non-reality, samsara/nirvana, that-which-
is-bound-to-the-chain-of-rebirths/that-which-has-gained-
spiritual-release) negates many "cherished antipathies" and
empties religious ideals "of self-established nature and
17
characteristics#" The mind feels itself confronted by a
challenge in taking up such an understanding which is at least
as great as the challenge of total detachment—the challenge of
something alien to the natural understanding and interpretive
activities of man#
16# Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p, 77
17» Streng, op. cit., pp. and 86
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Likewise in recognising that sunyata means that "no
radical bifurcation of the two planes of reality—the pheno-
18
menal and the absolute" may be allowed, the Madhyamikan
created for himself the task of comprehending the resultant
ultimate synthesis# It was then a matter not just of retraining
the understanding but of expanding it# Also, as Streng has
emphasised, "To know •emptiness' was to realise emptiness" and
thus to be free oneself from the illusion of the empirical and
19
phenomenal# While bound to that illusion one "experiences"
suffering, impermanence, and soullessness, but ^unyata is a
20
purely soteriological term, in that it incorporates the
secret of salvation from them,
Conze notes that "as a practical term 'emptiness' means
the complete denial or negation of this world by the exercise
21
of wisdom, leading to complete emancipation from it#"
Consistent with this he offers as a definition of sunyata the
words "inward 'freedom'" referring to the negation of the
22
world# Thus the nature of the Madhyamikan salvation is still
thought of as release from the world's confinement and limita¬
tion but through an insight which reveals that the confinement
and limitation is illusory, thereby freeing one from them#
Prajna
Sunyata as freedom may also be called "prajfta"~that name
of the intuition that everything is sunya# Prajna is an
intuition first of all because it is not merely a judgement#
18. Ibid., p. 97
19. Ibid#, p. 98
20# Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p, 61
21. Ibid.
22# Ibid., pp# 60-61
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Insofar as sunyata operates on the discursive level of thought,
it acts as a critical dialectic to deny the substantiality of
everything and the inherent inadequacy of reason. It is,
consistently applied, the negation of judgement and not just a
nihilism or negative attitude# The completion of the negative
judgement belongs to a different order of knowledge which we can
23
best understand as an intuition#
Specifically, prajna has been called "contentless
intuition" because:
Nothing stands out against it as an
other confronting it# It is always
described as advaya (non-dual),
advaidhikara (non-bifurcated}. It
might be truer to say that the abso¬
lute or the entire reality is its
content and not any particular
limited object# 24
When this is the case it is easy to see why "prajna is
Absolute, as the Real and the knowledge of it are non-dual
25
(advaya), and non-different#" It becomes therefore, synono-
_
mous with sunyata# Clearly thought is not able to operate in
this realm and the principle that "the real is transcendent to
thought" begs for a doctrine of gnosis#
Prajna, however, in its identity with sunyata, goes far
beyond a secret and mystical truth, and is better understood as
27
"a state of gnosis" if that term is to be used at all# Also,
as a state, the soteriological character is provided for,
incorporating the whole of the person# By the same token it
23# Murti, op. cit., pp. 155-159
24. Ibid., p. 21?
25. Ibid., p. 330
26. Ibid., p# 44
27# Conse, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 56
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goes beyond verbal description and expression, neither
23
asserting a teaching nor answering questions. Discursive
29
thought is quite useless to it.
This gives quite a different character to meditation and
mind-development in Mahayana, as it does to the treatment of
doctrine. As we have seen, even the basic truths of the three
marks of existence, of nirvana and samsara, etc. are ultimately
submitted to sunyata and discovered to be sunya. This leads to
their being "unflinchingly condemned as spurious and contra¬
dictory constructions" and the locus of truth centered in
"mysticism and revelation""^--that is, in prajna.
Yet Mahayana is clearly not unique in this latter situation
insofar as the Theravada recognised itself the essential
attainment of certain levels of mind development to understand
the true nature of reality and to remove the hindrances which
prevented escape from the rebirth cycles. As has been said,
"Buddhism is perhaps the one widespread religion which, in
theory at least, is wholly mystical, for it recommends to all
its followers the practice of mind control and the attainment
31
of intuitive wisdom." However, it should also be stated that
"many of the doctrines of Buddhism are claimed to be inductive
inferences based on the data of extra-sensory perception" or
the various powers the Buddhist believes are attainable, e.g.
psychokinesis (levitation, etc.), clairaudience, telepathic
32
knowledge, retroactive knowledge, clairvoyance.
28. Streng> op. cit., p. 89
29» Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. _I, p. 10
30. Ibid. "
31» Bloefeld, op. cit., p. 15
32. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp. ^38
and ^59; cf. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, pp. 50-51
19^
The difference between super-mental development and the
attainment of praj'na can only be clearly understood if it is
related back to the difference between a metaphysical dharma
theory and an essentially epistemological state of prajna, Thus:
The Madhyamika denies metaphysics not
because there is no real for him; but
because it is inaccessible to reason.
He is convinced of a higher faculty,
intuition (prajna) with which the Real
(tattva) is identical,33
The intuition of sunyata is the attainment of sunyata in
Mahayana thought. Yet, in the Theravada teaching the higher
mental powers and scope is necessary but the attainment of them
"is treated at the same level as normal perception and it is
considered possible to make both valid and erroneous inferences
3^
on this data," One might say therefore, that epistemology is
the heart of Mahayana whereas metaphysics is the heart of the
Theravada, While the latter must bring the streams of real
dharmas to cessation, the former must "know" within himself the




While Nagarjuna and the Madhyamikas represent the greatest
development of the doctrine of sunyata, and prajna, relative to
the sunyata doctrine, Mahayana as a whole is most noted for its
development of prajna in relationship to who and what persons
ultimately "are," In this development there are two foci—that
33, Murti, op, cit,, p, 126
3^« Jayatilleke, op, cit,, p, ^59
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of Buddhahood and that of Bodhisattvahood, It found its
earliest flowering perhaps in the praj'ria-paramita texts, but
one can trace its history with the centuries and the growth of
Buddhism to the East: Tibet and Mongolia, China, Korea and
Japan—today regions dominated by Mahayana Buddhism,
The term "prajna-paramita" means literally "the perfection
of (intuitive) wisdom," As such it represents most immediately
the conviction of the Mahayana that it was the duty of the
Buddhist not only to attain such insight and enlightenment as
was necessary for the attainment of his goal, but to go beyond
35
that and acquire the perfect wisdom of a Buddha, It must be
noted however that the perfection sought relates to the
Mahayana understanding of prajha as the attainment of sunyata,
and not just to the superogatory powers which the Theravada
believe Buddhas possess but not arahants.
It is of critical importance that Mahayana intuition of
sunyata draws the Buddhist into a monistic understanding, for
the individualistic attainment of the Buddhist concerned with
the cessation of his own rebirth cycles prompts the other major
aspect of the Mahayana development concerning us here—namely
the necessity for a universalistic interpretation of the
individual's task. If all is sunyata—i,e, one—and if samsara
and nirvana are but the preceeding thesis and antithesis of
that synthesis, each man is identical with them in their
totality and thus there is no possibility of meaningful
individual salvation. All sentient beings in which resides the
35 • Dayal, op, cit., p, k
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delusion of samsara must attain to prajna, and the perfection
of prajna by the same token is the illimitable form of it.
Hence, individual ending of a stream of rebirths falls
short of the vision and goal, for each must attain "individual"
prajna-paramita which entails "universal" prajna-paramita as
well. The emphasis on the latter therefore resulted first of
all in the vision of fully enlightened beings deathlessly
continuing to assist those still bound in sarasara and secondly,
but more significantly, resulted in what might be called the
sanctification of samsara. The latter follows necessarily from
the identification of samsara with nirvana—from the fact that
• c
samsara like nirvana is sunyata, prajna, salvation. Thus
samsara is as much the realm of one who has attained prajna as
is nirvana.
The Bodhisattva doctrine therefore is essentially a
consistent development of Kahayana prajna and sunyata doctrine,
and as Dayal shows, in its very nature as such it pushes
"2
irrevocably toward an apparent reversal of Theravada ideals.
In place of detachment is the desire for the salvation of all
beings; in place of the slowing down of all passions is the
intensification of salvific activities; in place of the
attainment of nirvana within the individual context is the
vision of all of sarasara as but the misunderstanding of
nirvana in which all men already may alternatively be understood
to be.
The path of one who would be a Bodhisattva became the
object of analysis and enumeration quite as complex as had the
36. Dayal, op. cit., p. 159
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subject of dharmas and states of consciousness in the
Abh.idh.arma, Thus for example, one encounters a list of ten
stages to Bodhisattvahood, each stage subject to finer delinea-
37
tion and enumeration of points. Likewise one has the
endless attention to the powers and skills of the Bodhisattva
who, as he progresses, goes far beyond the special mental
powers and physical powers of the arahant. In the end, the
beings described attain to conditions of existence and to
activities which merit the description of god-like by the
standards of Western mythology, for to speak of them as mere
humans becomes clearly inaccurate. They are not mere men,
using the skills and tools available to mere men, but Bodhi-
sattvas using the skills and tools available to Bodhisattvas,
It may be true that it was as men that they began their
Bodhisattva career, but it is not as men that they end it. One
might say they are the product of an evolution as spectacular
as man's from the amoeba, but no less natural or possible.
Perhaps one of the most radical ramifications of the
Bodhisattva career is that of the aid which he gives by merit-
sharing, Merit is "punya" which Dayal explains in this way:
Every act, which is inspired by
charity or charity and morality,
produces some punya, which leads
to welfare in this life and also
secures happy re-births, Punya
is generally regarded as the power
of good deeds that were done in
previous existences,
The Bodhisattva uses his punya, however, by the principle of
parinamana—the "bending round towards," transfer or dedication
37, Dayal, op, cit,, pp, 51 ff«» Schumann, op, cit., pp. 130 ff,
38. Dayal, op, cit,, p, 189
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of it. This is done in two ways: 1) directing it towards
one's own enlightenment (if still aspiring to Bodhissttvahood),
and 2) applying it to the welfare and spiritual progress of all
i+0
creatures. So different is this from the Theravada view that
Schumann points out its presence "distinguishes Kahayanic from
Hmayanic texts."
This principle of charity and merit-sharing is so central
to the Mahayana ideal of the Bodhisattva that ethics and karma
must be brought in line with it and not visa versa. Thus the
Bodhisattva, viewing things on a great scale, motivated by a
love which is regulated by prajria, may release sufferers from
the hells to which their karma confined them and undertake to
1+2
suffer in those hells themselves on behalf of the sufferers.
The Bodhisattva may even himself have to engage in activities
which would appear ethically questionable to plant the root of
merit or enlightenment in beings bound in the illusion of
k?
samsara.
Another substantial way in which other beings can be
assisted is by the creation of an environment which will maxi¬
mise their opportunity for progress and the ease with which
progress can be made. In its fullest development this is not
just another aspect of the use of merit to provide them with a
more favorable rebirth, but the actual creation of lands into
which beings can be born—called pure lands. This is accom¬
plished by the supernatural powers to create phenomena—in this
39. Ibid., p. 188
40. Ibid,, p. 192
41. Schumann, op. cit., p. 111
Dayal, op. cit., p. 192; Schumann, op. cit., pp. 111-112
^■3. Schumann, op. cit., p. 112
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case a paradise specifically designed for the attainment of
enlightenment. However, on these high planes of supernormal
powers, the distinction between Buddhas and Bodhisattvas fades
and wavers.
The confusion between the two results despite the superfi¬
cial distinction that a Bodhisattva is supposedly one who vows
not to enter nirvana himself until all sentient beings have
become enlightened; and a Buddha is one who possesses full
super-normal powers but will enter nirvana at the end of his
current life (which may be aeons long). However a Buddha may
1+1+
vow to aid sentient beings as well and a fully evolved
Bodhisattva may transcend the limitations of a physical human
body and even, through sunyata, the other limitations such as
1+5
final death. One can say that the Bodhisattva in doing this
1+6
relies on emptiness. Thus by the principle of sunyata and
the freedom of salvation from confinement in delusion which
prajna produces, there can be no ultimate Buddha/Bodhisattva
distinction in the end.
Buddhology
Something of this is seen in the development of the
concept of the Buddha by Mahayana—a development so far-reaching
that Murti wrote:
Buddha is Bhagavan, God, endowed as
he is with power and perfection. He
possesses, in entirety, all power,
splendour, fame, wealth, knowledge
and act. ^"7
Schumann, op. cit., pp. 105-106
k5m Ibid., pp. 112-113
^6. Streng, op. cit., pp. 85-86
Kurti, op. cit., p. 280
200
This too, follows from the sunyata doctrine and its
monistic import. Both the identification of all parts with the
whole and the synthesis of opposites, implies the designation
of the essence of phenomena as the Buddha seen in terms of his
fullest powers. Thus, for example: Buddha = prajna = sunyata
= nirvana = sarasara = Buddha, This aspect of the Mahayana
development is consistent with the rest, for as Murti asserts:
Anything like an adequate treatment
of the implications of the prajna-
paramita conception would have to
consider prajria (intuition) as Abso¬
lute, as Freedom and as Tathagata. 48
This term "tathagata" was used very early to designate the
Buddha as "he who thus came," but in Mahayana it expands to
serve this identification of the universal Buddha principle
within the cosmos.
To cope with these exploding values and understandings
which the term "Buddha" developed, the Mahayana used a three¬
fold designation. They spoke of the "dharmakaya" or cosmic
body when meaning to point to that most illimitable and mystical
understanding of the universal nature of Buddha which ultimately
only is knowable through prajna. They spoke of the "sambhoga-
kaya" or blissful body when intending to designate the helpful,
non-physical, ethereal and spiritual manifestations which teach
and assist the highly advanced on the upper levels of develop¬
ment, Finally, they recognised the "nirmanakaya" (or "rupakaya")
50
—the historically manifested body.
48. Ibid., p. 227
49. Schumann, op. cit., p. 23
50. Ibid., pp. 101-109
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These most directly consitute what we have been intending
as the domain of "Buddhology," for each receives full and rich
development as a Mahayana teaching (though some texts give a
two-fold rather than three-fold division)# Thus in this
development as regards the nirmanakaya we get the belief that:
The advent of a Buddha in the world is
not an accident, the lucky chance of a
human being happening to attain en¬
lightenment# It is a deliberate descent
of the Divinity, incarnating itself as
human being; his various (12 principle)
acta from birth to passing away into
parinirvana are make-believe acts de¬
signed to'create a sense of kinship with
human beings,5^
Here, "little significance is attached to the historical
Buddha who is a mere phantom body conjured up by the Dharma-
body" and as a result this form of Buddhism claims a validity
52
independent of any historical being#
The Buddhas of the sambhogakaya have also been called the
Transcendent Buddhas because "they cannot be perceived by the
senses," and sometimes they are understood as the creations of
53
the Bodhisattva's or advanced disciple's own mind. In their
powers and their will to assist beings working toward the
attainment of prajna and its perfections, they are virtually
identical with the transcendent Boddhisattvas who have evolved
54
beyond human rebirths# Together the transcendent Buddhas and
Bodhisattvas represent a realm or function perhaps best des¬
cribed as "a mediating principle between the absolute and
51# Kurti, op. cit., p# 287# Parinirvana refers to the human
death of an arahant or Buddha#
52# Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 232
53# Schumann, op. cit., pp# 104-105; Bloefeld, op. cit., p.
178
54# Schumann, op# cit#, pp. 112-117
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and phenomenal beings," They offer their assistance as
teachers and wonderworkers to the phenomenal worlds but retain
their freedom from the restrictions of samsara.
The realm of such BuddhaS and Bodhisattvas is called
"apratisthitanirvana"—"active nirvana" or "non-fixed nirvana"
C * e c 0
-
> 56
or "nirvana without standstill*" From it they continue to
*
relate to samsara while in a state of deliverance which should,
by Theravada thought, remove them irrevocably,.-from it. Thus
Mahayana comes to conceive an all-encompassing state of
liberation from samsara in the sense of absolute freedom
t
replacing bondage. As the absolute freedom which sunyata
allows is conceived to be nirvana, nirvana may be had with a
form of samsaric existence (though nonetheless sunya) and not
as the annihilation of it.
Summary
Thus Mahayana represents a radically different interpre¬
tation of the basic teaching about the Buddha and Buddhahood,
samsara and nirvana, from that interpretation of the Theravada,
Where the latter recognises "a human Buddha who disappears
completely in a lifeless nirvana" the former professes "the
ideal of a divine Buddha enthroned in a nirvana full of life,"
While the one develops a path for personal salvation feasible
to all men, the other envisions universal salvation with the
help needed from supernatural beings. Finally, while the one
represents a radical pluralism, the other conceives a radical
57
monism,
55, Murti, op, cit,, pp, 225 and 280
56, Murti, op, cit, p, 3^3} Schumann, op, cit,, p, 113
57, Murti, op, cit,, p, 765 Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic,
Vol. I, pi 7
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The Mahayana it would seem, would make the Buddha into a
cosmic principle, men into Buddhas and samsara into nirvana.
All of reality and the forms by which the Buddhist finds his
task in it, seems to be undergoing a sacramental revolution.
If the bonds of illusion are broken the absolute (sunyata) is
revealed everywhere in everything and no thing is either what
it seems to be or anything but what it is (i.e, sunya).
The significance of Mahayana teaching to the life of the
ordinary believer who finds himself scarcely able even to
begin the most preliminary steps to Bodhisattvahood is seen in
the religion of devotion to and assistance from the divine
reality. Nirvana recedes into oblivion as an ideal and the way
of self-salvation by the eightfold path is replaced by
reliance upon the Bodhisattvas and the prize of rebirth into a
Buddhaland, Assistance from the Divine realm becomes essential
to progress which is understood in terms of improving one's
environment rather than, at this stage, producing the required
changes within oneself,
Mahayana Buddhism thus appears to be a religion populated
by multiple saviours providing deliverance to devotees who
exercise faith in their powers and call upon them for their
assistance, Samsara becomes a wholly magical place in which
manifestations from the absolute may appear in any guise or
form engaged in the awesome and marvellous work of bringing all
beings to the full realisation of their own freedom and Buddha-
hood, The activities of the freely phenomenalising character
of the absolute are utterly normalised within the everyday
world of men and all the other planes of the cosmos.
20b
This means, in the final analysis, that Mahayana Buddhism
looks more theistic than Theravada Buddhism does, although both
admittedly provide ample room for devotionalism and personifi¬
cation of the sacred realities recognised by both. In Mahayana
thought however the transcendent is not other than the immanent
in any real way. Such distinctions exist only within the
bondage of illusion.
In Mahayana thought the significance of the two truths
theory for properly presenting its teachings is not to be
underestimated. Mahayana truth must thus always be viewed on
two levels. On the first, one accepts the illusory confinement
and the analysis of man and his world along the lines of dukkha,
anicca and anatta or nairatmya emerges—to which the saviours
and their salvation by merit sharing and pure lands is offered
in response. On this level the supreme Buddha principle
manifests itself in the world as an omnipotent, personal and
loving transcendent reality. Failing divine assistance man
could only see himself as dependent upon and utterly different
from that reality.
On the second level, however, all of this is re-viev/ed and
it is understood that dukkha, anicca and samsara are not real
but rather are nairatmya. The real is One and everything which
would seem to belie this—the manifestations from the Dharmakaya,
efforts to become enlightened by men, all the devices of the
Bodhisattvas to assist sentient beings, the phenomenal world in
its totality—is illusion. This is the final and ultimate truth
but the understanding of it is prajna and that means for men
only the first level of truth is available pending the
enlightenment which prajna brings.
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The second kind of truth certifies the atheistic nature of
Buddhism despite the appearance of the phenomenal, the first
level truths of Buddhist teaching. For Buddhism, quasi-theism
is a device which serves only provisionally within contexts
which are themselves provisional. Nor is it ultimately pan¬
theistic, for sunyata, the absolute, does not lend itself to
religious description—it being only the provisional Dharmakaya
which does that. In that sense what lies at the end of the
Mahayana epistemological path is as atheistic as the Theravada
metaphysical nirvana.
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CHAPTER 10: Theravada and Mahayana: A Summary
Buddhism, like all religion, attempts to provide men with
a perfectly integrated understanding and experience of them¬
selves and their world. The two forms we have considered differ
profoundly in this process. Consider for example the manner in
which the truth is grasped. In Theravada the individual
progressed by analysis and by insight gained in the states of
consciousness produced by meditation. Ling portrays the
process in this way:
The assent which has to be given,
largely on trust, to certain moral
and metaphysical propositions is
intended to serve only as the
necessary preliminary to one's
proving their truth for oneself at
a later stage. These propositions,
it is claimed, are grounded in the
fact that the universe is the
expression of certain laws. 1
The pattern of moving from faith to knowledge resulting from
the abilities of one's own mind which characterises Theravada
thought, is paralleled in Mahayana by the move from truth
rationally expressed, as in doctrine and dogma, to truth
intuited which constitutes that new form of existence designated
by the term "prajna." On this higher level:
There is the denial of all categories
and doctrines . • • , of all species
of dogmatic philosophy; all dogmatic
systems are drsti Copinionsl, and
prajna is the negation of all views
—sunyata. 2
The difference between these two systems is seen in the
relatively clear scientific nature of the first which is
1. Ling, Buddha, Karx and God, p. 18
2. Murti, op. cit., p. 58
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essentially a matter of expertise in the use of the mind and
understanding of what it reveals, and in the series of qualifi¬
cations which must accompany our statements about Kahayana
teaching. Thus the faith which exists on the lower levels of
development is directed toward those manifestations of the
universal Buddha nature who will help to produce the desired
effect upon one's spiritual progress. Yet what they work on is
innate to the devotee and one must ultimately affirm that it is
his own nature which recognises its oneness with the apparently
external saviours.
One might say that the Theravada methodology is analytical
and the Mahayana devotional but both serve to move the Buddhist
from an inadequate understanding to a perfect one, and both are
true only as a generality in need of constant qualification.
It is probably more important to note that, as Lama Govinda has
pointed out, "in Buddhism the center of gravity lies within the
individual."^ Likewise Ninian Smart has said of Buddhism:
But unlike the Semetic faiths (Judaism,
Christianity and Islam), it starts from
an interior mystical quest, rather than
from the prophetic experience of a
dynamic personal God.^
Lama Govinda made the contrast with "religions of revelation"
5
which "depend upon the authority of tradition." In any case
Buddhism functions anthropocentrically in the movement toward
deeper truth, or the deeper experience of the truth, although
this characteristic has by no means shown itself hostile to
3. Govinda, op. cit., p. 39
Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, p. 39
5. Govinda, op. cit., p. 39
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either a highly rationalistic development or a profoundly
devotional one—or, for that matter, to combinations of these
and other patterns for relating men to religious truth#
This brings us to another point# Despite its saviour-like
Bodhisattvas, gods and goddesses, Buddhas and other super¬
natural beings, the Mahayana no less than the Theravada rejects
"God" for reasons which Bloefeld stated thus:
(1) Being non-dualists, they cannot
conceive of a supreme being or of
other beings as more than provi¬
sionally separate; (2) their concep¬
tion of ultimate reality is imper¬
sonal; (3) they look upon the universe
not as a creation of divine reality
but as a delusion in men's minds i_i.e#
phenomena do not have the reality they
appear to havej • • . . °
The Buddhist rejection of a God/world dualism is not so much
atheistic in the sense of being anti-theistic as it is in the
sense of being non-theistic# Buddhism is thus not theistic but
neither did it develop a conscious polemic against theism so
that it is only in recent times that theism and Buddhism have
had occasion to measure what they themselves are saying in
light of each other.
Part of the difficulty in discussing the atheistic nature
of Buddhism arises precisely from the very different systems it
opposed and its unawareness of orthodox Christianity# Finally
its atheism must be founded upon its understanding of reality
which for the Theravada is pluralistic (composed of dharmas)
and for the Mahayana is monistic (sunyata)# In this analysis
Mahayana is not theistic because of its higher truth of
6# Bloefeld, op. cit#, pp, 51-52
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sunyata which must eventually reveal the provisional nature of
the dharmakaya and absorb it into its own oneness, that absolute
emptiness, Theravada is not theistic because dharmas are real
ultimately, having their own independent reality and this
includes the dharma of nirvana which is impersonal, inactive
and soulless.
Yet we must agree with Conze when he declared that
Buddhism "is essentially a doctrine of salvation and all its
philosophical statements are subordinate to its soteriological
7
purpose,"' The salvation which the Buddhists conceive is an
ending to a bondage. The bondage to the Mahayana is not
ultimately real and the realisation of the truth of freedom thus
constitutes salvation. To the Theravada however it is all too
real and will only be ended through the use of the natural laws
by which the dharmas function or exist.
It is in this context that it is most inappropriate to
speak of Buddhism as either strictly world-affirming or world-
negating, any more than as pessimistic. Buddhism provides both
a day by day, this-worldly pattern of life (ethics, values,
specifically Buddhist activities, a body of knowledge to be
increasingly understood) designed to help the Buddhist become
competent in living, achieving his greatest potential, psycho¬
logically able to respond positively to any eventuality.
Buddhism also provides ideals, skills and attainments which
appear to surpass normal or even extraordinary human
achievements.
7, Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p, 213
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In this latter category are the stages of Bodfelsattvahood
or arahantship in which the individual assumes powers the
facticity of which is at least unestablished by Western empi¬
rical standards if not generally denied# When one enters this
area it must be granted that Buddhism would appear to have
abandoned the man in the street as he is and to offer a quite
other-worldly vision# In fact, in both the Theravada and
Mahayana systems an evolutionary pattern exists and men are
required to master their present situation if they are to move
to a further, more advanced one# The more mythological
teachings should inspire this task but they cannot replace it#
Ultimately Buddhism as something which is practiced as
well as learned, understood and conceptually integrated, seeks
to decrease suffering in this life through a realistic evalua¬
tion of the deepest cause of suffering and an ethic and life
style designed accordingly# It is anthropocentric not only in
its analysis of where truth is to be found, and how, but also
in the changes which it seeks# These changes men must produce
within themselves even if it does not appear so to them in some
stages, for they cannot be the passive recipients of them#
The treatment of nirvana reveals that this highest ideal
is no simple negation of this world either# In Theravada
thought the distinction is made between sopadhisesa-nirvana
which is achieved by the arahant in his lifetime and
nirupadhisesa-nirvana which represents the continuation of the
g
state after the arahant has himself died# The distinction
8. Brandon (editor), A Dictionary of Comparative Religion,
item by T# 0# Ling, p, ^69; Murti, op# cit., pp# 3^7
and 3^9
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assures the propriety of assigning to the condition of a living
individual in this life and in this world the name of the
supreme achievement. Such a person is characterised by a peace
9
and insight which must radiate through his living experience
in this world.
Sopadhisesa-nirvana does not represent a heavenly
existence. The man continues to eat, sleep, talk, walk, relate,
be ill or well and otherwise be a normal human being. It does
not even eradicate the final event of death. It affirms life
as what it is: Wholly impermanent thus filled with suffering
and soulless. It is life as such which it masters, utilises,
and absolutely accepts. The one aspect of this world and
existence in it which it does not accept and sets itself
against is the pointless perpetuation of suffering, imperma-
nence and soullessness. Theravada Buddhism tells a man how to
live and die in this life so as to minimise suffering and
maximise the positive side of reality.
In Kahayana thought the nature of world utilisation and
affirmation is revealed in its identification of samsara with
o
10
nirvana and in its concept of apratisthitanirvana. The
Theravada may be triumphalist in their vision of the potential
for a man but the Mahayana are triumphalist in their vision of
what a man is. The former is intent on a process of self-
mastery, the latter on a process of growing enlightenment. In
either case something can happen to man in this life which
changes his experience of this world and himself from negative
9. Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, p.
10. Murti, op. citt, pp. 3^3-3^
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to positive. In so doing only truth or reality already
available in the very structure of reality (the patterns of
dharmic flow or the sunyata nature) is utilised.
Finally then, we may summarise by making these points
about Buddhism, First, it is not dualistic but maintains that
in the world is to be found all that matters, variously under¬
stood monistically or pluralistically. Secondly, it is in this
sense world-affirming although its descriptive words which
serve that uniquely Buddhist kind of world-affirmation appear
emotively negatives Suffering, emptiness, impermanence, insub-
stantiality. Finally, the vision of a sacramental life,
hallowed by the Buddhist identification of it as such in
opposition to other modes of life, provides the Buddhist with
a holy ideal in some fundamental sense inseparable from the
profane world,
»
In Buddhism the sacred may occur in any place or in any
time. Indeed, for the Mahayana it is in all places and all
times and the "trick" is to "see" that the profane is really
the sacred. In Theravada the profane may become the sacred-
man may realise it from the very stuff of reality and his life
may embody it prior to his death in such a way that the event
of his death is affirmed as wholly natural and sacred and thus
utterly right when it occurs.
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PART II; ANALYSIS
A. The Christian Atheists and Buddhism
CHAPTER 11: Simone Weil
The Divine Movement
In Mahayana thought, as we have seen, there is the
deceptively substantial world of samsara with its wonderful
assortment of forms and powers which reveal themselves to be
ultimately empty before the onslaught of an insight which
denudes them of all their illusive characteristics. Analysis
thus progressively deprives of any true beingness that which
seems to be; and the full and absolute force of this the
Mahayana intends with the word "sunyata,"
Now Simone Weil presents us with a process not unlike this
Mahayana one, although it must be arrived at in stages. Thus
if one looks at creation in Weil's vision one finds her
speaking of something which can only be nothing. First of all
it represents God's diminution, his loss of whatever the
"substance" of divinity is; but also it is the replacement of
true divinity by false divinity--that which is inauthentic and
2
empty of divinity. Thus true "being" can only be God, for
creation is the negative side of all that he is.
If however, creation cannot "be" it is equally clear in
Weil, that neither is God "being," for the creation is but an
aspect of what he is—the aspect of that part of God which God
loves and which makes self-love by God possible,^ For all of
1, Weil, Waiting on God, p, 87
2. Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p, 1^0
3» Weil, Waiting on God, p., 68
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its negative attributes in relation to the "God" aspect of
divinity (his absence, withdrawal, its false divinity),
creation is the divine creation/decreation, the process by
which God goes to the furthermost point from himself so that he
if
may contemplate himself, love himself and eat himself.
Indeed, in Weil the entire process, that circular movement
which changes nothing, is but "the perfect image of the eternal
5
and blessed act which is the life of the Trinity," and it is
precisely this which carries all the negation into God himself.
Indeed Weil's "God" in this context is but a point in a
totality of which she can speak most clearly only in ontolo-
gical negatives and which itself must be understood as "God"
consistent with the Christian "Godhead,"
Thus it is not just creation which is absence of God,
emptiness, loss of substance, but it is the Godhead as the
process creation/decreation and its extremes of God and Christ,
If God does not exist in creation, the lack of existence
penetrates infinitely the meaning of divinity, for creation is
nothing but an aspect of God, Consistent with this Weil
constantly negates her designations of the Absolute: The Good
is a nothingness which is not unreal;^ the void is the supreme
7
fullness} "this world insofar as it is completely empty of God
g
is God himself" —for, it follows, God himself is emptiness.
The greatest difficulty in following Weil's "cosmology"
from the viewpoint of an analogous Hahayana one, is language,
4, Weil, Waiting on God, p, 28; Intimations of Christianity,
p. 1^-9
5, Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p. 93
6, Weil, Gravity and Grace, p, 13
7, Ibid,, p, 21
8, Ibid,, p, 99
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Weil does use the word "empty" in the context of the whole
9
universe and she does use the word "void" and these are
doubtless close equivalents to the Buddhist "sunyata" and
"sunya," She does not, however, use them with the same single-
mindedness elevated to an epistemological absolute as Nagarjuna
reveals, Weil talks about the cosmos she envisions, never
adhering too consistently to any one formulation or expression
or description, but always pushing to create something of the
nature of that vision in the scattered words that somehow,
albeit obscurely, serve it.
The impetus of her writing is clear however. Creation is
empty of God for he is not there, yet God too is empty for he is
present in the form of absence, he is creation emptied of
divinity, and he is as truly decreation as he is creation. As
Nagarjuna would say: Sunyata is sunya. Thus if "God" is the
word which functions as a kind of absolute for Weil, it can be
embued with little more content than "sunyata," Weil wants as
consistent a rejection of ultimacies and finalities as did
Nagarjuna, God cannot be made to be, to have being; and
creation was made to be "not being," The only appropriate
modes of description are those which remove all ontological
grounding.
Thus in Weil one gets the vision of creation, like samsara,
reflecting order and purpose of the kind which might be
described as "ongoingness" which is cyclical, or a changeless
10
"perpetual becoming," While the Buddhists would speak of the
9. Ibid., p. 21
10, Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p, 185
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paticcasamuppada and karma as reflecting capacity for structure
and order in sarasara, Weil would speak of gravity and necessity.
So long as one remained able only to see and know creation or
samsara, one would be subject to this order-giving law, and
remain confined to it.
Both Weil and the Buddhists however, envisioned the
ability to know the voidness of that samsara or creation. To
Weil it was the absence of God, the Trinity as an act of self-
emptying and self-eating, as creation/decreation, as a deifugal
force and self-loving which constituted an attraction/repulsion
whole or unity. For both, the attainment of this vision or
this understanding, was at once the achievement of emptiness
and the knowledge of it. Thus for the Buddhist prajna =
sunyata because knowing silnyata is being sunya. Likewise for
Weil, the acceptance of the void is the counterbalance of the
void's creation—the one both provides the necessity and the
12
energy for the other and they share a supernatural nature.
In both visions voidness and realisation of voidness are but
aspects of one function.
Also, the non-existent God parallels the sunya nirvana of
the Mahayana Buddhist and its identification with samsara. The
emptiness and voidness, the absence and non-finality of the
universe is the divine self-eating and self-contemplation. On
the other side of the void of creation is the void of decreation
The God who loves himself through his non-existence in creation
loves the creation because it is himself. Nothing is other
11. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 1; Intimations of Christianity,
p. 185
12. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 10
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than him, and he is not other than the nothing# Creation must
know itself ultimately as "God's absence" just as God is
present to himself in the absence of creation# That emptiness,
with its extremities at the creation and crucifixion is a
mediation constituted by the divine spirit# It is the ultimate
divine emptiness# It is the void which is realised with the
recognition that the universe is devoid of finality except as a
void whole#"^
All of this is to say, of course, that creator and
creation in Weil are empty and precisely that is their fullness.
To separate the one from the other in any final way is impos¬
sible, but to see the one through the other is the only valid
*
understanding# Still Weil lacks the advantages she would have
gained by having given to .this vision a key designation such as
"sunyata" is#
Nevertheless it is true that God is empty where creation
is concerned and creation is empty where God is concerned and
that thereby the whole of God feeds on creation and creation
feeds on God (his diminution)# Likewise Weil allows at no
point a coming to rest of the cyclical movement encompassing
both creator and creation and depriving both of substance,
finality and being# There is no ground, no place, no final
designation which distinguishes that which is eaten from that
which eats, of that which loves from that which is loved, of
that which empties from that which is emptied#
Voidness does not function as the universal critique in
Weil's thought, however, insofar as she does not elevate it and
13« Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p# 199
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focus on it as did Nagarjuna. Rather, Weil stands once removed
from the purity of this concept at a point of greater complexity,
namely at the point where the underlying intuition is of the
unity of opposites. Weil therefore is more intent on saying:
These are the same; than she is in saying: These are one
emptiness. The difference is a matter of tone, emphasis, and
perhaps clarity, so that one wonders if she would not have
ultimately come to develop her vision in the language of
emptiness even as she found herself always reflecting its
underlying truth.
The fact remains however that Weil is not univocal. As
the circle she contemplates spins, she is mesmerised by the
apparent interchanging of the two sides—now it is creator, now
creation, now absence, now presence. But they are two sides of
one whole, an endless movement without beginning or end to its
aspects, ever cycling, momentarily appearing in one aspect but
just as truly the aspect in which it will, in the next moment
of contemplation, appear.
Weil can seemingly only do this justice by describing each
aspect and noting that each of them shares the same emptiness
of finality and that being does not seem to her to constitute
a truth capable of eradicating the potentially secret and
idolatrous unity of the changing phenomena in the cyclical
movement. Thus all is empty but there is no absolute emptiness,
only the eternal creation/decreation. Her synthesis is not a
third higher truth, but the intuition of the symbiosis—the
living unity—of the poles inherent in it.
Mahayana did this too when it developed the concept of
"active nirvana" from which the transcendent Bodhisattvas who
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have realised the six perfections (and therefore nirvana) and
a
thus merit the designation "Great Beings" (Mahasattva), may
1 if
continue to be effective in samsara, This curious concept
seems to span all aspects of the illusive phenomena of samsara
as well as the qualities of the non-phenomenalising nirvana.
Clearly the underlying principle of sunyata as developed by
Nagarjuna and the Madhyamikas makes such a union possible,
since it only actualises the freedom inherent in the transcen¬
dent state of full perfection—i,e, perfect realisation of
sunyata. Yet it reflects a complexity still one step removed
from the simplicity of absolute nirvana.
In Weil, united as the whole, is the self-emptying
creation moving toward the crucifixion which becomes the
negative reverse of the creator and which turns the movement
toward decreation through the mediation of the spirit. This
is to create a negative metaphysics or a metaphysics of
emptiness as we have seen. It is too, to deny the ultimate
reality or materiality of the phenomenal world, on the one
hand, and to remove the identity of God as "being" outside
creation on the other. But the unity herein indicated is a
unity of pure relativity and change, never seen as static or
frozen in an eventual undifferentiated oneness, even though
changing nothing.
This clearly makes sense in Weil's context, for even
though the eternal cycling is cosraically conceived it is not
progressive—it is not going anywhere, Weil does seem to
envision something both active yet contained however, and thus
1^. Murti, op, cit., p, 3^3, Schumann, op. cit,, pp, 112-113
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defined, set, a "life" which is ultimately one in its three-
foldness: Emptying as a creative act, perfect emptiness, the
absorption of emptiness. Here active nirvana as samsara,
paramita and sunyata does seem analogous to Weil,
Suffering
As well as comparing the emptiness theme in Weil with that
of sunyata in Mahayana, it is interesting to compare Weil's
basic understanding of the world with the three marks of
existence as the Theravada Buddhist formulates them. One is
immediately struck, in doing so, by the prime significance of
suffering in Weil's thought. Indeed, one of her images for
man's situation is reminiscent of the Buddhist image of the
enormous, even ocean-like flood which constitutes samsara and
the raft of the Buddha's teaching which takes one across,
Weil's image is less optimistic, however:
Man is like a castaway, clinging to a
spar and tossed by the waves. He has
no control over the movement imposed on
him by the water. From the highest hea¬
ven God throws a rope. The man either
grasps it or not. If he does, he is
still subject to the pressures imposed
by the sea, but these pressures are com¬
bined with the new mechanical factor of
the rope, so that the mechanical rela¬
tions between the man and the sea have
changed. His hands bleed from the
pressure of the rope, and he is some¬
times so buffeted by the sea that he
lets go, and then catches it again,
The nature of the suffering most central to her is the quality
of its endlessness and its only mechanical change. Indeed, to
grasp the line between the creator and one point in his
15, Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p, 82
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*16
creation which a man represents is to introduce a new source
of suffering into one's existence#
This image that the contact with the dynamic source of the
whole is productive of suffering is analogous to the implicit
realisation of the Buddhist that only honest and effective
analysis reveals the full and inevitable extent of suffering
within samsara# Thus in a sense the Buddhist does become more
aware of suffering by virtue of his refusal to delude himself#
Weil too insists that "men can only appear to elevate them¬
selves above human misery by disguising the rigours of destiny
in their own eyes, by the help of illusion, of intoxication, or
17
of fanaticism#" The man who grabs the rope is, in effect,
acknowledging the whole meaning of his illusory independent
existence and its painful nature, for the rope represents no
more than the insight into the true nature of things and the
passive acceptance of it#
Suffering and wisdom are thus intimately bound together in
Weil's thought, even as they are in Buddhism# To be wise is to
understand in the most profound—i#e. experiencial—manner the
fundamental nature of suffering in existence# She sees the
understanding of St, John of the Cross that participation in
the suffering of the cross "alone allows penetration into the
depths of divine wisdom" as being in line with the law: "By
18
suffering comes understanding#"
In Weil's vision, suffering is elevated to divine
significance however, indicating a profound affirmation of it
16# Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p# 197
17« Ibid., p, 54
18. ibid., pp. 58-59
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which stands in startling contrast to the Buddhist quest for
detachment from it and termination of it. This could have been
19
predicted by her cosmic crucifixion and its centrality to
God's self-love and self-eating. In her divine universe of
creation/decreation, suffering is in the very nature of God's
willing the cyclical movement because it is the opposite pole
to the creator and without this dipolarity the whole of what
God "is" could not be. Thus Weil says that the "abyss of love
on both sides" which "the abandonment at the supreme moment of
the crucifixion" is, constitutes "the real proof that Chris-
20
tianity is something divine," By the same token, she admits
that it is the fact that God willed suffering which makes her
21
consent to it even in that abhorent form of a Child's tear.
Thus for Weil, the understanding that suffering is an
identifying mark of creation calls forth an affirmation of it.
For her even "the supreme greatness of Christianity lies in the
fact that it does not seek a supernatural remedy for suffering
22
but a supernatural use for it," Suffering is one aspect of
the divine activity and to reject it is at one and the same
time to reject the divine activity and the truth of one's own
existence.
Yet one cannot assume that this realisation came effort¬
lessly to Weil, Indeed, like the rope in her vision, it is
itself productive of suffering, so that she says:
I feel an ever increasing sense of
devastation, both in my intellect
and in the center of my heart, at
19. Ibid., p. 93
20. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 79
21. Ibid., p. 68
22. Ibid., p. 73
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my inability to think with truth at
the same time about the affliction
of men, the perfection of God, and
the link between the two. ^3
Clearly perfection must incorporate suffering for perfect God
is the triune God: Creator, crucified, and mediator—in which
all of creation participates through the crucifixion and
mediation. Yet Weil's complaint is a sign of the destructive
and painful nature of this insight.
At this point it is perhaps instructive to note that with
the development of Mahayana thought, the idea was introduced
that "dukkha (suffering) should be welcomed with joy if it is
2k
endured in the service of other creatures." However even
should the Bodhisattva enter a hell-world on behalf of a
sentient being, the perfection of his insight which allows him
to welcome pain with joy, also ultimately places him "beyond
25
and above both pain and pleasure." Thus detachment represents
a final triumph over dukkha whether dukkha is seen as a real or
illusory aspect of samsara; and even insofar as Mahayana might
be said to make use of suffering in aiding other creatures, it
is always with the growth of this conquoring detachment in mind
and for the purpose of its final fruit.
Weil's understanding of joy is also significant here, for
joy is to suffering what the creator is to the crucified or God
is to Son. Weil says therefore, that "perfect and infinite joy
really exists within God" and as it is such "whether I share in
2g
it or no," its independence from suffering is as ultimate
23. Weil, Seventy Letters, p. 1?8
2ft. Dayal, op. cit., p. 159
25. Ibid., p. 160
26. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 33
22k
as suffering's independence from it—suffering represented by
the perfect and infinite suffering of the moment of Christ's
abandonment on the cross previously referred to. Yet the
ability to conceive full joy is part of the purification and
intensity of suffering, just as "it is necessary to have had a
revelation of reality through joy in order to find reality
27
through suffering." Hereby she relates the two poles,
indicating the mixing of the two, suffering and joy, along the
line of creation which lies between them. Each pole may be
perfect and infinite, but the totality in between is related to
both and thus limited and mixed.
Finally, this matter of suffering is related to that of
evil. Seemingly Weil would allow the presence of evil in God
by recognition of it in the world—one form of his emptiness.
Thus she tells us that "the absence of God is the mode of
divine presence which corresponds to evil" and as Christ marks
the point of absolute absence, his suffering is redemptive and
23
"God is present in extreme evil." This qualifies the meaning
of divine goodness obviously, and in recognition of this V/eil
insists that "the word good has not the same meaning when it is
a term of the correlation good-evil as when it describes the
29
very being of God."
With Weil's divine whole mixing joy and suffering and
presence and absence, therefore, one must recognise it also a.s
mixing good and evil \vithin it in a combination which on the
higher plane may still be spoken of as having good. She
27. Ibid., p. 76
28. Ibid., p. 2k
29. Ibid., p. 89
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asserts therefore that creation is "good broken up into pieces
and scattered throughout evil"*^ and argues that if everything
were worthless evil could take nothing from us—proving the
31
good aspects of life. Interestingly, she also introduces the
polarity "innocence-evil" as an analogous one, it would seem,
to "presence-absence," for she speaks of evil as "the innocence
of God" since it requires us to place him "at an infinite
32
distance in order to conceive of him as innocent of evil,"
Innocence is remote from evil and thereby guilt is excluded
from the unity of God, Christ's crucifixion is suffering,
absence and evil; God is joy, presence and innocence; and
creation, the mediation of the two, mixes these without guilt
within it or the judgement of evil upon the whole,
Impermanence and Soullessness
The second mark of existence also present in Weil as well
as Buddhism is that of impermanence, We have already noted the
inherent dynamism of the cyclical movement which constitutes
the divine life and therefore also creation. The vision of its
eternal continuation justifies Weil's speaking of the universe
as a "perpetual becoming," and yet the changelessness of the
whole she can recognise also as order which she identifies as
33
"equilibrium and immobility," Her universe is a static
internal dynamism. Seen from within, everything is "finite,
3if
limited, wears out," She herself drav/s a parallel with
Buddhism here:
30, Ibid,, p, 62
31, Ibid,, p, 76
32, Ibid., p. 99
33» Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p» 185
3^« Weil, Waiting on God, p, 139
We want everything which has a value
to be eternal. Now everything which
has a value is the product of a
meeting, lasts throughout that meeting
and ceases when those things which met
are separated. That is the central
idea of Buddhism (the thought of
Heraclitus). It leads straight to God.
In pointing out the discrepancy between our desires and the
fact, Weil is even following the Buddhists in the relationship
which they see between human suffering and impermanence.
Although the Buddhists would not say that impermanence led
to God, they would certainly agree that a full understanding of
imperraanence could lead to release understood either in terms
of ending it or transcending it. Weil, with this statement,
can only be reminding us that God is the eternal cycling of
creation/decreation by which he is his own nourishment and his
own consummation of the emptiness which he made from himself.
If we are to seek an analogy to this in Buddhist thought, it
would have to be as we attempted to show, in the identity of
samsara/nirvana achieved by the Mahayana in their intuition of
sunyata.
The third mark of existence, it will be recalled, is
anatta—soullessness. Now Weil not infrequently makes use of
the word "soul" even as she does the word "God" and as with the
latter, only a close and full analysis of what she means by it
can indicate how orthodox or heterodox that use is within the
Christian context. Interestingly, such an analysis is almost
at once productive of another broad similarity between Weil's
vision and that of Buddhism.
35. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 97
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Weil, as we saw, describes each human as "a point through
■56
which God's divine love for self passes" and its "self" as
"only the shadow which sin and error cast by stopping the light
37
of God," and she adds, "I take this shadow for being." By
this description she declares the illusory nature of that which
man identifies himself as and defines him wholly in terras of
the cyclical movement of the divine life. He thus becomes
identified with the ever-changing and moving aspect of God and
thereby is deprived of any true being. Insofar as he "is," he
is illusory and inauthentic.
The negative and undesirable nature of our being is
reasserted also by Weil's view of time as "God's waiting as a
beggar for our love"—that love which of course is not ulti¬
mately ours both because we are not and there is no "us" to
have love and also because the creation is nothing but the flow
7O
of divine love. Clearly however, in our illusory existence
we hinder that flow and reduce God to poverty by depriving him
of his own sustenance.
Knowing this raises the issue of our consent to our non-
being which, if it is given, means that "all our being, all
that in us appears to be ourselves, becomes infinitely more
foreign, more indifferent, and more distant than this uninter-
39
rupted passage of God's love." Weil can easily be seen to be
saying here, that as we abandon ourselves and let the "entity"
we seem to be cease creating illusions so that it is only the
36. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p. 197
37» Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 35
38. Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. Waiting on God,
p. 76
39. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, pp. 197-198
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flow of the stuff of creation/decreation, the truth of our not
being an independent entity will be actualised in us and will
replace the illusion.
There is no mitigating the totality of the soullessness
Weil affirms, for she tells us:
To remit debts is to renounce our own
personality. It means that we re¬
nounce everything which goes to make
up our ego, without any exception.
It means knowing that in the ego there
is nothing whatever, no psychological
element, which external circumstances
could not do away with. It means
accepting that truth. It means being
happy that things should be so,^
Nor is the happiness a "consolation prize," for even the joy of
being the unobstructed return of God to himself, that joy which
flows with the love, is God's joy, perfect joy, and with God
the unobstructed object of that movement "no corner is left for
if 1
saying 'I,'"
Weil's self-abandonment and soullessness is not a
misunderstood case of the absorption of the soul in the divine
fullness, either. To specify this she asserts that the renun¬
ciation of the illusory power of saying "I am" is not a
transference of that power to God, "for the true I am' of God
42
is infinitely different from our illusory one," This truth
is related to that of our false divinity. Creation has nothing
it can return to God, it is only the prelude to decreation and
God's return to himself in the movement of the divine life.
40, Weil, Waiting on God, p, 152
*f1, Weil, Gravity and Grace, p, 27
42, Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p, 87
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Like the Buddhists, Weil sees the implication in this
perspective that possession is utterly meaningless. Thus
"social goods are no more than reinforcements to the power of
43
saying •I,*" she points out, and ultimately "we possess
44
nothing in the world" as everything can be lost. There
remains to us in this view but one free and independent act:
45
The destruction of the "I" which we do as a gift to God. As
beings contingent upon "sin and error" as Weil said, our
contingency's eradication is the eradication of our own being.
To destroy the illusion of being an authentic, existent entity
is the only true act of an inauthentic illusion.
The illusory individual is not just undesirable because it
*■
blocks the divine movement, but also because it seems to be the
producer of even more illusions than that of its self or "I."
This characteristic Weil calls the imagination which, as the
46
"filler up of the void, is essentially a liar." In this
continual filling up activity of the imagination, it blocks
"the fissi&s through which grace might pass"^ and as grace
would function for the destruction of the self, imagination can
be seen as what might be called the instinct for survival of
the self. Itself ultimately unreal, it creates more and more
unreality in the effort to prevent the individual from per¬
ceiving that internal unreality. Like the liar who must lie to
hide the fact of the initial lie, the web of his own making must
ultimately appear for what it is and the truth emerge.
43. Ibid.
44. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 23
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 16
47. Ibid.
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Ultimately in Weil's vocabulary, "self" and "I" and "ego"
and "personality" are used to indicate all of what an entity
imagines itself to be and all of that is illusory and unde¬
sirable. "Soul" is used to designate nothing other than this,
but usually represents the self denuded of imagination and
coming to understand its own poverty of being and is thus
engaged in the destruction of the blocks, of the "I," etc. and
the emptying of error and sin which prevent the divine flow
from moving without obstruction. In its proper state the soul
is no more than the name of a point in that flow of love. As a
point in creation it is clearly empty of being yet insofar as
it represents the free movement of the divine life it is a
possible concept. Thus while "self" should be destroyed, as it
is contingent upon sin and error, "soul" cannot be destroyed as
it is contingent upon the divine life. It is not that soul is
anything real, but precisely that it is itself the emptiness of
God which makes it both indestructible and unidentifiable as an
entity, yet established as a point in creation by the act of
creation.
In this discussion of Weil's soullessness we see the demand
to destroy all sense of possession even the sense of possessing
beingness of one's own. In this sense detachment emerges from
Weil's thought as it does from Buddhist, as a desirable
achievement—both detachment from the world and from the self.
The significance of this truth in Weil's vision cannot be over¬
estimated. Thus even as the Buddha in the second truth pointed
at craving as the key to man's entanglement in samsara, Weil
states: "The reality of the world is the result of our
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attachment." Likewise, even as the Buddhist identified the
reality for which one craved as only apparent and not true
reality, Weil also identifies the reality of the world as "the
reality of the self which we transfer into things" which "has
nothing to do with independent reality," and the latter becomes
k9
perceptible only through total detachment.
As with the Buddhist, Weil's detachment is an absence of
both repulsion and attraction, for she speaks of the ability
"to contemplate what cannot be contemplated (the affliction of
another) without running away, and to contemplate the desirable
50
without approaching." It is with the images of nudity and
death that she develops this "living neutrality," writing that:
The truth is not revealed except in
nakedness and that nakedness is death,
which means the rupture of all those
attachments which for each human being c.1
constitute the reasons for living ....
The detachment is also described as putting one's life into God
even though this means that it is put "into that which we can-
52
not touch in any way" and that doing so "is a death." Indeed,
it is precisely the death to one's own life, one's autonomy
53
which is required.
This detachment which makes it possible for us to accept
death completely also sets the ground for our being brought "to
5k
the state of perfection" —i.e. life as the movement of the
divine life which is empty of self-life. This Weil calls "the
^8. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 13
k9, Ibid.
50. Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 71
51. Ibid.
52. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 99
53. Ibid.
5k, Weil, Waiting on God, p. 152
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forgiveness of debts"—unequivocally classifying attachment to
personal life as undesirable and sinful. Our only valid exis¬
tence is as God's love for himself through us which it is right
that we should give him through the renunciation of that
55invalid existence he permits but begs from us.
Contemplation
Clearly the achievement of this detachment is going to
take some substantial changes in attitudes and values, as the
Buddhist found, and like them, she makes use of meditation which
Weil calls "contemplation," Also this for her would seem to be
of two kinds and reflects a division which the Theravada estab-
r
lish between Insight Meditation and Tranquility Meditation,
Thus on the one hand Weil recognises a contemplation of the
world which will be the basis for our imitation of the order
thereby discovered—that order which is thought by the only Son
of God and which can only be seen as our becoming natural, and
57
what we naturally are. This kind of contemplation is how we
58
are to understand "the supernatural destination of science,"
Such contemplation makes use of the analytical powers of
the intellect and is analogous to Insight Meditation, It
relies on thoroughness and honesty, not faith. Nothing lies
outside its realm for it must contemplate everything that is—
59
however initially appealing or revolting. It looks "with a
certain suspension of judgement" and indifference^ in order to
55, Weil, Gravity and Grace, p, 28
56, Nyanaponika, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation, p, 102
57, Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p, 103
58, Ibid.
59, Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p, 71
60, Weil, Letter to a Priest, p, 12} Waiting on God, p, 35
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achieve that honest analysis which must validate the truth of
her vision—as it was the way she herself arrived at that
vision.
Strictly speaking, however, Weil does not see this kind of
contemplation as making discoveries, but "only good for servile
61
tasks" like clearing the ground. Its great weakness lies in
a tendency toward building dogmatic systems rather than
reducing them to their tell-tale component parts. Thus Weil
seems to wish to use this kind of contemplation not unlike
Nagarjuna's use of sunyata as a negative dialectic to show the
false existence of every "thing" which appears to be real, but
in fact she knows that the intellect is rarely content to
simply dismantle and naturally tends toward dogmatic construc¬
tions, Indeed, in the Theravada Abhidharma system we see
precisely the two sides of Insight Meditation: The reduction
of everything into its smallest meaningful unit to uncover its
true nature; and the construction of detailed and complex
interrelated units to illustrate the system dogmatically on a
macrocosmic (e,g, the dhatus) as well as microcosmic (e,g, the
dharmas) scale,
Weil therefore, also develops a kind of contemplation
analogous to both Tranquility Meditation and prajna. It is of
the nature of a transrational insight, a revelatory experience
which cannot be reduced to intellectual systematisation. In
Weil's context this is "the soul's looking" and "it means that
63
we have stopped for an instance to wait and to listen," For
61, Weil, Gravity and Grace, p, 13
62, Weil, Letter to a Priest, p, 65
63, Weil, VJaiting on God, p, 140
ZJ>k
such contemplation there exists only the void and the essential
silence or "non-reply," but so fundamental is it that one's
Gk
very life may represent its function.
It is with this kind of contemplation that one is related
to the dogmas of religious faith, for "they are things to be
regarded from a certain distance with attention, respect and
65
love." Indeed, such dogmas before the analytical intellect
of insight contemplation may often be revealed to have "strictly
66
speaking no meaning whatever." This means that if they are
found to be productive to the soul's looking experience, their
value is not in what they say but in what they do. Buddhism
knows this characteristic of some verbal formulations very well
and it is seen most clearly in the Zen koan and the Tantric
mantra. It is hard to see how Weil could be saying anything
other than this in her belief that:
The mysteries of the faith are degraded
if they are made into an object of
affirmation and negation, when in
reality they should be an object of
contemplation."''7
Appropriately, as valid contemplation of the soul's
looking type, we must assume that the soul is properly turned
toward God during this and that therefore the flow of divine
love is unobstructed. When Weil says that her adherence to the
68
mysteries is love and not affirmation, then, it has several
levels of potential meaning. It is, insofar as the soul's
6^f. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p. 198; First and
Last Notebooks, p.~~S3
65* Weil, Letter to a Priest, p. ^8
66. Ibid., pp. ^8^f9
67. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 117
68. Weil, Seventy Letters, p. 155
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looking can be seen as the movement of self-love in the divine
life, but a particular aspect of God's love for himself. It is
also, however, insofar as this looking activity of the soul
represents an aspect of a point in creation, a moment of love.
Like prajna, therefore, it is both the-real-and-the-knowledge-
69
of-the-real in one non-dual union. Contemplation of the
mysteries in this manner is therefore but another way of
speaking of a created point of God's self-love.
Taken as a whole, the two modes of contemplation which
Weil conceives do not provide for the credal dogmatism of
intellectual adherence. She allows only an obligation to
direct one's attention—i,e, to contemplate either as a state
of being (the soul's looking/God's self-loving), or as a neu¬
tral, detached intellectual enterprise of analysis. Each of
the two has its proper role and character and prevents a one¬
sided approach to truth, demanding that the man who would
70
engage in them be both a mystic and a scientist.
There is also something of the epistemology behind the two
truths theory of the Buddhists in this development by Weil,
Her assertion that the fundamental question "why?" will be
71
greeted by an essential silence is akin to the realisation
that insight and not verbal response will alone "answer" some
questions. Likewise, when Weil speaks of the transcendental
correlation of contradictories and its relationship to detach-
72
ment she recognises that on one level contradictories do
69, Kurti, op. cit., p, 330
70, Weil, Letter To a Priest, p, 39? Intimations of Chris¬
tianity, p. 103
71, Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p, 83
72, Weil, Gravity and Grace, pp, 89 and 92
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exist while on another they do not. This would explain many
apparent contradictions in Weil's own thought which can be
resolved if considered in the context of her whole system which
recognises the phenomenal "world" on one level and the divine
73
totality understood negatively on another.
Finally, when Murti tells us that "the formless Absolute
(sunya) manifests itself as the concrete world" by means of
- 7^
"its phenomenalising aspect karuna" we are inclined to
contrast Weil's image of God's perpetual love for himself as
the act of creation and decreation. Certainly in Weil creation
75
is an act of God but most of the world as man knows it is the
work of man's imagination and as such a hindrance of the divine




The work of the Bodhisattvas to release men from the
illusory bonds is the work of karuna and likewise Weil con¬
ceives of a similar disentanglement which is achieved through a
dismantling by man of all his illusory aspects—leaving
nothing but the divine love. Indeed, neither Weil's God nor
the Buddhists* Bodhisattvas are intent on turning the world
into a paradise through effective reform, but rather do their
saving work by eradicating the illusion which the world and
men are. Salvation, effected by the phenomenalising force of
the Absolute is therefore a matter of removing something unreal
and not a preservation of anything man knows himself to be,
73, e.g. Weil, Waiting on God, pp. 131» 138, 139? Letter to a
Priest, pp, 3*1-35; Gravity and Grace, p, 625(especially
note the intricacies of the issue of good in the world),
7*U Murti, op. cit., p. 109
75. Weil, Waiting on God, p. 68
76. Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 100
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The metaphysical nature of enlightenment reveals itself
77
here, for Weil's "love . • • is light" parallels the Mahayana
identity of the compassion of the Dharmakaya with prajna. The
fully enlightened Bodhisattva is also one with the aspect of
karuna.
O
The function of love or compassion in such a vision is
clearly not, as Weil explicitly said, consolation or encourage-
78
ment that the world will be made better but rather on the
contrary a way of seeing the world and oneself which causes
both to give way to the absolute reality of "God" or
"sunyata." It should be remembered however, that in this
process the Buddhists believe suffering is dissolved through
the realisation of its illusory nature while Weil integrates
suffering into the very nature of the Godhead.
Summary
In the fragmentary meditations of Simone Weil seems
hidden a vision of the world and man and God with analogies in
Mahayana Buddhism. She portrays creation as a dynamic struc¬
ture filled by man's imagination with illusory but seemingly
existent stuff (including himself) which can however, by
contemplation, be seen to possess the characteristics of
suffering, impermanence and soullessness. Rightly understood
creation is the emptiness bounded on one side by the divine
self-emptying and on the other by the divine self-emptied.
These two constitute opposite poles united into one whole by
the mediation of the spirit, itself the dual embodiment of
77« Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 13
78. Ibid., pp. 13 and 105
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creation/decreation, Each man is a point on the line between
these two extremes through which the movement of self-love and
self-consummation flows—unless because of the evil of sin and
error he has become an obstruction, thinking that he is,
desirous of existence and good. As the latter his situation is
inexpressibly tragic because incomparably wrong. His task is
to turn himself and thereby destroy his self so that he might
again be an authentic point in the nothingness which is not un¬
real only in that "compared with it, everything in existence is
79
unreal,"
Weil does not, however, as we noted, possess a clear
absolute such as sunyata although the word "God" when it refers
to what is more properly termed the Godhead, encompasses all—
the totality of Weil's negative vision. Still, there is no
nirvana to stand outside and offer solace to the awful claus¬
trophobia her bipolar universe can arouse, for those character¬
istics of the world which the Buddhist would seek mastery of
and freedom from, Weil recognises as aspects of the divine life
which must therefore be affirmed and fully actualised. Her
emptiness does not free but defines and obligates. Enlightened
man is not identified with the absolute but with a point in the
flow of divine love.
Consequently, Weil's system is closer to the Buddhist
system if described at the level of active nirvana—just short
of the absolute (sunyata). She does not provide for its reso¬
lution in stillness even though she envisions that its change
has no significance, accomplishing nothing, except its own
79» Weil, Gravity and Grace, p, 13
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perpetuation. She rejects the world created by man's
imagination but not creation itself which is the deifugal or
withdrawal movement balanced and neutralised ultimately by its
reversal and the return of God to himself. Movement described
as love is thus absolutised rather than stillness.
2^0
CHAPTER 12: Focusing on the World
Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Secularity
One of the most notable characteristics of the late
fragments of Bonhoeffer with which we are concerned, is his
desire to find God in the world as the world is encountered
before a division into sacred and profane—or to put it other¬
wise, Bonhoeffer wishes to view the world as would a secular
modern man and then say: This secular world shows the divine
presence. Thus precisely in its ungodliness he asserts the
1
presence of God and hxs nearness.
This is however, to understand divine nearness and even
God in a wholly new light and the revolution involved is not
unlike the revolution introduced by the Mahayana when they
identified nirvana and samsara with each other. It involves a
v »
complete reorientation of thought so that what one expects to
see in viewing existence is drastically altered from the nature
of previous expectations, Bonhoeffer was concerned that pre¬
viously the Christian tradition had looked for God at those
points where men felt their limitations: Death, weakness,
ignorance, the mysterious. In the face of these he could
"recognise" God and thus they not only said something about
where God was to be found, but also something of what he was
all about and what his relationship to man and his world was,
Bonhoeffer's suggestion is essentially that the tradition
is wrong on both counts. First of all, God is no more in man's
1, Bonhoeffer, op, cit., p, 12^-
2*f1
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weaknesses and ignorance than in his strengths and understanding.
Secondly, he is not just the numinous power outside that domain
where we are at home and comfortable and God is an alien. If
God is to be affirmed at all he must be affirmed as something
which has no special domain or possession such as the opposite
of the secular, immanent and profane. Indeed, the pairs
secular/religious, immanent/transcendent, profane/sacred are
made obsolete by what Bonhoeffer suggests. Man's realm and
God's realm collapse into one as does the distinction between
nirvana and samsara in Mahayana,
The danger which the polarisation reveals, is being felt
by both Bonhoeffer and Kahayana in their modification—namely
that the poles v/ill be represented by good/bad, flee from/flee
towards, authentic/inauthentic, worthwhile/not worthwhile. It
was felt that nirvana must not be thought of as something else
than sarasara, a sort of alter-existence to which one could
3
escape for the pleasant continuation of their samsaric self.
Since what one is, is only samsaric, there is nothing to go to
nirvana and therefore also no nirvana to go to; and since
everything is empty, one's samsaric self and nirvana are the
same thing—identifiable with each other,
Bonhoeffer saw the Christian church as offering God as a
sort of refuge in the face of man's limits* To the extent that
one experienced boundaries in one's living experience, to that
extent one would be aware of God and his realm. Likewise such
a man, if he was very aware of God, could doubtless come to
2. Ibid,, p, 104
3« Streng, op. cit., p. 75
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prefer to pass over into the security of God's realm, free from
the limitations which frustrate here. In continuous and subtle
ways if not in conscious and fully directed ones, there could
be an attempt to abandon the confines of the known for the
freedom of the unknown. The danger of this dualism then is the
danger of escapism.
That danger of escapism is itself the danger of seeing
incorrectly what one wishes to escape from. Neither nirvana
nor God must, following the import of Bonhoeffer's and Maha-
yana's thought, prevent us from understanding the full nature
of our existence, from knowing it for what it is and from
making right use of it. Bonhoeffer's prison life set him in a
new environment more lacking in contact with "God's realm" than
any previous one he had known. There he did not attend church,
nor at times read the Bible, but he did read such books as one
on the worldview of physics and watch his secular companions
k
for even a hint of awareness of transcendence. In this new
environment he began to acquire a new perspective.
The result of Bonhoeffer's new perspective was a question¬
ing of the traditional segregation which lumped the sacred and
religious with a transcendent God and the secular and profane
with an immanent presence which was more an absence due to an
abdication which permitted man his autonomous realms so long as
due recognition existed that his autonomy was by a gracious
loan which may be revoked at any time. Likewise, the Mahayana
emphasised, through the identification of nirvana and samsara,
nirvana too could not be segregated. It was not a special kind
k, Bonhoeffer, op. cit., pp. 82, 79-80, 103-10*t
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of reality in a special kind of place. Bonhoeffer was made
aware of the error of segregation by the retreat of religion
from his personal world while the Mahayana discovered it by the
retreat of anything substantial from samsara.
Thus the secular (Bonhoeffer usually used the term non-
religious) functioned as did sunyata. Viewing the whole as
secular, God becomes identifiable with the whole and thus with
secularity. Viewing the whole as empty of beingness or sub¬
stance, samsara becomes identifiable with emptiness and thus
with nirvana. Obviously important differences exist between
the two concepts and their functions, but there is a parallel
effect: Each serves to shatter the validity of a segregating
and polarising understanding of the ultimate value of their
existence.
Also, for both Bonhoeffer and Mahayana, the destruction of
the ultimate validity of the polar understanding reordered the
question of value and worth. Thus Mahayana illuminated
samsara's full potential in a way which it was felt corrected
the obscuration of that potential which occurred in Theravada
5
thought. Samsara became as much the realm of the fully
enlightened being as was nirvana. Indeed, the fact that no
distinction existed and samsara was the realm where salvation
is meaningful, meant that samsara became more appropriate than
nirvana. The superficial effect of the sunyata concept was to
re-evaluate both samsara and nirvana so as to bring them into
alignment.
5. cf. Smith, "The Ideal Social Order as Portrayed in the
Chronicles of Ceylon^" The Two Wheels of the Dhamma, p. 51
which suggests this criticism is illfounded.
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By the same token, the recognition of the utter secularity
of the world made it essential for the man who still wished to
speak of God, to understand some essential link between God and
secularity by which in turn his whole secular world gained a
previously withheld value. Only through this technique can the
rejection of the religious category's claim not amount to a
rejection of that which the religious category claimed to
possess.
Of course, the difficulty is whether or not God can exist
apart from the polarity which identified him before, Sunyata
as a negative dialectic might provisionally evaluate more highly
samsara and devaluate nirvana in relation to some overly
simplified view of their difference, without losing its
ultimate significance. Indeed, since its ultimate significance
is really its ability to demonstrate the function of emptiness
as infinitely applicable even to itself, nothing whatsoever can
annul its supremacy. Thus the identity of samsara and nirvana
only supports and reflects sunyata's significance.
When the segregation of God's realm from man's realm
breaks down however, God ceases to be something clearly other
than man and his world, A God identifiable with the world of
man, fully integrated into it, is either no longer identifiable
as himself or the world is no longer identifiable with itself.
To say something was secular was to say something was not other
than but one with us. To say something was religious or sacred
was to identify it as somehow representative of something other
than man's world. Insofar as Bonhoeffer was attempting to
secularise God therefore, he was making it impossible for us to
recognise God as a positive concept, God-realm and man-realm
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merge, into one new, unnamed realm. Mahayana could name it no-
realm because Mahayana develops along the lines of a negative
dialectic, but Bonhoeffer has nowhere else to go. This is what
causes him to say that God is now the ungodly.
Bonhoeffer's situation is clearly not just the result of
his rejection of the secular/religious polarity, but primarily
the result of his preference for secularity over religiousness,
because as we have said in comparing it to sunyata, what is
secular lays claim to that by which the religious previously
distinguished itself. This is in contrast to the atheist who
denies that there is anything more divine in the religious than
in the secular intending thereby to challenge the significance
of divinity. Bonhoeffer is denying that there is anything more
divine in the religious than in the secular, intending thereby
to challenge the significance of the religious.
That living is thus a fully secular activity where the
concept of God is not functional or meaningful is recognised by
Bonhoeffer's affirmation that "before God and with him we live
£
without God." In an empirical and not an ontological sense,
God is empty of meaning and purpose. God does not function—
but sunyata does. Secularity functions, but nirvana and
samsara do not. Thus Bonhoeffer's Christian must be secular
with the same urgency that Mahayana Buddhists must be sunya—
i.e. attain prajna. To realise each within the context of each
one's system is the appropriate goal. Bonhoeffer denies that
there is any ultimate truth in religion and religiousness, Maha¬
yana denies that there is any ultimate truth in samsara or
nirvana.
6. Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 122
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Autonomy
From the individual's point of view, Bonhoeffer's positing
of God in the secular non-religious every day stuff of life and
the universe, raises the question of the significance of the
Christian doctrines of Christ and salvation, for as he himself
recognises, Christianity has aligned itself with religion
7
against the secular and to deny the one threatens the other.
Inevitably, therefore, a drastic revolution takes place here
too.
First of all, Bonhoeffer is consistent in his vision of
g
autonomous man who lives without divine assistance —i.e.
wholly secular insofar as all that he is expected to be and to
do is fully represented by the potential of the secular world.
There are no supernatural forces, no miraculous interventions
to be expected. Man is to consider his world as the wholeness
from which he must complete any incompleteness which he may
experience. This is not to say that he will not fail in the
process, but only that there is no other way to success except
on this principle. Men living without some other-worldly
source of aid are living truly.
In this he is like the Buddhist who ultimately realises
that the achievement of prajna or the cessation of the dharma
streams is of his own doing and no one else's. Nor does this
vary from the Bodhisattva ideal if it is taken in the context
of beings doing only what is "naturally" possible for beings to
do. The doctrine of transcendent Buddhas shows a somewhat
greater similarity to soteriological theism at this point.
7. Ibid., p. 91 ff.
8. Ibid., p. 122
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however, for it stretches the analogy nearly to the breaking
point to make the desired achievements dependent on each man's
ultimate unity with the Dharmakaya which from great love and
mercy produces the transcendent Buddhas. Yet even so, the
function of divine assistance is never so absolute, so essential
and final as, for example, in the orthodox Christian doctrine
of redemption.
Specifically facing the non-soteriological nature of what
he is saying, Bonhoeffer cites the disappearance of interest
in an individual salvation and asserts that there is no need
for "a last refuge in the eternal from earthly tasks and
9
difficulties." What meaning salvation has must relate to this
world and not to any other. What happens to man must happen to
him in relation to it. It is both the realm in which he has
meaning and the realm in which he must make that meaning and
salvation is salvation to it and bears its full meaning in the
. , . . 10
context of living in it--i.e. before death or extinction.
Again, the parallel with Buddhist understanding is
striking. Buddhist salvation is precisely salvation in
samsara—never salvation from samsara. Just as man is a being
in need of being freed from samsara—something which both
happens in it and continues in it—so man is a being in need of
realising the full potential of secular existence. Such a
realisation is prajna, enlightenment, nirvana (in the Theravada
sense of sopadhisesa-nirvana); and Bonhoeffer's understanding
of salvation. All represent a reality of which one can say:
9. Ibid., pp. 9k and 112
10. Ibid., p. 112
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This is to realise the full potential of phenomenal reality
available to the individual man.
As with the Buddhist however, Bonhoeffer could scarcely be
understood to be suggesting thereby something which is seen by
the individual as capable of being fulfilled by the individual
independently of his awareness of other men and other sentient
beings. The truest vision of salvation, therefore, is a social
one. For the Theravada this means that one's consciousness
must be structured so as to operate by the lines of love for
all creatures as well as the realisation that in bringing the
flow of their own streams of dharmas to an end they are thereby
taking a step which they are responsible to take and should in
no way avoid taking toward the eventual cessation of all streams
of dharmas and for the prevention of further suffering in their
own. For the Mahayana this means that each man is one with
samsara and will not have attained the final perfection until
©
all of samsara is perfected. Of course, for Mahayana this also
means that each man's path is that of the Bodhisattva rather
than that of the arahant.
For Bonhoeffer it has to do with the proper orientation,
order and quality of life in the secular world, but there is no
clue that he understands or envisions this in a Utopian manner.
On the contrary, Bonhoeffer's analysis of the world—the only
world, the secular world—selects suffering as central to the
enterprise. The suffering about which he writes is intimately
related to the concept of weakness and therefore implies the
deterministic nature of the world, the vast complexity and
magnitude of its forces, the relative and even ultimate inabi¬
lity of man to substantially alter the nature of its running
and thus his existence within it.
2k9
There will be no Utopia where man can be himself yet free
of death, pain, suffering of all kinds, because God and man are
both secular—i,e, they are both of this world and that means
being weak and suffering. The meaning of the Christ event is
precisely this, God is weak and suffering in the world—he can
11
do no more than man in the world. If there is anything he is
not, it is a being or force or reality beyond and outside the
world which by a trick of the incarnation is preparing to
translate man to another realm.
In fact, Bonhoeffer's vision of the Christ event is not a
vision of it as a message of God's identity with man and man's
existence but as a message to man of exactly what his identity
as a man is and how he is to exist. The symbols of the Christ
event show man that the way to live is as powerless and
suffering, identifying with God thereby rather than God's
identifying with man. Thus to be Christian is to follow Christ's
lead, as he was God 3aying: This is how I am and this is how
you are to be—weak and suffering. Such weakness and suffering
is watching with God, as in <3ethsemane, and this is the
12
central meaning and substance of life.
Such affirmation of suffering does seem to be the recog¬
nition of it as an essential characteristic of the world and as
related somehow to the deterministic nature of its structures
against which man is unable to effectively struggle. Acceptance,
but more than acceptance—identification—with these realities
is required. Consequently, Bonhoeffer would seem to be
11. Ibid., pp. 123-124
12. Ibid., p. 122
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sanctifying a unique kind of Christian detachment which
plunges into the world and anticipates a living experience
characterised by suffering and weakness. It does this for no
reward other than the fact of its thereby identifying with God.
This is not the Mahayana acceptance of suffering by which
the Bodhisattva intends to aid other creatures in their evolu¬
tion toward enlightenment, for there is no prajna to release
men from it. Nor is it Theravada detachment which is based on
a basic conviction that samsara is fundamentally undesirable
and suffering is one of its elements to which one must become
detached. The Theravada detach themselves from their suf¬
fering, whereas Bonhoeffer'S detachment is such that by it man
can suffer in identification with God freed from visions and
dreams of rescue from existence in some supernatural salvation.
Yet Bonhoeffer does speak of conquest of power and space
13
which God achieves by his suffering and weakness. Such a
more positive prognosis or interpretation of what is going on
bears no direct relation to the individual suffering Christian,
although it may to the whole body of suffering Christians—the
14
Church. With no development of this thought from Bonhoeffer
before his death it seems proper only to suggest that he is
referring to some sense of control through having risen above
and somehow, out of one's own resources, transcended all that
the world can do. The phenomenon of psychological mastery even
in the midst of physiological trauma is familiar to self-
mastery training. One who expects to suffer and is ready to do
13. Ibid., p. 122
1*f. Ibid., p. 80
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so, for example, cannot be threatened or intimidated or injured
by the occurrence of suffering in any way which he has not
already fully integrated. Likewise one who expects to die and
has come to know that when or how it occurs is an irrelevancy,
cannot be startled by the appearance or character of his
imminent death. Such a person we would say, is "on top" of his
situation and it is perhaps this kind of conquest to which
Bonhoeffer refers.
Bonhoeffer may therefore be saying that God ultimately is
victory insofar as it is a case of the world not doing anything
to him he does not desire. It is a case of God choosing
suffering and weakness and death in the world, han accepts it
only, but God chooses it and therein lies the crucial difference.
God is ultimately in control of his situation and this alone
15
constitutes his help to man.
William Hamilton
Perhaps the most fruitful development by Hamilton is to be
seen in his move toward a world-affirming mode of Christianity
which attempts to establish itself without the baggage of a
faith-supported dogma or a specific eschatological hope for the
future. Thus love becomes the key to his claim that the life
he lives is Christian and the essential ingredient of his world-
affirmation. He understands the radical movement to which he
sees himself as belonging, as a movement from institutional
religion with its rituals, practices, account of history, pro¬
clamations about God,to one of identification with the world
and participation in its activities.^
15. Ibid., p. 122
16. Hamilton, "American Theology," op. cit., p. 7» "The Death
of God Theologies Today," op. cit., p. 37
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On whether the world in its profane development with which
he now casts his lot ia a prize or a problem, Hamilton must in
the main be seen as accepting the latter. This is so even
17
considering the optimism which he champions and the almost
18
ecstatic utterances about "Jesus in the world," for the over¬
all tone is one of mixed pain and possibility. Hamilton's
secularity is neither Utopian nor pessimistic. He writes about
19
the suffering of the world but there is a moderation in his
tone which seems to reflect an acceptance of its inevitability
without consistently elevating it—or indeed any other charac¬
teristic except the world's natural secularity—to a position
of being a fundamental and absolute characteristic.
In his development, Hamilton works without metaphysical
categories for the most part, intent upon the problem of des¬
cribing the radical Christian's joint alienation from the
substance of the tradition and instead his citizenship in the
world. Despite its disruptive effect upon all traditional
Christian thought, Hamilton concerns himself with expressing
and formulating the nature of Christianity without its familiar
religious materials wherever possible. His symbols of Christ
and God being no longer sustainable in the worldview of tradi¬
tional dogma, he attempts a rejection of the latter and utili¬
sation of the former: Christ infused into the world to lend
value and meaning to the secular stuff of human experience.
17» Hamilton, "The New Optimism," op. cit., p. 159 "The
Shape of a Radical Theology," op. cit., p. 75
18. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
p. ^9 ff.
19» Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, p. pp. 91-92;
"Banished from the Land of Unity," op. cit., p. 63
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It would seem such an enterprise is far removed from
Buddhism, The world is taken as man's only home and life as
being at home. Neither heaven nor hell beckon the radical from
this realm of his being, and within that realm there is no
struggle for escape, nor progress toward a divine order,
Christianity enlightens the world-dweller on matters of living
in the world's center—the focus of his concern as his back is
turned upon all kinds of "boundary situations," Thus Hamilton
■*
does not engage in analyses which might provoke something like
the Buddhist understanding of dukkha, anatta, anicca but
neither does he forcast progression into some Kingdom of God,
He lacks a soteriology largely because he posits nothing from
which man must be saved, Man is a world-dweller and dwelling
in the world is his sole occupation however ambiguous such
existence is.
The only hint of a numinous quality or religious tension
in Hamilton's writings is in the unwavering vigor with which
he points Christians deeply involved in God and the church away
from these distractions toward "the world, worldly life, and
20
the neighbor as the bearer of the worldly Jesus," What
meaning divinity had in the past is rejected or assimilated but
in either case is denied its character as an authentic external
norm which by its very nature condemns the world to dependency
and inadequacy, Hamilton, like the other secularists,
experienced the implosion of Christian values by which all other-
worldliness was emptied into this world which becomes the new
center.
20, Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op, cit,,
P. 37
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A hint of the Bodhisattva's ultimate concern for the
salvation of all sentient beings bound in samsara is reflected
in the new center to Hamilton's vision. That is, when Hamilton
makes other men the center of the Christian's concern and life,
we feel that theme is highly reminiscent of the full import of
the Bodhisattva's vow. Such energy as flows through the
Christian and the Bodhisattva is to be functional for others.
Hamilton however lives for the world because it _is the world
and his task is to live for it. The Bodhisattva of course
intends the release of all sentient beings in samsara from its
e>
illusory alienation from nirvana.
Hamilton has not developed for us the significance of
Christ being hidden in the world and our consequent ability to
21
become Jesus and form Christ among men in the world. Certainly
these themes however remind one of the belief in Mahayana that
all men are really Buddhas because the Buddha nature is really
hidden in all men and thus enlightenment is not a creation of it
22
but the utilisation of it. The Buddha nature however trans¬
forms man's existence when it becomes activated and Hamilton
does not tell us what the effect of Christ's universal reality
is.
One wonders if Hamilton intends the universalised Christ
to represent the highly devotional ideal of the Dharmakaya, for
25
example, thereby making the profane but a mask for the sacred.
If such is the case, again it is not developed for Hamilton
21. Ibid., pp. 49-50
22. Conze, Buddhist Scriptures, pp. 139-144
23. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
P. 49
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never in tone or content strays from the seemingly unalterably
secular and profane character of his world, so that by default
his Jesus in the world must represent the profanisation of the
sacred and not the reverse. On this level, Hamilton can only
reflect a strong contrast of tone with Buddhism.
Summary
Bonhoeffer and Hamilton represent an effort to transfer
the values of God and Jesus and Christ symbols into the world-
at-large. There is on their part an effort, in other words,
at sacramentalising the secular which seemes, as we have just
seen, more effective as the opposite. Neither wants to get
caught up in talking about the way the world is in a metaphy¬
sical sense, nor in talking about anything except the world and
man as a part of it. Yet their practice of using Christian
materials in this activity surely indicates that what they want
to say can be said and must be said in these forms, indicating
further that secularity incorporates some of what came and still
comes from the religious heritage of man.
256
CHAPTER 15: A Functional Problem
Gabriel Vahanian
Iconoclasm
Gabriel Vahanian believes in some transcendent entity upon
which man is dependent for his own existence and to which man
1
owes his allegience, Vahanian also knows that it would be
unknown to man were it not somehow also immanent and this
immanence he posits as God's reality "attested in the world and
its empirical phenomena through the structures of human exis-
2
tence, of man's works and his word," Thus Vahanian represents
a twofold emphasis: The transcendent and culture. The first
is the unknown realm of God, the second is the realm of God's
creation in his own imageless image. Whatever "God" means to
Vahanian must include something of both realms.
Buddhism and Christianity probably differ most significantly
at precisely the point of the transcendent realm. In Mahayana
thought the meaning of everything must be arrived at through
S
the ultimate device for understanding it: Sunyata. In
Vahanian's view nothing assumes its proper perspective short of
/_
its right relationship to the Transcendent, Bunyata clearly
creates no thing but it does reveal the ultimage no-thing-ness
of everything which is. The Transcendent is, on the other hand,
that which establishes the thingness of everything. Creation
is dependent but it is not empty, it is other than the trans¬
cendent but it is not devoid of structure for accepting the
transcendent,
1, Vahanian, The Death of God, pp. 1^-15
2, Vahanian, No Other God, p, W]
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In Theravada dharma-theory( nirvana exists apart from the
momentary dharmas which constitute samsara, and in its quies¬
cence and eternality it differs from them# Again it does not
create and sustain the momentary dharmas, representing instead
only a "transcendent Other" wholly beyond samsara and all of
its formations# Yet what the dharma of nirvana and the realm
of the transcendent other require is an uncompromising icono-
clasm# To even thus describe them is to place them utterly
beyond further of man's concepts of them and every attempt
which he would make to bring them down within the scope of his
existence#
Throughout both Mahayana and Theravada the difference
between Vahanian's transcendent entity and their unspeakable
ultimates is seen most clearly in the Christian (perhaps even
3 'Western) concept of "creator," Even if sunyata provisionally
allows the whole to be represented as the Dharmakaya or active-
nirvana and thus describes it as "divine reality," the
empirical world is not anything other than illusion which with
if
the correction of that illusion will dissolve into emptiness#
Sunyat'a, the dharma of nirvana and the transcendent deity,
share an ultimate ineffability and require that care be taken
in order that they do not become erroneously substituted by
some idolatrous attempt to grasp them intellectually. Therefore
sunyata is available only through prajna and on the level of
discursive thought must be turned upon itself to protect and
remain true to its ultimate significance by the denial of any
3# Bloefeld, The Way of Power, p. 213
*f# Ibid., pp# 51-62
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reality other than sunya reality in all that sunyata means to
5
the minds of men# Likewise the dharma of nirvana can only be
ascribed negative values and to make it a desired goal would be
to create an image of it which would prevent its significance
c
from being realised.
Amid this complex of linguistic, logical and verbal
inadequacies stands also the transcendent deity Vahanian
defends. In it he gives iconoclasm a function not unlike the
dialectical use of sunyata. Thus he says:
Iconoclasm is, for all practical
purposes, the essential ingredient
of monotheism as understood in the
Biblical tradition. Without this
element, faith in God loses its
indispensible character, and can
result neither in radical commitment
to God nor an equally radical and
iconoclastic involvement in the
world.7
Precisely because God cannot be conceptualised Vahanian sees
that "religion and its gods are ... so many screens, so many
g
obstacles between the living God and man." Thus the only
proper position is the consistent rejection of all images of
God which claim to represent the one true God—it is that
9
methodological atheism which characterises Vahanian's position.
The result of an iconoclastic attitude toward the
idolatrous pretences which religion is responsible for is here
surprisingly analogous to the result of prajfla. By prajna
therefore one empties the gods and every other pretender to
5. Murti, op. cit., p. 356
6. Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p. 211
7. Vahanian, Wait Without Idols, p. 26
8. Ibid*, p. 230
9. Vahanian, No Other God, p. 82
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absoluteness of any substance or being which would allow the
10
place they claim, Vahanian expects man to be able to see
that there is a God but man can have no God, just as the
Buddhist affirms that man can attain an insight which will
show him the falsity of the gods he worships, yet also the
true nature of his own status. The ultimage effect of sunyata
upon the religious structures of man can be no less deflationary
for them than the effects of iconoclasm on those same struc¬
tures, despite the fact that Vahanian maintains the reality of
God by means of that iconoclaam.
For Vahanian however, this serves as a barrier which must
cause us to turn around and accept the significance of creation,
for him an ultimate one and not an illusory one. Although the
whole of human experience continues to be understood icono-
11
clastically this does not empty it of meaning but only
defines the limitations and structures of that meaning, God is
thus not a "goal" any more than is nirvana, but his ultimate
reality prevents even the reality of the world from being
treated as a substitute for him, albeit the proper and divinely
constructed environment for man.
The task which Vahanian feels each man is confronted with
is the task of living iconoclastically in God's creation.
Religion insofar as it speaks and acts in a manner consistent
with faith in transcendence succeeds in this but insofar as it
12
puts forward a concept of God it fails, Secularity is the
realm in which this is done so that religion cannot justify its
10, cf, Bloefeld, op, cit,, p, 178} Gonze, Thirty Years of
Buddhist Studies, pp. 46-^-7 (n. item 9)»
11, Vahanian, No Other God, p, 34
12, Vahanian, The Death of God, p. J>6
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separation of itself from the world. This is all part of the
iconoclasm which desacralises the world and dedivinises
13
nature, however, and the function of uncovering God in the
world of man. Iconoclastic religion never gives God to man for
that is what it denies is possible, rather it gives man his own
image which is no less his own and proper image by virtue of
its being shared with God in some way man cannot know.
Anthropology
Iconoclastic religion therefore is more anthropological
than theological for it tells man what God is not (namely any¬
thing which claims to be God) and what he himself (man) is.
That the icon of God is irrecoverably hidden in the icon of
man (man knows his own image but not God's which he can
affirm only iconoclastically) is the secret of man's valid
existence and its ultimately dependent nature, Man is made in
the image of God but neither man nor the rest of creation is
divine,
Vahanian understands the incarnation as the unknown
seeking the known which is the reverse of the known seeking the
unknown—a process of which the inevitable result is the dis-
15
paragement of all that is creaturely. It is therefore the
authentification of man but not by man—rather by God from
16
without. As such it constitutes the "crisis of religion"
because it shows up its failure to measure man's goodness and
17
ignorance and make man like God, The incarnation does this
13. Vahanian, No Otner God, p, 8
1*f, Ibid,, p, SO




by virtue of repeating the image of God available to man as the
image of man; and demonstrating the image of man as combining
18
both involvement in the world and commitment to God. These
are one, not two as Vahanian sees them, and thus, while the
world is truly secular and not divine, it is "the theater of
God's glory," and secularity is "the only religious mode of
being.
To invest the present and immanent "with the attributes of
the eternal and transcendent" is, in Vahanian's view, the error
20
of religiosity, however, which clearly shows what the
incarnation is not. Thus the incarnation is not a shortcut to
God since one must talk about God to talk about Jesus but as
one can only speak iconoclastically about both God and man,
21
Jesus too is subject to the pervasive iconoclasm. Thus
Vahanian tells us affirmatively only that:
The incarnation means God's proximity
to man, his presentness to all that is
created. It means that God does not
turn his back on this world, and that
man must not either.22
Jesus is not therefore, a judge who will separate "the elect
23
from the reprobate" but rather that which points "to every
man's inseparability from God's presence, even if that presence
is so stifling, so doubtful, that it is abysmally felt as an
2*f
absence."
18. Vahanian, No Other God, p. 8
19. Ibid., pp.~U-9
20. Vahanian, The Death of God, p. 67
21. Vahanian, Nc> Other God, p.
22. Vahanian, Wait Without Idols, p. 127
23. Vahanian, The Death of God, p. 25
2*f. Vahanian, Wait Without Idols, p. 132
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What this means is that man fails the iconoclastic ideal
whenever he turns to a search for the eternal and transcendent#
To say that nirvana is and that it is not a goal, or to say
that all is sunyata but that sunyata itself is not something in
which one can finally find being and permanence, and thus
neither is it a goal, properly speaking, is perhaps parallel to
this insight of Vahanian's. Vahanian however, clearly implies
a transcendence which relates to man—indeed even gives him his
existence—and the clear definition of man's place and the
nature of God's presence in it does not abrogate this duality#
It seems one would have to say that man is in the image of
God by virtue of the separate existence from the transcendent
which he is allowed yet that this somehow implies that the
present and immanent is thereby related to the transcendent
which remains inconceivable to man by virtue of its own
ultimate autonomous and truly independent being# The dualism
is complete because of the authenticity of man's realm and the
inavailability of God's realm, but it is incomplete by virtue
of what is required from God to sustain man's authenticity--
namely creation and incarnation#
Samsara in Mahayana thought is denied authentic existence
even of a conditional type by virtue of its empty status#
Vahanian on the other hand, although he has no available God,
witnesses to the fact of the transcendent through the definition
of man's world as the result of creation and scene of incarna¬
tion# By virtue of the incarnation creation is related to the
transcendent—not in a manner which gives it access to the
transcendent but only to its own realm, Relatedness does not
dissolve the duality as it does in Mahayana thought, where it
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is viewed as an infinite relatedness and thus ultimately one,
/ 25
although always a one which is viewed as sunya.
The situation in which Vahanian views man is perhaps
somewhat analogous in this context to Theravada dharma-theory,
recognising the discrepancy caused by the absence of any
relationship between nirvana and the conditioned, momentary
dharmas, It still is the fact that the Theravada believe that
the world of the momentary dharmas does have an independent
existence, that that is the world of samsara and the only one
in which man can purposefully exist—albeit only in the sense
that he is a composition of dharmas. Also the dharma of
nirvana is unavailable to man as man. It is transcendent and
*
inconceivable. The Theravada can not properly see nirvana as
some place in which they will achieve their own salvation just
as Vahanian asserts that the world is the scene of man's
proper existence, Man's realm is not thereby granted a
transcendent value but its own proper value is thereby fully
recognised.
Nor does Vahanian's recognition of the divinely appointed
but not divinely characterised authenticity of creation amount
to a deification which would parallel the Mahayana identifica¬
tion of samsara with nirvana by means of their shared sunyata.
Thus Vahanian's secularity underlines the importance of man's
full acceptance of his world—even while distinguishing between
the right acceptance which embodies an iconoclastic faith in
transcendence and a wrong acceptance which would not only
accept but enthrone the world as a self-sustaining reality.
25» Streng, op, cit., pp, 97 and 159
26k
There is also a significant parallel with both forms of
Buddhism's emphasis on right insight or understanding and
knowledge, in Vahanian's recognition that how one understands
himself and his world can make all the difference between man
fulfilling what is expected of him and not doing so. Thus the
task of religious man is not only to demonstrate a consistent
iconoclasm but also to act as "the avant-garde of society, as
26 27
the axis of culture" in the formation of a "cultural will"
faithful to an iconoclastic faith in transcendence. To fail in
this activity would be the misinterpretation of that word which
23
is "the image of an imageless reality,"
The religious expression of God speaking through the world
and man responding with an iconoclastic secularity reflects the
only numinous and mystical quality of Vahanian's highly
sociological and critical development. This is experienced by
his readers most fully in his analysis of "the word" and
communication. Thus Vahanian writes:
The word is what brings into evidence
the reality of the world, and does so
by expressing the verbal nature of
reality, 29
This represents God's ongoing relationship to the world as
creator for "the world is what takes place in and through the
word," and for Vahanian this means that "without the word the
world is powerless,
Even the words of man's communication are not bearers of a
definite sense, of a content of ideas, but are rather "the
26, Vahanian, No Other God, p, 99
27, Vahanian, "The Future of Christianity," op, cit,, p. 265




ambiguous Yes and No" and the translation of the text of
31
communion. Language is symbolic, Vahanian asserts, "and can
32
communicate only where there is communion." Such a vision
sacramentalises man's struggle to express in speech and action
his religiousness and his secularity in such a way that he is
also in communion (dialogue) with God who is "speaking the
world" in a sense. In such a world the Kingdom of God would be
realised.
Buddhism does not readily offer an analogy to this kind of
communicating transcendence and immanence. Its affirmation of
the authenticity and value of the world along with a real
transcendent which will always stand over and against its
creation is quite alien to the Buddhist intuition of the nature
of reality. Never would samsara be accorded this kind of worth
by the Theravada nor this kind of finality by the Mahayana.
Never would nirvana be accorded this kind of relatedness by the
Theravada nor sunyata this kind of limited and conditional
interpretation.
Thus we can note that, while recognising that salvation
must be worked out within samsara and utilising only what is
inherent in it, Theravada would still never evaluate samsara in
an inherently positive manner as does Vahanian. Likewise, while
equating samsara with nirvana under the dialectic of sunyata,
Mahayana would never concede the autonomy to samsara which
Vahanian posits in creation. The partial parallels such as the
mutual inavailability of a real absolute resulting from
31. Ibid., p. 51
32. Ibid.
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iconoclasm and a dialectic of emptiness, can never alter the
deep discontinuity on the fundamental levels of the two visions.
Dorothee Solle
Solle has attempted to reserve a place for theism with her
representationalism, for it retains God while removing the
problem of theism. The nearest equivalent in Buddhism would be
those beings which Emanate from the Dharmakaya to teach the
Dharma to those for whom the Dharmakaya is inconceivable
because of the delusion of samsara by which they are bound.
This is not however, a true representationalism by any stretch
of the imagination and the similarity of function is not
sufficient to justify a full correlation with Solle's Christ.
Such beings in Buddhism are as ultimately unreal as those to
whom they go--they are projections and not representations in
33
her precisely established meaning.
It is however, of note that Solle posits an ultimate
disappearance of the representation, suggesting in the future
a new relation between man and that which Christ represents to
34
man. The "new earth" of such a situation will also complete
the process of our being represented to God which thereby may
35 36
annul the finality of death. Solle's eschatological hope
would seem to deny the finality of impermanence and soullessness
which the Buddhist would affirm and suggests the Christian
vision of personal continuance. That she ultimately means
anything quite so traditional seems highly unlikely, however.
33. Solle, op. cit., p. 20
3^. Ibid., p. 97
35. Ibid., p. kZ
36. Ibid., p. 97
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given her overall modern and secular tone and concerns. Nor
can one see how representation can preserve within it the
orthodox Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection.
This definitely constitutes a problem in Solle*s thought
although we take her here not to suggest ultimately a solution
to man's finitude which would make it impossible to take it as
including a real death. While representation is double-edged,
God's "death" is a manner of speaking because of the cultural
condition of the absolute whereas man's death is wholly exis¬
tential—i.e. real. Consequently while in this area Solle
sounds most like traditional Christianity and least like
Buddhism, we cannot see how she can ultimately align herself
with the orthodox Christian position.
Summary
Vahanian and Solle must reflect a situation in which the
vast bulk of men and their culture are subject to an incorrect
worldview and understanding of reality which makes the correct
one unavailable. Vahanian suggests that an analysis of the
world in which the whole culture shares will—or at least can—
reveal both the correct vision of the world and of mankind.
Solle offers a dogmatic device to "see man through" the time of
blindness. Buddhism knows both techniques to correct wrong
knowledge; Analysis, which in Buddhism reveals the imperma-
nence of everything or its emptiness; and a dogmatic device in
the form of the theory of dharmas or the concept of sunyata.
While in Vahanian's view the transcendent is displaced by
an iconoclastically motivated methodological atheism, and in
Solle's it is temporally displaced into the future, Buddhism
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displaces its transcendence beyond all opinions and thought
processes (Mahayana) or beyond the world of change (Theravada)#
For all however, the world then becomes critical as the matrix
for man's response to his reality#
The most significant aspect of Vahanian and Solle's
thought however, is that they would insist that the world is
adequate and sufficient, whatever the difficulties of properly
understanding its meaning# Its autonomy has been established
in the sense that no direct intervention of the transcendent
is possible or necessary. Thus in S'olle the seeds of the
future are present in the here-and-now, God-is-dead stuff of
the world just as in Vahanian the creation as creation is
already the complete object of the Transcendent's relations
even if on man's part this requires a dynamic development and
4
history of this awareness#
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CHAPTER 14: The Atheistic Analysis
Paul Van Buren
Methodology
Van Buren is a secularist who is not so intent on
describing what God is doing in the world as he is in under¬
standing what man is doing when talking about God. In this
process he begins from the experience of humanity and from
reflection upon that experience—a perspective he defends even
1
in the face of karl Barth's criticism of it. He seems to feel
himself speaking for a segment of contemporary mankind which he
2
calls variously modern man, secular man, and religionless man,
which has difficulty with much religious language.
The nature of Van Buren's secularity is, at least on one
level, less a matter of theology than a matter of inherited
worldview or cultural disposition. Within this context Van
Buren does not offer an apologetic for the secular realm but
rather draws attention to the pervasive and unavoidable charac¬
ter of it. Thus he speaks of the secular Christian trying to
understand his religion in a secular manner; of the modern man
who is inside and not outside the church; of the religionless
man to whom the distinction of the gospel as the proclamation
of God's reaching down to rescue man as opposed to religion
which is man reaching up to find God, is a meaningless
3
distinction.
1. Mehta, op. cit., p. 54 (the author quotes Van Buren from an
interview with him).
2. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, pp. 11, 84
and 157
3« Ibid., p. 84
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Consistently throughout his writings, Van Buren is then
concerned with speaking about religious matters in a manner
appropriate to men who are fundamentally secular, by which he
means that they insist even religious verbalisations if they
are to be meaningful to them must reflect their perspective
(which by implication is necessarily different from the reli¬
gious one)# He thus is not asking for the acceptance of a
proclamation from another cultural set, but simply that reli¬
gion not be in some special category over against modern man#
Rather, if he were religious at all, modern man could be so
only in some manner faithful to the meaning of his underlying
secularity.
In this sense there is an empiricism and rationalism about
Van Buren's approach which is not unlike a well established
theme in Theravada Buddhism especially insofar as one confines
himself to the immediate approach to the Buddhist claims. Thus
we are told that the teaching of Buddhism is verifiable and not
if
confined to one time or culture. The Buddhists believe that
Buddhist teaching may be individually and personally tested and
does not require any more of an initial commitment of faith
than is required to make the serious attempt at verification#
However, this affirmation of the verifiability of religious
meaning or even of the discoverable character of verifiable
religious meaning must be set in a context for both Buddhism
and Van Buren. Thus for both there is a quality of realism
about the multitude of views and opinions which men believe
they have verified rationally. Van Buren speaks of the
b, Conze, Buddhist Meditation, p, by; Jayatilleke, op. cit.,
p. 390
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necessity of seeing things "in a certain way without feeling
obliged to say that this is the only way in which they can be
5
seen," and he also speaks of the effects of a pluralistic and
relativistic world upon the category of the absolute which has
£
thereby been dissolved. He recognises that in the world where
truth-systems are considered language games, "there could be no
7
one game that was the game,"
Buddhism too recognised that the proliferation of views
and opinions indicated the very great limitations of the
rational mind of man where formulation and verification of
ultimate truths was concerned. Thus it ranked lowest among a
postulated three degrees of knowledge, mere opinions empirically
based and affected by defcp biases within men; placing the
results of scientific and philosophical reflection which were at
least partially objective as somewhat safer but by no means at
the top~a place reserved for illumination characterised by
g
"the identity of the mind knowing the object known," Also the
Buddha is cited as recognising that the method behind concep¬
tual knowledge plays a more important part in its dependability
than the "so-called •ideas' or opinions (ditthi), beliefs and
9
disbeliefs" which people held.
In this same context it is interesting to note Van Burets
interest in what kind of questions were being asked and even in
10
the act of questioning itself. He came to feel, for example,
that the questions to which the classical proofs for the
5. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, pp, ^1-^2
6. Van Buren, "Theology in the Context of Culture," Frontline
Theology, Peerman (editor), p, ^7
7. Ibid.
8. Govinda, op. cit., p. 41
9. Ibid., p. ^0
10. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p, 7
existence of God were an answer, were not properly phrased to
11
be answered. Anselm for example, might well speak of
Absolute Reality but the modern secular man would not speak in
such words, meaning that Anselm's question would no longer be
12
acceptable. Traditional answers about God are therefore
useless insofar as the questions they answered are invalid.
Buddhism too has a deep motif of rejecting certain
questions for a variety of reasons such as their ultimate
irrelevance to what really is relevant to man or their improper
13
formulation. Thus while some questions required categorical
or analytical responses, others could only be "answered" with
1 k
a counter question or set completely aside.
Van Buren's abiding passion for man's linguistic life and
its implications also is reminiscent of the theme in the
Madhyamikan school reflected by Nagarjuna. It is much like
that of the language analyists who insist that:
Words and expression patterns are
simply practical tools of human life,
which in themselves do not carry
intrinsic meaning and do not neces¬
sarily have (meaning by referring to
something outside the language
system.15
Sunyata, as Streng points out, functioning for Nagarjuna as a
denial "that an ontological structure in itself exists corres¬
ponding to any mental concept or rational structure," brought
Mahayana in this context in line with such men as Ludwig
16
Wittgenstein and P. F. Strawson. Van Buren aligned himself
11. Mehta, op. cit., p. 53 (quoting Van Buren)
12. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, pp. 38 and 40
13. Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, p. V?
1^. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 281
15. Streng, op. cit., p. 139
16. Ibid., p. 1^2
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with the same position in his acceptance of the essentials of
their understanding of "language games" and his prolonged
inability to identify anything as "God" if by that one means a
transcendent absolute being.
In this light Van Buren must be seen as departing from an
understanding of the matter like that of the Theravada dharma
theory metaphysics with the effectively transcendent absolute
of nirvana. He is, therefore, more in alignment with Mahayana.
Here however he differs in that he is willing to allow that the
problems connected with the linguistic analysts theories are
likely to be of concern to only some persons, whereas Nagarjuna
believed the similar theories by which he operated effect "the
17
salvation of all existing beings." Van Buren's inherent
relativism creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and exploration
which speaks about "some men" and possible ways of expressing
18
what seems to matter. For Nagarjuna the significance of
universal emptiness relativised everything in an effectively
absolute manner not uncongenial to the evangelistic fervor
19
Mahayana Buddhism frequently shows.
If however, one accepts that Van Buren would not follow
the Theravada in its metaphysics, there still remains that
similarity in the aspects of methodology of concern to us here.
Thus Theravada methodology recognises that the method of
verifying its metaphysics precedes full acceptance of them and
is thus able to share an understanding of the all too fallible
17» Streng, op. cit., p. 142
18. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p. 170; The Edges of
Language, p".' 1^9
19. Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, pp. 5k-
55; Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p. 77» Murti,
op. cit., p. 3^9
27^
nature of cognition left to its own devices, Theravada would
go on, as we have seen, to prescribe meditation as the best
method for verifying its view of the world. Van Buren, true to
the ultimately personal nature of truth which his relativism
forces upon him, must content himself with an exposition of
some of the language games or uses of language which he finds
useful.
Thus certain aspects of methodology are shared in common
by Van Buren and the Buddhists, notably in the anti-metaphysical
and epistemological flavor of their beginning points. In
Buddhism this characteristic caused it to be described as an
empiricism viewed from within and only a metaphysics viewed
20
from without. The status of the metaphysical in Buddhism is
therefore dependent upon its having been disclosed upon the path
of inner experience rather than by pure speculation if it is to
21
be accepted. As Lama Govinda describes the situation:
Metaphysics is an entirely relative
concept, whose boundaries depend upon
the respective plane of experience
upon the respective form and extent
of consciousness. The Buddha over¬
came metaphysics and its problems,
not merely ignoring them, but in an
absolutely positive manner, in that
through training and the extension
of consciousness he pushed back the
boundary lines of the latter so that ^
the metaphysical became the empirical.
Van Buren of course does not undertake anything so
extensive, but the greater part of his writing has to do with
the problems of empiricism and epistemology with the character
and limitations of language always in view. Although he




moderates his early rejection of metaphysics, he does not go
beyond speaking of metaphysics as "a view of things which is
23
our view" when he does allow it. Ultimately however he does
not strive for a complete metaphysics of this sort in his own
development, contenting himself with only partial success in
attaining "a way of seeing the world, of seeing everything"
2k
which he believes would constitute a full mataphysics. What
metaphysics he thus sees himself engaged in fully he defines as
"the attempt to clarify the foundations of our thought and the
25
fundamentals of our language," —which seems to have more in
common, we again note, with epistemology than metaphysics.
If Van Buren never gets to an affirmative description of
the universe and its nature, he thereby shares this situation
in common with the Mahayana who at best arrive at a negative
metaphysics through the doctrine of sunyata but never lose
their antipathy to what would be categorised as a true con¬
structive metaphysical system. One cannot discover a meta¬
physics in a void. The distinction at this point between
Van Buren and Mahayana however is apparent in his belief that
his failure is a requisite of the limitations of human under¬
standing and Mahayana belief that their "failure" is the
requisite of their absolute understanding.
Other Similarities
One is inclined to recognise some further very minor
similarities with Buddhism in Van Buren's thought. For example
26
his discussion of what he calls a "discernment situation"
23. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p. 1^8
2k. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, p. 165
25. Ibid., p. 107
26. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p. 155
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gives rise to the suspicion that this is but another way of
speaking of the sudden flash of insight or illumination not
unlike the Buddhist expects from some meditation techniques
which they have developed (e.g. Zen sartori). Likewise when he
speaks of being "struck by the Biblical story" or its contem-
27
porary portrayal one has the sense of a special insight
derived from contact with certain verbal forms.
This also suggests that the Bible may function like the
Dharma to bring its hearer (or reader) to a special insight.
Thus Hahayana and Theravada texts concur that "one who sees the
28
Truth sees the Buddha" while Van Buren tells us that we
discover the freedom of Jesus for ourselves when "the history
of Jesus and of his liberation of his disciples on Easter is a
29
discernment situation." Certainly the Buddhist's intuition
also associated liberation with what the Buddha was in terms of
the understanding of his truth.
Further, in Van Buren's insistance that Jesus' teaching
was that "our human life cannot be put in parentheses as
preliminary, tentative, only a dress rehersal for a later
30
supposedly real performance which is supposed to transcend it"
we have an affirmation of the benefits of the religious Chris¬
tian insight in this lifetime. Such an affirmation matches
favorably the Mahayana and Theravada belief that nirvana can be
achieved even amid samsara—in the former case through active
nirvana and in the latter through the pre-death nirvana of the
arahant.
27. Van Buren, "On Doing Theology," op. cit., p. 59j Theologi¬
cal Explorations, p. 66
28. Ling, Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil, p. ^f0
29. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p. 151
30. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p. 177
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Indeed Van Buren's treatment of the concept of freedom is
highly reminiscent of that detached freedom from suffering and
desire which the Buddha or Arahant displays. Thus the discern¬
ment situation is not only at one and the same time a libera-
31tion which happens to the Christian and a new perspective,
but it is specifically a liberation exemplified in Jesus. This
freedom is a freedom from anxiety, the need to establish one's
own identity, and a freedom to exist for others in a "solidarity
v/ith men, compassion for them, mercy toward their weakness and
32
wrong." Indeed his death is seen as a measure of this
33
freedom.
It is doubtless easiest to compare such an image of Jesus
with the Bodhisattva ideal in Kahayana thought, even though the
arahant too strives for egolessness, compassion and mercy. It
is easier to see the Bodhisattva*s theoretical career as one
long life for others. The arahant's personal contribution to
the ultimate cessation of all momentary dharraas by the syste¬
matic cessation of his own dharma streams by which he thereby
provides for such dissolution of suffering as he is able,
represents a far less spectacular contribution in some ways.
However, on both counts, Bodhisattvas and arahants are men
like Jesus who live devoid of the grasping v/hich egoism produces
and in full knowledge of their underlying oneness v/ith the
nature and experience of other men. Van Buren only affirms
Jesus' humanity, however, insisting that he is nevertheless
unique by virtue of the ability of his freedom to make other
31. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, pp. 169-170
32. Ibid., pp. 123* 151
33. Ibid., p. 151
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men free. The Buddhist of course would assign that characteristic
to all Buddhas, and be inclined to perceive Jesus insofar as he
reflected it, as having attained Buddhahood,
With regard to God, we can note that Van Buren's general
reluctance to develop a doctrine of God is a weak parallel to
the Buddhist refusal to describe the dharma of nirvana or the
void. Insofar as either could be known it would be only-
through an order of consciousness wholly alien to the mind of
humans who are not far advanced toward those psychic attain¬
ments Buddhism postulates as possible.
Indeed, since neither nirvana nor sunyata can ultimately
be described as experiences, Buddhists v/ould even agree with
Van Buren's anti-theistic linguistic philosophy which denies
"non-verbal experiences,"^ recognising in doing so that the
emphasis for Van Buren is more on the pervasive linguistic
character of ordinary human existence than on the possibility
of human extension beyond what would strictly come under human
experience. The final comment indeed on Van Buren is to point
out that his treatment of the problem of the word "God" in all
his writings serves only to point us back to the issue of
methodology as it has been discussed here,
Herbert Braun
35
Herbert Braun's "unconditional" obligation certainly
suggests an order in the world demanding specific responses which
is somehow apparent to man. It is certain that this does not
require a God, for the Theravada system understands its ethic
3^, Van Buren, The Edges of Language, pp. 66-67
35* Braun, op. cit., p. 215
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as the specific outgrowth of the analysis of reality which
should be apparent to anyone making a successful analysis.
Braun may be referring to such a situation in which one feels
unconditionally obligated to fulfill the clearly necessary
pattern of existence.
It is unclear in Braun, however, to what extent the
scripture is necessary to help man make that analysis, although
the implication is: Not necessary but certainly helpful. It
appears that men discovered how we must live through under¬
standing of their inter-personal relations and in the scripture
then recorded this—albeit in forms now culturally alien.
After the fact, therefore, it may be of some use by demon¬
strating what others have learned, but represents no unique
source of knowledge. One is thus strongly reminded of the
Theravada view of the achievement of the Buddha and of the
nature of the dharma, or the truth.
Alistair Kee
Alistair Kee offers us an analysis which attempts to save
man from total abandonment to a wholly relative universe. That
men must not follow simply any natural ethical rules which
evolve from social structures in a godless world is implicit
in his ethic of transcendence. Some more awesome authority
inhabits man's reality to point out the proper values and draw
man into a struggle of overcoming his disabilities and
weaknesses.
Kee's vagueness as to the nature of the transcendence he
affirms prohibits any clear analysis. Yet he has told us of
36. Kee, op. cit., pp. 1^3» 200
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the validity he sees in "the infinite qualitative distinction"
between time and eternity which means that in some sense (he
disallows "supernatural" or "metaphysical") he recognises an
37
absolute functioning within man's world of experience. Like¬
wise he feels that he can still speak in terras of "ultimate
38
concern (for) that which came to expression in Jesus Christ,"^
39
and even to call this "coming to expression" an "incarnation."
Also, in insisting that ultimately both ways of life—both
that in which Jesus is the measure of all things and that in
which man himself is—are natural, Kee avoids some "super-
2f0
natural" technique for man's proper fulfillment. He admits
that the one requires striving (the way of transcendence) while
the other is adopted unconsciously and effortlessly. Also he
asserts that Jesus makes the other clear but he does so without
if1
re-establishing "the old supernaturalistic metaphysics."
Thus it seems that Kee is striving to describe an
existence in which the pattern of life into which most men fall,
is undesirable and misses certain possibilities which are
connected with such a thorough revolution that when those
possibilities are grasped the entire pattern of life will
change. This conception stands without a personalistic God but
somehow rooted in a non-metaphysical transcendent reality which
qualifies time by validating the meaning of eternity in some
quite unclear manner.
37. Ibid., p. 202
38. Ibid., p. 195
39. Ibid.,p. 212
40. Ibid., p. xxvii
41. Ibid.
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Such a development does not exclude a highly abstract and
general view of Theravada Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism also
offers no God, but the Buddha is indeed an incarnation of a
possibility before all men which when entered into will
radically restructure the pattern of their lives and reveal
significant meaning in time and existence which is not other¬
wise readily understood. Indeed, the dharma teaches a way of
life which requires man to overcome by wholly natural laws the
life which would otherwise and equally naturally occur.
An equation of Jesus and the Buddha would not be allowed
by Kee, however, who insists that his faith to remain specifi¬
cally Christian must see Jesus as "of the utmost significance"
rather than as "one of a long line of great historical figures
who have pointed beyond themselves to something or someone
1+2
greater." In terms of our issue, this seems inapplicable for
the Buddha did not point to something greater but, having
attained enlightenment and nirvana, embodied that "something"
which Buddhism is all about—and anyone duplicating his achieve¬
ment would do the same. Likewise any arahant or highly advanced
adept could be recognised as "of the utmost significance" which
is such a minimal affirmation in this circumstance that Kee
cannot hope to rest his case for Jesus* uniqueness upon it.
Thus Kee's thought remains too provisional and incomplete
for a clear development yet in its skeletal form represents a
primitive worldview one would expect might well escalate along
Buddhist lines. If one takes his belief in the ultimate
inability of men to pursue their own ends and correlates it
k2. Ibid.
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with the Buddhist teaching of impermanence which ultimately
functions to deny men what they desire and crave; and if one
takes his "never-failing Source of power to pursue quite
different ends" and correlates it with the activities which
place one irrevocably on the path toward the desireless
condition necessary for the attainment of nirvana, one can speak
lf3
either as he does of "God" or as the Buddhist would, of
"Dharma,"
It seems that Kee will have to give more substance to his
development than he has if he wishes to preserve its uniquely
"Christian" form in a manner which would satisfy him. Other¬
wise it appears that within his formulation it would 'be as
appropriate to offer the Buddhist Dharma as an answer to the
question: "What kind of reality is it?" as to offer Kee's
ifif
"transcendence" and Israel's "God,"
Summary
In Van Buren, Braun and Kee we have attempts to talk
about men's experience in such a way as to avoid theism yet do
justice to certain profound aspects of that experience. What¬
ever the special qualities of life upon which they focus, in
this process there is a concession of the need to treat those
qualities in the most respectful manner and with the most potent
religious materials available. This category of Christian
atheism is similar to a highly rationalisitic approach to
Buddhism which is generally more common in Theravada develop¬
ment than Mahayana. There is a decided avoidance of myth and
a comparable absence of a definite metaphysics. Yet there is
Ibid,, p, 200
Vf. Ibid., p. 231
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not an absence of some numinous aspect to reality which
indicates that what is going on is intended to be an attempted
retranslation of the accepted meanings of life and not a
devaluation#
28k
CHAPTER 15: The Sacred World
Thomas J. J, Altizer
Three Themes
Altizer presents something of a novelty in that he himself
relates his thought to other religious traditions and conceives
a classification which he calls "Oriental mysticism." Very
early he declared that "Buddhism may fairly be regarded as a
1
representative form or Oriental mysticism," and he has
described the structure of it in this way:
The Oriental mystic follows a path
leading to a dissolution of conscious¬
ness, an inactivity of the self, or a
total transformation of a spa-fcial and
temporal existence into an infinite
and eternal Being. These purer expres¬
sions of the mystical way are consum¬
mated in the epiphany of a primordial
Totality, a Totality that reveals
itself as being the underlying reality
of a seemingly fallen cosmos, and a
Totality that is the original source
of the polarities of consciousness and
the antinomies of history. Yet it is
of crucial importance for our own pur¬
pose to note that the way of the ^
Oriental mystic is a way backwards.
In this development several themes emerge which recur in
Altizer's thought and which appear critical to his understanding
of Buddhism, traditional Christianity, and his own system. The
first theme is that of the temporal direction, the second that
of the ultimate religious reality and the third that of the
status of the profane world.
Beginning with the first we must note from the outset that
at the time of writing his first book, Oriental Mysticism and
1. Altizer, Oriental Mysticism, p. 11
2. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 129
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Biblical Eschatology, Altizer was caught up in the idea that it
was the "reality of history which must be negated and reversed
by the Christian faith," but that later he came to understand
that it was rather the "religious movement to a primordial God
3
or primordial beginning" which must be negated and reversed.
Thus we find him speaking in Mircea Bliade and the Dialectic of
the Sacred of a backward path and a forward path to the sacred,
of a backward movement and a forward movement. Yet in this new
"reversal" Altizer does not mean that the forward movement must
replace the backward, an eschatological replace a "return to
k
the 'nontime' of the primordial beginning." Rather he comes
to think of the reversal as part of a full dialectical movement
in which:
No longer can we dream that the path
to the sacred is backwards, nor can
we live in the vain hope that the
true path is only forwards: The
center is everywhere, eternity begins
in every now.^
The issue is, of course, that neither Theravada nor Mahayana
Buddhism shares the Hindu and Christian belief in a time of
primordial purity. While samsara is, if one is bound to it,
undesirable in some fundamental sense, Buddhists make no
statement of its beginning precisely because time can never
have the substantiality which Altizer's mode of speaking relies
upon. The Buddhist is not involved in "a backward-moving
remembrance or re-presentation (anamnesis) of the sacred events
c
of the past or the primordial Beginning."
3« Altizer, Toward a New Christianity, p. 301
Altizer, Mircea Eliade, p. 195
5» Ibid., p. 200
6. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 131
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In Theravada dharma theory there is no dharma for time and
as dharmas are either eternal or momentary they lack in them¬
selves a passage of time. Thus for the Theravada it is not
surprising to find that "time is the concept (kala-parmatti) by
which, first and foremost, mental states are distinguished in
7
internal intuition." Likewise in Mahayana thought, time must
fall under the device of sunyata and yield itself to ultimate
emptiness as well. Time can be no more real than any other
aspect of samsara/nirvana.
That the unanswerable questions in Buddhism included
precisely the question of the world's beginning is a further
g
and final aspect of the timeless characteristic in Buddhism.
Likewise through the teaching of the paticcasamuppada Buddhists
underline that they neither posit a first beginning nor believe
that one can imagine a time when there was no ignorance or
9
craving for existence.
It is impossible to know whether or not, in fact, Altizer
has misunderstood this aspect of Buddhism and consistently
interpreted it as a religion which represented a backwards
movement or carelessly did not distinguish it at this point from
traditions where such a movement is present. If it is a misun¬
derstanding it represents a distortion of which his reader
would do well to be aware, for it means that whenever Altizer
speaks of Oriental or Eastern understanding which refers to
sacred reality we must either exclude Buddhism if that reality
7. Aung, op. cit., p. 16
8. Govinda, op. cit., p. 43; Murti, op. cit., p. jkk
9. Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, pp. 46-
47; Nyanatiloka, op. cit., p. 157 (cf. Anguttara Nikaya
X:61)
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is referred to as "original" or "primordial," or we must
exclude these concepts as Altizer's point relates to specifically
10
Buddhist understandings.
The second area of difficulty with Altizer's treatment of
Buddhism is in his understanding of what he called in Oriental
11
Mysticism and Biblical Eschatology "the religious reality."
While he comes to reject this reality, his understanding of it
does not change from that early formulation and thus a later
but succinct description is usable here:
Whether they speak of Brahman-Atman,
Purusha, Nirvana, Sunyata, or Tao,
the various forms of Oriental mysti¬
cism give witness to an eternal and
primordial Reality, a passive and
quiescent Reality without energy or
motion, and a Reality that only truly
appears through the disappearance or
inactivity of all other reality
whatsoever."1^
Treated technically, Altizer's description here is too general
to be adequate for the understanding of either nirvana or
sunyata.
In Theravada thought the samskrta dharmas are wholly as
"real" as the asamskrta dharma of nirvana. The "presence" or
"absence" of nirvana is not a possible way of formulating that
conception where the dharma of nirvana is eternal, other
dharmas are momentary, but all are "real." Surely, likewise,
in the living, walking, talking, teaching and meditating form
of the Buddha before his death we have the epitomy of the
10. Re. sections ambiguous in this light: Altizer, The Gospel
of Christian Atheism, pp. 33-3^t ^Oj Altizer, "America
and the Future of Theology," op. cit., pp. 18-19
11. Altizer, Oriental Mysticism, p. 13
12. Altizer, "Word and History," op. cit., p. 129
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Theravada concept of nirvana in life. The Buddha's life after
enlightenment embodies the pinacle of human attainment—not the
annihilation of ouch life. That such an attainment would
eliminate future suffering as well as present suffering speaks
of the positive long-term effects. While Altizer may not be
wrong to speak of nirvana as "passive and quiescent" this does
0
not constitute a sufficient description of the Theravada
nirvana. What he has given in the above description is a
c
similarity which the concepts he names may share among themselves
but which does not make them equivalents.
This is certainly even more true of sunyata. As we said,
in the Mahayana thought, sunyata serves the Bodhisattvas and
Buddhas as the principle for their utterly free phenomenalisa-
tions and activities, providing the conceptual framework for
"active nirvana." Mahayana thought is, if anything, even more
resistant to the "passive and quiescent" theme Altizer believes
to be so central, than is the Theravada formulation. Again,
while such formulations as Altizer engages in are by no means
contrary to some Mahayana efforts at conceiving sunyata or
nirvana, they cannot stand by themselves and do justice to its
full function or significance. If Altizer should insist that
it is the final, ultimate and most abstract structure of
sunyata to which he refers it could only be said that such lies
far outside the scope of verbal formulations in the realm of
prajna.
Finally, and closely related to the other two, is the
issue of the status of present phenomenal existence. Altizer
tells us that "the forms of Oriental mysticism ... must
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13
culminate in an absolute negation of the Given" and that
"nirvana is radically detached from all experience and
1*f
understanding of the world," Likewise he asserts that:
Our initial judgement about Oriental
mysticism must be that it is a way of
radical world-negation • • . .
Oriental mysticism sets itself against
the autonomy of that which appears
before it, seizing upon the actuality
of that which happens to exist or to
be at hand as the initial springboard
for its own movement of negation.
However, this movement of radical
negation is inseparable from an inter¬
ior recovery of a sacred Totality, a
primordial Totality embodying in a
unified form all those antinomies
that have created an alienated and
estranged existence,^5
In these formulations Altizer is attempting to express the
radical disjuncture which he conceives between the world in
which man finds himself and of which man finds himself, and the
religious reality.
The crucial point in this formulation by Altizer is seen
in his equation of the Kingdom of God with the Buddhist
nirvana. Such a pairing supports the idea that nirvana is some¬
place to go, a "heaven" which exists as a reward for the
successful Buddhist, an alternative environment to samsara evenF
®
as the Kingdom of God is to the "kosmos" or fallen world in
Christianity, Thus, just as the Kingdom of God brings an end
16
"to the present order and structure of the world," so nirvana
would represent the abolition of samsara.
13« Altizer, "The Sacred and the Profane," op, cit., p, 1V+
14. Altizer, "Nirvana and the Kingdom of God," The Journal of
Religion, April, 1963, p« 109
15* Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, pp. 33-3^
16, Altizer, "Nirvana and the Kingdom of God," op, cit,,
pp, 108-109
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However, nirvana is clearly not a heaven. It is no place
and it provides, as we have already noted, no sanctuary from
samsara, Rather, for the Mahayana, it is sarasara known through
prajna as sunya and for the Theravada it is a kind of dharma
which comes to be substituted for the samsaric dharmas but is
also eternally real regardless of the condition of the samsaric
dharmas which may reveal it (as in the case of an arahant who
is said to have achieved nirvana) but cannot partake of it.
In the Theravada formulation there is a disjuncture of kind
between saraskrta and asamskrta dharraas but the one does not end
» o » »
and the other begin any more than does nirvana represent a
primordial totality to which the Buddhist seeks to return.
Indeed, nirvana is of no concern to the individual Buddhist
except as a name for the condition of samsaric reality which he
attempts to initiate according to the laws by which the samskrta
• fe
dharmas occur. In this sense it is the natural completion of
natural existence—its perfection in terms of the most ideal
utilisation of samsaric dharmas.
Certainly there are deep negations within both Mahayana
and Theravada formulations, the objects of which are rooted
in the world as the Buddhist perceives it—suffering, bondage,
ignorance. However, if nirvana is to be equated with the
sacred reality of Altizer's concern, he must recognise that it
is not so separate from the Buddhist's world as is the Kingdom
of God from the Christian's, In Mahayana thought nirvana even
is samsara; in Theravada thought nirvana has no significance to
man except as a certain samsaric attainment. Always there is
that where they do not overlap: Without prajna the Mahayana
cannot know that samsara is nirvana and the Theravada recognise
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the irreconcilable difference between samskrta and asamskrta
* • o V
dharmas, Yet likewise there is the realisation of nirvana
b
within samsara: Prajna and the end of defilements.
The Dialectical Method
The difficulty which these three themes reveal must be
identified as by no means representing a complete misunder¬
standing so much as a problematic methodology which Altizer
adopted and which remains critical to his thinking throughout
all the stages of his development, and consequently, also
critical to his understanding of Buddhism and his mode of
describing it and relating it to what he wishes to say about
Christianity—both traditional and modern radical forms. The
basic nature of this methodology Altizer takes from Eliade and
he tells us:
I am employing Eliade as a route to a
new form of theology • • • • Eliade
posits a sacred that is the opposite
of the profane; it is this very dia¬
lectical opposition of the sacred and
profane that makes the sacred mean- „
ingful to the profane consciousness.
This is critical to our understanding of Altizer and of
his understanding of Buddhism in particular, for Altizer is
informing us that the only way in which the critical truths and
reality with which he wishes to concern himself can be handled
is dialectically, or set in opposing pairs which become the
basis for an effort at synthesis achieved through a negation of
one and affirmation of the other.
The result of such an approach is pervasive and critical.
Opposition becomes essential, Separation is built into the
17* Altizer, Mircea Eliade, p, 18
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system. Altizer's "alienation and estrangement" are inherent
in his whole approach, for he consigns himself to begin with
them. In Mahayana thought such dialectic is used to undermine
man's confidence in the rational mind. In Altizer's thought
dialectic helps him understand and respond to, grasp and work
with the categories he selects. The sacred is thus known not
in relation but in opposition and as Altizer wishes to equate
nirvana or sunyata with the sacred he must necessarily under¬
stand it as the opposite to aamsara.
By this methodology, however, Altizer must not only
structure concepts into opposing pairs, but must determine v/hich
shall be the one which he will then negate, and the one which
he will then affirm. While he begins with negating the profane
and affirming the sacred, the critical reversal which he under¬
takes eventually brings him to the affirmation of the profane
and the negation of the sacred. All pairs based upon this
basic sacred/profane dualism share in this negation and affir¬
mation even as they are made to share in an identity of the
nature of contrarity and opposition.
There is, virtually predictably, in such a method, a
tendency to view everything as being part of some basic pair of
opposites or contraries and eventually to view everything as
dividing in some finally complete division. It is such a
division as this that Altizer conceives with his sacked and
profane pair. Such dualism may sound very Gnostic, but Altizer
saves himself from such a judgement by defining Gnosticism as a
system which embodies a hatred of both the world and existence
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18
in the world, or in other words as a response to a basic
dualism, Gnosticism negates the profane and affirms its
opposite, the sacred.
19
Yet Altizer also knows Gnosticism as artificial for
Altizer has no intention of maintaining a dualism and that is
the character of dialectical thinking of course, for it provides
a technique for rising above dualism. Altizer seems to pose
two such techniques. The first is that of religion which
20
involutes, reverses history and annuls antinomies as it
returns to the primordial Totality in its backward movement.
This is the technique which Altizer first attempted and which
*
he identifies with the negation of the world and the affirmation
of the sacred Reality opposed to it.
The other technique for responding to the fundamental
oppositions by which he understands existence is that of dialec¬
tical thinking. This is itself, as he uses it, the opposite of
the religious one, for it affirms the profane and negates the
sacred in a movement which carries Altizer not backwards or
even forwards but into the present. It is, as such "a radical
21
quest for a new mode of religious understanding" which
opposes the old religious understanding.
The difference between the two techniques is therefore in
the ability of Altizer's dialectic to find the "ultimate coin-
cidencia ojrpositorum ... in the Now" or, in the eternal
recurrence where there is no backwards or forward because "the
18. Altizer, "America and the Future of Theology," op. cit.,
p. 19
19. Altizer, Oriental Mysticism, p. 168
20. Altizer, "The Sacred and the Profane," op. cit., p. 1^3
21. Altizer, Hircea Eliade, p. 13
29^
22
center is everywhere, eternity begins in every now," This
method embraces and affirms a radically profane nothingness
therefore and negates the religious method which would seek and
23
affirm a sacred Totality which does not belong to the present.
Altize^s intent to embrace the profane leads to a curious
pattern of affirmations and negations. First and foremost he
must negate that sacred reality which stands in opposition to
the profane and this he identifies as God, proclaiming a dual
doctrine of the death of God and his kenotic/incarnational act
through Christ by which the sacred is emptied of its transcen¬
dent form and is incarnated in the immanent, "being here and
now ... (drawing) into itself all those pov/ers which were
2k
once bestowed upon the Beyond."
This negation of God however means that his old form
becomes empty and vacuous as the process empties it into the
new form of the new existence, the new humanity, the new here
and now, and in the old form of God contemporary man "recog¬
nises the spiritual emptiness of our time as the historical
25
actualisation of the self-annihilation of God." Altizer
admits "the horror and anguish embedded in such a condition of
humanity" as the death of God creates and the loss of the
ancient creator/creation cosmology which authenticated our exis-
27
tence and saved us from "the brute realities of history."
22. Ibid., pp. 199-200
23. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 150
2km Altizer, "Theology and the Death of God," op. cit.,
p. 93
25. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 110
26. Ibid. ~ ' * ~~ "
27* Altizer, "Theology and the Death of God," op. cit.,
P. 95
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There remains only "an autonomous world existing in-itself"
but this means that our existence is now "vacuous and rootless,
and that a nothingness "has descended upon man in the wake of
his struggle to create a new history and a new reality,"^ Man
exists "in a chaos freed of every semblance of cosmological
31
meaning and order," Still to Altizer the dialectic of the
death of God and incarnation affirms our "chaos, nothingness
32
and despair" —not rejects it. It is the embodiment "of the
33
total affirmation of meamnglessness and horror,"
Such a mood as Altizer herein expresses approaches the
intuition of samsara which the Theravada adept might experience
as he meditates upon the sheer insubstantiality of the dharmas
as the only ultimately real things, and upon his own soulless-
ness in the face of the meaningless order of the procession of
the dharma streams eternally recurring in the pattern indicated
in the paticcasamuppada. The Mahayana would wholly understand
this description too, but submit it then to sunyata and negate
even the nothingness of samsara by the affirmation that it was
as empty as nirvana. Yet the inherent affirmation of sarasara
would be there in the arahant's attainment of complete mastery
of his dharmic reality and the Mahayana adept's perfect under¬
standing of his world through prajna,
Altizer's dialectic reflects the affirmation of freedom
inherent in an analysis of the world's autonomy, however, for
28. Altizer, "Word and History," op, cit,, p, 127
29. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p, 110
30. Altizer, Oriental Mysticism, p, 152
31. Altizer, "Theology and the Death of God," op, cit,, p, 102
32. Altizer, "America and the Future of Theology," op, cit,,
p. 17
33. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p, 150
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he understands that the transcendent God who was an eternal and
impassive being "is the power enclosing energy and stilling
movement, the power of darkness standing over against and
3^
opposing all life and light"—-m other words, God is Satan.
The true evil is therefore Being, the Other, the transcendent
realm which by its absolute superiority could only deprive man
of anything he should think was his and could only be an
irreconcilable opposite to man and his existence.
To be rid of this evil is to be freed, it is to recognise
our chaos as God's tomb and our anguish as the "smell" of his
decomposition and this recognition amounts to a liberation from
"the uncanny and awesome sense of the mystery and power of our
35
godless reality." With God, man is "enslaved to the aliena-
36
tion of 'being' and to the guilt of 'history'" but without
God man is freed from both. As in the case of the Buddhist
sunyata: Nothingness liberates. Without an external judge and
director, reality is freed to follow its own natural paths, to
be what it is and to affirm that without challenge or comment
from above or without.
But the freedom with which Altizer is concerned is more
than an ontological freedom. It is also deeply ethical for it
includes freedom "from the alien power of all moral law" which
37
to Altizer is the true meaning of the forgiveness of sin.
Likewise it is freedom from a particular past, ecclesiastical
38
confession or even civilisation. The liberation affects man's
pattern of living as well as his world-view.
3*f. Ibid., p. 97
35. Ibid., p. 96
36. Altizer, "Theology and the Death of God," op. cit., p. 110
37. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 1V?
38. Altizer, "America and the Future of Theology," op. cit.,
p. 18
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This freedom is in fact the result of a human autonomy
which is the personal counterpart of the autonomy of the world,
and as such it too demonstrates "the vacuity of human exis-
39
tence." Thus Altizer can portray the resultant freedom as
not only of the texture of moral freedom but of deliverance
40
from selfhood as well. Since awareness of the Wholly Other
God had been possible only through "a fallen confinement in an
isolated selfhood" with the death of such a God man "ceases to
be aware of a distance separating himself from other," and he
41
experiences the abolition of his autonomous solitary ego.
In the final analysis Altizer's affirmed v/orld would seem
to have much in common with Mahayana^ sunya samsara affirmed
too as nirvana. Altizer has to kill a God before he can iden¬
tify the sacred with the profane but Mahayana has only to
banish that ignorance which suggests that there is a substan¬
tial reality of any kind, sacred or profane by Altizer's
categorisation.
Ultimately it cannot be forgotten that by his method
Altizer seeks to return to man everything which he lost in the
negation of the sacred as the opposite of the affirmed profane
in a dialectical movement seeking a final coincidencia opposi-
torum. Thus eternity has become the concrete, present moment;
43
our darkness is really light; even God is most truly God in
his incarnate state of alienation from the transcendent form
and thus through the death of God "God remains God or the
39» Altizer, Oriental Mysticism, p. 173
40. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 128
41. Ibid.
42. Altizer, Mircea Eliade, p. 124
43. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 152
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44
divine process remains itself," When Altizer declares the
new symbol of Eternal Recurrence as a portrait of a new totality
45
of bliss and Yes-saying as "a primary symbol of the higher
ways of mysticism always reflecting a final coincidencia
oppositorum, a total union of transiency and eternity, of suf-
46
fering and joy" one feels oneself not far removed from a
Buddhist samsara and nirvana which do not lend themselves to an
• e
easy polarisation.
It is not unlikely that Altizer cast the whole understanding
of religious methods and symbols and concepts in the way in
which he did both because its usefulness to the particular
Christian difficulties with which he is concerned is apparent
in his retelling of the Christian myth, and because it supported
his claim to the uniqueness of Christianity, Buddhism then
became a religion and religion became that which "must neces-
-i
sarily direct itself against a selfhood* a history, or a cosmos
existing immediately and autonomously as its own creation or
47
ground," Clearly in the need to do this Altizer shows that
he equated nirvana or sunyata with the threat to his existence
which he felt in the transcendent creator God or the new
creation/primordial totality symbol which in Christianity is
represented by the Kingdom of God,
With his dialectic therefore, Altizer believed he had
solved the problem of God, creating a form of the Christian
myth which he and other secular men might affirm, and establishing
44. Ibid,, p, 88
45. Ibid., p. 153
46. Ibid., p. 150
47. Ibid., p. 34
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its superiority over all religions—necessarily hostile to
secular man. Thus Altizer says:
I
The history of religions teaches us
that Christianity stands apart from
other higher religions of the world
on three grounds: (1) its procla¬
mation of the incarnation, (2) its
world-reversing form of ethics, and
(3) the fact that Christianity is
the only one of the world religions
to have evolved—or in some sense
to have initiated—a radically pro¬
fane form of Bxistenz.
This statement can be no more than an argument in the round.
Altizer has defined and described Buddhism by his concept of
religion and Christianity by his concept of world affirmation.
He has set sacred and profane against each other and refused
them proximity in Buddhism but asserted a coincidencia opposi-
torum in Christianity. Indeed, the very problems which haunted
Altizer do not exist in Buddhism in the terms he understands
and knows yet by creating them for Buddhism he has imposed upon
it a form of the dialectic which he rejects.
In fact, Altizer is probably very close to the Buddhist
approach to the world which takes it as containing its own
deepest truths, yeilding an autonomous ethic, and placing its
highest values in the fullest uses which can be made by man of
the here and now with which he finds himself. Nirvana and
o
sunyata support, not challenge this.
William Mallard
With Mallard we are relieved of a development which relies
heavily on its contrast with "Oriental mysticism" and "religion"
as did Altizer's, yet one otherwise remarkably like his
48. Altizer, "Theology and the Death of God," op. cit., pp.
110-1H
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colleague's# Thus Mallard is intent on making the point that
"the world and its 'other' (i.e., the absurd actuality of human
history, and the fearful divine Abyss) have met in a dynamic
coincidence#" He too sees this realised "in the literal and
anguished death of Jesus" which becomes identical with "the
Divine 'death'" in which "the Infinite as the abstract, wrath-
50
ful Abyss of Deity" vanished#
Thus "two opposite realities are brought into a new kind
51
of unity with one another" and the result is that the sacred
is now only the openness of the future and "the tension of
52
human freedom toward its secular future," This provides the
basis, as it did for Altizer, for an affirmation of the world,
an acceptance of reality and a proper understanding of it#
Christianity does not support an alienation of man from his
world which can no longer be replaced by a new creation, or
from his own being which can no longer be broken up to provide
for some eternal soul#
In this discription Mallard speaks of "the creative
tension towards the future in successive deaths and rebirths"
53
so that "the kingdom comes and is always coming#" This
identity of the Kingdom with the always approaching moment is
highly suggestive of the identity of samsara with nirvana in
Mahayana thought and of the Buddha nature in all men, for it
includes the incarnate form of the divine# Likewise there is
a realisation that man knows himself as suffering and limited
^9. Mallard, op. cit., p. 328
50. Ibid., p. 335
51. Ibid., pp. 327-328
52. Ibid., pp. 335 and 338
53. Ibid., p. 328
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by the ambiguities of his existence but a call nevertheless is
5b
made for belief in the fact of a meaningful future which the
Buddhist would understand as offered in prajJia and its freedom.
Summary
Both Altizer and Mallard are involved in a way of
formulating the Christian myth which does not oppose God's
reality to man's in a way which deprives man's of an ultimate
validity and God's of a meaningful participation in it. V/hen
they speak in terms of the death of God, the incarnation through
Jesus, the transformation of transcendence into immanence, they
are speaking in clearly Christian vocabulary. When however,
they speak of the coincidence of opposites* the unity in man's
world of the sacred and the profane, the quality of nothingness
and voidness, chaos and man's impermanence, they are speaking
in a vocabulary which might serve too to express Buddhist
principles and truths.
Finally, we would suggest that while the Theravada system
cannot be fairly portrayed as a simple negation of existence,
using as it does samsara to terminate itself leaving only
nirvana, the Altizer-Mallard view is most congenial to the mood
of the Mahayana and their resentment of the separation of
nirvana and samsara which does exist in the Theravada system,
however qualified it may be.
What sets Altizer and Mallard apart most distinctly is
their death of God, Christological incarnation theology sugges¬
ting an historical process behind the identity of the opposites
5*f# Ibid., p. 339
I
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--their coincidence. This knows no xoarallel in Buddhism and
would seem to reflect a flow of the abstract into the concrete,
the sacred reality into the profane. While the flow of
compassion may be seen as such a movement from the dharmakaya
to the nirmana and sambhogyakayas, it is not the ultimate
direction but only serves the purpose of returning the energy
through a growth in enlightenment.
The difficulty in clearly distinguishing the Altizer-
Mallard development from the Mahayana is in the nature of its
dialectical method which is difficult to end short of some
final mystical resolution. This is far more clearly apparent
in Altizer than in Mallard, Mallard avoids such a resolution
because he is less concerned with a specific function between
the transcendent, the human element and the resultant unity in
the Kingdom, Altizer however, being at least as concerned
with his method as with the dogmatic system which he constructs
from it, is caught up in and committed to the system in a
manner which Mallard's presentation escapes. Thus one suspects
Altizer's final resolution is so mystical that it becomes
debatable whether he himself finally affirms the profane by the
time his dialectical pendulum has completed its swing to bring
the sacred into synthesis with it.
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PART IIj ANALYSIS
B. The Structure of Christian Atheism
CHAPTER 16: Collapse of the God/World Dualism
Choosing the World
The one point at which the Christian atheists' voices
converge despite all their divergence on other matters is in
their rejection of that elusive yet pervasive Christian
cosmology which recognises a God apart from and outside a world
which for its part is then conceived as dependent upon and
obedient to the authority, initiative and sustenance of God.
Insofar as they are atheists it is first and foremost in this
sense.
Thus Weil offers an understanding of God and the world
which sees the world as a complex of aspects of the dynamic
movement within the Godhead. Bonhoeffer insists that man must
live without God and Vahanian follows with a description of our
culture as doing just that. S*611e echos this in pointing out
that the transcendent God is a victim of the loss of the
Absolute by our culture. Hamilton, Altizer and Mallard replace
the otherness of God with a special interpretation of the world.
Van Buren, Braun and Kee turn from God as a name for something
transcendent to man's world, to God as a name for some aspect
of man's own existence.
What is clearly challenged here is that structure of
traditional Christianity which Joseph Campbell called "mythic
dissociation" in which "the sense of the sacred is still
1
officially dissociated from this earth and its life." It is
1. Campbell, "The Secularisation of the Sacred," The World
Year Book of Religion, Vol. I, Cutler (editor), p. 633
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further, a specific concept of the sacred which places the
world and men in a demeaning condition and position with regard
to the sacred which is specifically problematic. Insofar as the
Christian atheists continue to speak of God or in any way
reflect some qualification upon some popular conception of what
atheism is, this point may appear obscure, yet it underlies the
broader development undertaken by each and thus becomes of
primary significance.
That there is confusion on this point cannot be denied.
In the responses to a "Death of God" theology which appeared in
a sudden outburst of publication in the 1960,s, the problem was
identified differently. Some said that it was Nietzsche's God
who was dead, others that it was the idea of a supernaturalist
God, or a concept of God created in the seventeenth century, or
the God of metaphysics and morality, the God of everyday "good
churchgoing people" whom the theologians no longer believe in,
2 ....
and so on. Even among the Christian atheists there is a
broader base of attack apparent than simply that against tradi¬
tional theism, as for example, Vahanian's rejection of the
cultic concept of God still held by Christian religiosity which
has lost its cultural base, Kee's antipathy toward specifically
a personal supernatural being, or Weil's attack on a God known
by his providence and consolation.
2. cf. Comstock, "Theology After the 'Death of God,'" The
Meaning of the Death of God, Murchland (editor), p. 216}
DeDeugd, "Old Wine in New Bbttles?" Talk About God, p. 135;
Maclntyre and Ricoeur, The Religious Significance of
Atheism including Maclntyre's "The Debate About God" (esp.
p. 14) and Ricoeur's "Religion, Atheism and Faith" (esp. p.
66); Novak, "The Christian and the Atheist," The Meaning of
The Death of God, "Murchland (editor), p. 72
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At the center, however, is this inability to work with a
traditional theology which was essentially dualistic, and an
acceptance and affirmation of the ultimate adequacy of the world
in and of itself for any eventuality which may befall it. Man's
realm comes to take on a new kind of autonomy and sufficiency
which casts man and his situation in a new light and can no
longer locate the God beyond. Thus when Anthony Flew referred
to the Stratonician presumption that "the principles of the
world lie inside the world"^ he was summarising the case which
the Christian atheists take to be true. It is not just that
the world is not deficient in reality or inferior in value but
that the world is the only reality or value so far as man is
concerned.^
Weil, Vahanian and Solle represent important variations on
this theme and require some comment in line with the qualifica¬
tion "so far as man is concerned." For these three, man reads
in himself and his situation of something which provides a
decisive indeterminancy. Thus time and space measure the
infinity between God and Christ in Weil's vision but those two
poles reflect an absolute aspect which is difficult to correlate
with that aspect of the world. Also her formulation of an
illusory selfhood and imaginary world must be carefully under¬
stood within the context of the true world of creation/decreation
as an aspect of the divine life.
In Vahanian there is the infinite which the finite cannot
comprehend but which requires the wholly finite state of
3. Flew, op. cit., pp. 69 and 19^
A-. cf. Ogden, op. cit., p. 3^
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iconoclasm or methodological atheism. In SBlle there is that
which Christ is the representative of and the identity of which
is not yet available. The theme in all three is one of man and
his reality as complete so far as man's doing precisely what as
man he should do. The world provides all that man needs and
all that he needs to know as well as the way to be what he
needs to be whether it is empty, iconoclastic or represented.
What numinous emptiness, infinity or representation there is
beyond that is to man as man, non-utilitarian, even as is the
dharma of nirvana to samsaric man in Theravada thought.
The strong similarities between Weil's thought and the
Mahayana system are important here, for both do engage in a
strange kind of world affirmation which utilises no other
reality than that available to man. Thus, both the world and
man as of one nature with it are held up for man's deepest
consideration and analysis which they are confident will reveal
the empty, unreality of everything which that world and man
appears to the unanalytical mind to be. The resultant negation
gives the world its highest value however and thus Weil can see
it as an aspect of the flow of God's love even as the Mahayana
can see it as a manifestation of karuna. Man is therefore
offered a world which is nothing but it is precisely a nothing
which is invaluable and the only thing which man is and has.
In this surely curious way Weil and Mahayana can be said to be
affirming the world as its own totality: Nirvana is samsara
and God is the world; all is sunyata and nothing is real—except
as the real nothing.
The world which is affirmed as its own totality by
Vahanian and Solle is a world which is affirmed in a manner
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analogous to the affirmation made by the Theravada of samsara.
Nirvana is not the realm of man. nor is the transcendent God
a *
for whom provision is made by a methodological atheism, cultural
iconoclasm, or representation as immanent and thus weak and
suffering—or, put otherwise, of the stuff of which man him¬
self is. Therefore man must find his meaning and direction
himself within a world which readily reveals under his insistent
efforts the deepest truths of its nature. Among these is a
central truth which Vahanian knows as faithfulness to the
inconceivable, Solle as acceptance of Christ's status as a
representative, and Theravada as the cessation of defilements
and the end of grasping.
For the others there is not the same complexity and
subtlety in this matter of non-dualism as a contrast to theistic
dualism. They fall into two categories: That with Bonhoeffer,
Hamilton, Altizer and Mallard who insist that the old trans¬
cendence is now somehow unified with man's world; and that with
Van Buren, Braun and Kee who seek to show that the old trans¬
cendence always was but part of man's existence wrongly
projected out of man's world as the God of theism.
The Designation "Secular"
Martin E. Marty in his study of modern secularity cited
and accepted an Oxford English Dictionary definition of
"secular" as:
Belonging to the world and its affairs
as distinguished from the church and
religion ... chiefly used as a nega¬
tive term, with the meaning non-
ecclesiastical, non-religious or non-
sacred; of or belonging to the present
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or visible world as distinguished
from the eternal or spiritual world}
temporal, worldly. 5
Such a definition is not wholly appropriate to much modern use
of the word however. Where the Christian atheists are con¬
cerned secularity is better defined as the practice of relating
g
everything to this world. It is true that they are not
uniform in their understanding of how this is so but they are
uniform in seeking the essential rightness of this situation
for man.
The broader, non-dialectical understanding of secularity
allows us to speak of Weil, Vahanian and Solle as secularists
although they are more problematic in this area than the others
because of the broader implications of a transcendent aspect of
the structure of their world. They would not, however, divide
their world into two spheres—the sacred and the profane, the
religious and the secular. Even granting that these three are
less ambivalent about religion and not at all hostile to what
each understands as good religion, they oppose a religion of
two life spheres in one cultural world and here align themselves
with the more dominant secularity of the others.
Such a treatment of the concept of the secular finds
support outside religious atheism as well, as in William Lynch*s
suggestion that secularity be regarded as the "march of mankind,
in the autonomous light of its own resources toward the mastery
7
and humanisation of the world" —a concept which brings him
within sight of Bonhoeffer and the predominant tone of the
5. Marty, The Modern Schism, p. 9
6. cf. Gomstock, op. cit., p. 236
7. Lynch, Christ and Prometheus, p. 7
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Christian atheists, Weil must be distinguished from this ideal
as well as the Buddhists insofar as the use which she and they
make of the world and the manner in which she and they affirm
it is not directly related to a drive for "the mastery and
humanisation" of the world in the sense of modern social
engineering so much as in the sense of what might be called
"spiritual engineering," On the other hand, insofar as Lynch
and the other Christian atheists intend something far deeper
and more radical than is usually understood on the level of the
social sciences, they must be seen as approximating to Weil's
and the Buddhists' view.
At any rate "secular" is an appropriate designation for
the Christian atheists' system in terms of its centeredness in
this world—a definition which is, as we have said, broad and
non-dialectical. Such secularity might be pinpointed in three
themes: Innocence, responsibility and solitude.
Innocence is seen in the Christian atheists rejection of
the vision of the world as fallen and dependent upon God for
any validity to which it might return. Even Vahanian who
attributed to man a tendency toward idolatry and mere reli¬
giosity shows no desire to place upon man the burden of some
metaphysical guilt such as that which Helmut Thielicke des-
g
cribed as a guilt in the very source of man's being. Rather
Vahanian sees the traditional Christian avoiding this extreme
by formulating an "ethic of forgiveness," now replaced by
9
secular man's "ethic of innocence," for which Vahanian has no
8, Thielicke, Nihilism, p, 49
9, Vahanian, The Death of God, p, 185
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harsh words. Even Lynch recognised the close connection between
innocence and secularity when he pointed out that "the secular
10
project always moves toward some approximation to innocence,"
The whole theme of redemption in traditional Christianity
is of course challenged by this, even fatally undermined.
Indeed, the move to identify God's own identification of himself
with the world and human existence which we find in various
degrees of advance and fullness in Bonhoeffer, Hamilton, Altizer
and Mallard is an alternative to the belief that the world is
morally as well as ontologically in debt to God, In fact
precisely one aspect of the God/world dualism which became
intolerable was this aspect of man's guilt and the subsequent
denial which tended to follow from that guilt of any independent
worth of man's existence.
The theme of innocence is closely aligned as well with
that of responsibility. As Jean Lacroix said of atheism, it
11
takes responsibility and refuses guilt. Likewise Erich Heller
in writing about Nietzsche emphasises the theme of responsi¬
bility and the fact that atheistic man takes everything upon
12
himself, Vahanian too took the ethic of innocence seriously
because responsibility was as essential a cornerstone to it as
to the Christian ethic of forgiveness, and "if anything it does
13
not propose to be easier than the Christian ethic,"
This matter of innocence and responsibility possesses quite
different qualities in Buddhism than in Christianity so that
10, Lynch, op, cit,, p, 10*f
11, Lacroix, The Meaning of Modern Atheism, p, kG
12, Heller, "The Modern German Mind," Toward a New Christianity,
Altizer (editor), p, 100
13, Vahanian, The Death of God, p, 185
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the comparison is a complicated one# Both the Mahayana emphasis
on prajna (insight) and the Theravada emphasis on ignorance (as
the first of the paticcasamuppada, for example) would argue for
the identification of wrong understanding or lack of under¬
standing as the key to the Buddhist's problem# Sin is a v/ord
of questionable validity in the Buddhist system except perhaps
as Obeyesekere uses it "to refer to the violation of religious
14
ethics." Even so, as such it would reveal the more
fundamental ignorance or lack of insight#
When man discards guilt and assumes responsibility for
himself he also assumes a new solitude# At first sight the
universe must seem a far more friendly place if there is a
sovereign power at work in it for the welfare of its living
creatures# Yet it is precisely this consolation of God, this
divine assistance which we find the Christian atheists rejecting,
as in Weil's opposition to religion as a source of consolation
and Bonhoeffer's violent rejection of a Deus ex machina, a God
used as a stopgap#
There is a preference for what Marghanita Laski described
as an uncomplaining solitary endurance which comes with
15
atheism. Inherent in the innocence, responsibility and
solitude of the atheists' position is, in fact, a revision of
16
man's self-understanding. While atheism might appear, from
the point of view of those who find themselves living with
divine assistance, to put itself at a disadvantage, the
14# Obeyesekere, op. cit., p# 12
15» Bloom, God and Man, pp. 29-30 (quoted from a discussion
between Archbishop Bloom and Marghanita Laski published
here)
16. Reid, op. cit., p# 66
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Christian atheists come to experience the opposite as true.
It is men who do not expect help and who take responsibility
for the totality of their life who are closest to that which it
is important for men to attain.
There is, however, more going on in this new understanding
than just the character-building qualities to which Laski
referred. Thus as Lehmann saw, "the more acutely the •death of
God1 is experienced the more threatening does the question of
17
his presence become." The other side of man's solitude is
therefore his freedom and independence. The man who accepts
the help of the God of theism also finds himself subject to
that God and crushed by his ontological magnitude and priority
which can only diminish man's sense of himself in his own eyes.
Man*s solitude is therefore two sided. It reveals the horror
of a transcendent God which in the Christian atheists reaches
its peak in Altizer's identification of God with Satan
(following Blake), and Weil's reversion to the pattern of
emptiness and unreality—an equally radical response in a quite
different form. It is also however the proof of man's freedom
as Altizer and Mahayana realised.
The Christian atheists take this so seriously that they
are prepared to affirm even their own mortality for the freedom
of being responsible for themselves in the world. In fact, the
death of God and the mortality of man are inextricably inter¬
twined as Dunne emphasised when he compared the contemporary
theology of the death of God with the old universal myths of
17» Lehmann, "Some Ideas on Pastoral Theology," Concilium;
Atheism and Indifference, March, 196?$ p. ^
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the death of the gods which reflected that truth about man.
Curiously the only point at which Weil sees the freedom
inherent in man's atheistic reality is when she affirms that
the only free act—truly ultimately free—which she believes
man makes is that of negating his own self, or accepting his
own unreality in the end.
Salvation in the World
The result of this move is that just as redemption does
not fit with innocence and responsibility, salvation from
finitude and its evil does not fit with solitude. Thus there
is no true personal salvation in the orthodox Christian sense
in Christian atheism. Altizer does attempt to give man
eternity with his dialectic but it is given to man in the form
of "The Great Humanity Divine" and not to individuals. Also
Mallard may speak of confidence in a meaningful future and
Solle of a time when representation will come to an end, but
both know that the fact of death must also be affirmed, Solle
because it is the dead that Christ must represent to God and
Mallard because it is a crucial factor of the existence which
became affirmable with God's incarnation into it.
Yet salvation continues to be a useful word to the
discussion of Christian atheism although its meanings must be
carefully identified. Thus if salvation is taken to be the
attainment of the fullest possibilities of human existence as
it is prior to death, the Buddhist can name the attainment of
nirvana by the arahant during his lifetime or the condition of
the Bodhisattva after he has attained prajna, as salvation.
18. Dunne, "The Myth of God's Death," The Meaning of the Death
of God, Murchland (editor), p. 167
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Likewise the Christian atheist would recognise full human life
without guilt or an isolating egoism as salvific in contrast to
the guilt and alienation of the Christian man in a fallen world
before a perfect and omnipotent God. Such a use of salvation
changes its context from the after-life to the now and as such
is recognised as one of the important aspects of secularisation.
There can be no place for a resurrection of the body, a
translation into a heaven~an ideal world—or a new creation
*
which rises from the ashes of the destruction of this one in an
apocalyptic cataclism. The only hints of ideality in the
future are rooted in the principles of this world and involve
the possibility of process and evolution. Thus for the
Christian atheists, as Bonhoeffer so explicitly insisted, there
can be no salvation in the traditional Christian sense. A
secular Christianity is nonsoteriological and nonredemptive by
20
the traditional meanings.
However, if one wished to speak of salvation as the
attainment of a certain state within this world, as do the
Buddhists and as is implicit in certain Christian atheist
»
themes, it would be appropriate to speak of self-salvation not
unlike that in Hegelian thought as noted by J. N. Findlay in an
21
article which caught Altizer's attention. If salvation finds
any meaning at all in Christian atheism it is in the context of
intrinsic forces. The Mahayana could see this as the Buddha
19. Marty, op. cit., p. 104
20. Kaufman, Maynardj "Post-Christian Aspects of the Radical
Theology," Toward a New Christianity, Altizer (editor),
P. 349
21. Findlay, "Hegel's Study of the Religious Consciousness,"
Toward a New Christianity, Altizer (editor), p. 55
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nature in all men, and the Theravada as the potential all men
possess to naturally direct their dharmic streams into that
condition where nirvana is realised.
<3
Even when we move closer to the boundaries of atheism and
theism as with Vahanian and Sblle, this can be seen in Vahanian's
belief that the culture can formulate an iconoclastic will,
rightly reading the Word in the world; and in Solle's resting
with man the crucial decision of whether to accept Christ as
representative or not—-a decision so crucial that Christ and
22
God himself are at risk in it. As an influence from beyond
the world, representation can have no reality and is finally
and ultimately the result of the world's own nature, its own
choices, its own directedness.
Likewise we see self-salvation in Weil's insistence that
it is left to man to negate his own self along with the ability
to do so. Those who take Jesus as a model for the path of such
self-improvement and self-perfection such as Hamilton, Van Buren
and Kee follow in the steps of the Theravada Buddhists who look
to the Buddha not as a saviour but certainly as a model from
which much can be learned and which will prove of much
assistance.
Strictly speaking for Altizer and Mallard Christ's death
becomes soteriological because it ended the validity of the
traditional Christian view that God was remote, holy and
creator. Once the incarnation had occurred however, it would
no longer be meaningful to speak in such a manner nor even to
remember it. Man now one with God's incarnate reality must
22. Sb'lle, op. cit., p. 123
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settle to the totality of his world# Finally, insofar as God
is most truly himself in his alienation from transcendence, as
Altizer says, it was the previous situation which was contin¬
gent and preliminary, embodying the fullness and finality of
this present situation#
In this discussion we can also note that while nirvana as
o
a pre-death reality is a state of self-salvation within human
existence, the Theravada's dharma of nirvana as a trans-
personal reality in the ultimate sense is a state with which
comparison to Christian atheism here appears impossible# Also
in Weil's case we do not have any thoroughly metaphysical
expression of her thinking about that point on the time-space
spectrum which a man is in the context of human death, A
projection of her development could take the line that death is
finally nothing but part of the illusion of the world as is man
and thus the point itself is an eternal and impersonal one.
This would be roughly parallel to the thought in Mahayana
about impersonal phenomena but because of the "point" aspect
not a close equivalent.
Thus Buddhist salvation does not carry the individual
beyond death# Even active nirvana must be understood as the
phenomenalisation of the Dharmakaya in samsara and not the work
of individual beings in the sense that samsaric beings are
individual. More clearly the nirvana of the post-death state
of the arahant preserves nothing of that man who had realised
it before his death for he disappeared with the breakup and
cessation of the dharmic streams comprising him#
Buddhism and Christian atheism are therefore alike in the
rejection of a salvation which will take man from a conditional
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environment and place him as himself in an unconditional
reality. There is no life after death such as traditional
Christianity promised its followers and no heaven in which men
will enjoy a perfect yet nevertheless personal and individual
existence. Instead the prize to be won by the individual is
one comprised of the stuff of this present existence whatever
the ambiguities and conditionality which necessarily follow, or
whatever loss of selfhood may be incurred.
Religion
Given that the Christian atheists tend to identify
religion with a God/world dualism and secular/religious split
as well as with the promise of help in determining and
attaining the end toward which man must work v/ith eternal life
offered as a reward, it is small wonder that most of them
reject religion as having any place within the life of the
Christian atheist. This, to most of them, is_ religion.
Yet we must agree with William Fennell who insisted that
"the death of God does not necessarily have as its consequence
23
the demise of religion," Buddhism is offered among other
things as an indication that theism and religion are no more
inherently related in a manner which would not permit the one
without the other than is religion and the kind of childish
dependency which seeks a God to get men out of difficulty and
explain the mysteries in his existence.
Much of the rethinking about religion may be useful to
Christian atheism on further reflection, Richard R, Niebuhr,
for example, has offered a definition of religion as that by
23, Fennell, op, cit., p.
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which we "present an image in ourselves of what we believe to
be the conduct the world/age itself exhibits," or put otherwise
as "the name of the human condition of being affected in the
totality of our being by the multiplicity of energies and
2k
casualties that make up our environment," Such a definition
would cohere with the ideal which Altizer, for example, holds
up.
Certainly Samuel Miller's assertion that "the function of
religion is to fulfill the possibilities of the world" would
agree with both Buddhist and Christian atheist activities and
25
values. Nor is either fulfilling the possibility of this
world so that they might receive as a reward some other world.
This does not deny the belief that there is something out ahead
of man which is to be struggled for, however, and Steeman may
be right even atheistically when he suggests that religious
life begins with existential dissatisfaction. Buddhism and
Christian atheism both represent a move toward fuller under¬
standing and improved human existence and thus by this view
too may be regarded as religious.
While the Christian atheists are not of one voice over the
matter of rites and rituals a possibility of the continuation
of these aspects of religion must remain. Indeed V/eil, Solle
and Mallard specifically would seem to defend their worth,
Hamilton, Bonhoeffer and Kee, for example, represent instead an
ambivalence or rejection with regard to such activity. Within
2k, Kaufman, Gordon; "Theological Historicism as an Experiment
in Thought," Frontline Theology, Peerman (editor), p, 1^5
25» Miller, Samuel; op, cit,, p, 72
26, Steeman, op, cit,, p, 72
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itself Buddhism shows a spread from highly abstract and
rationalistic philosophy to a highly mythological and symbolic
27
system which provides an ordinary folk worship. When even an
atheist such as Laski suggests that atheism needs religion's
28
rites, rituals and words, it seems safe to suggest that
Christian atheism itself may clarify and modify its partial
hostility to religion in a generalised sense.
Indeed, the alienation from a deliberate religiousness
within the system of some of the Christian atheists is almost
solely the result of their acceptance of the assumption that
the secular/religious split is valid and that a choice must be
made as to which of these will be affirmed and which denied.
If they refuse to understand religion as making true secularity
impossible and regard it rather as a collection of rather
varied tools which one might choose to use in the secular
project the possibility of very elaborate religious structures
might yet evolve in the most secular of the Christian atheists.
Mallard's statement that the Church's worship "should always
concretely dramatise her secular existence, in which the
29
issues of faith are realised" hints at what might be expected
along these lines.
27# Smart, "The Relation Between Christianity and the Other
Great Religions," Soundings, Vidler (editor), p. 112
28. Bloom, op. cit., pp. 29-30 (quoted from a discussion
published here between Bloom and Laski).
29. Mallard, op. cit., p. 3^0
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CHAPTER 17s Atheistic Theology-
Personal and Free
We have already suggested that the Christian atheists are
religious whether they would appreciate that designation or not
if for no other reason than the habitual use which they make of
Christian vocabulary and symbols in a process of seeking self-
understanding and world meaning. Further, most of them regarded
themselves as theologians doing theology—as among the most
/
recent of the great tradition of theologians stretching back in
time behind them. Nor is it to be forgotten that they are
popularly regarded as theologians, with the exception of Weil
who would be more likely to be described as a modern Christian
mystic, or as Susan Taubes put it, as a "French philosopher--
2
mystic—saint."
Nevertheless it is clear that their theology is radical
and that they are engaged in that activity which Marty describes
as changing the substance or altering the meaning of symbols
while retaining a certain continuity in the symbols themselves.^
Likewise much of their work might be regarded as using religious
formulas "for purposes other than of expressing the theological
statements for which they were originally framed." Indeed,
there are times when it must be wondered if they have not
strayed from theology to something some claim to be quite
different—such as a "community development of doctrines" or
1. e.g. The Christian Century's series "for younger theologians"
published in the mid-1960's to which Van Buren, Altizer and
Hamilton contributed. This series was reprinted in 196? in
the book Frontline Theology edited by Dean Peerman.
2. Taubes, Susan; "The Absent God," op. cit., p. 107
3. Marty, op. cit., pp. 100-101
Mclntyre, "The Debate about God," op. cit., p. 22
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religious philosophy defined as the development of personal
5
religious convictions.
Certainly one of the aspects of the thought of the
Christian atheists is its highly personal character. This is
so much the case that Ogletree believes it has abrogated
theology's responsibility to and for the faith as a transper-
g
sonal ideal, and Robert McAfee Brown is led to respond to it
with the insistence that autobiography has little to do with
theology. The latter admits that the theologians who write of
the death of God may be accurate in describing their own
experience and even the temper of modern man, "but that they
say very much about the reality or unreality of God seems ques-
7
tionable" he tells us. The suggestion is clearly that the
Christian atheists are too personal to be theological.
The principle inherent in this criticism is a procedural
one and is even more clearly pointed out in response to a
statement like the following one of John Montgomery:
The final and best evidence of God's
existence lies in his Word—in the
triple sense of Christ, the gospel he
proclaimed and the scripture that in¬
fallibly conveys it. The historicity
of the Resurrection, the facticity of
the Biblical miracles, the internal
consistency of Holy Writ and its free¬
dom from empirical error: These must
be sustained, or the God of scripture
will face away into a misty transcen¬
dence for us too, and eventually dis¬
appear. ^
5. Christian, Oppositions of Religious Doctrines, p. 9
6. Ogletree, op. cit., p. 3^+
7. Brown, "A Campaign on Many Fronts," Frontline Theology.
Peerman (editor), pp. 160-161
8. Montgomery, "A Philosophical-Theological Critique of the
Death of God Movement," The Meaning of the Death of God,
Murchland (editor), p. 53
It is precisely in such an argument that belief in God depends
upon belief in certain dogmas, that the Christian atheist would
not be caught. Those dogmas which have lost their grounding in
the modern worldview and modes of thought must not be sustained
simply to preserve an otherwise and in this sense admittedly
unbelievable theism. The Christian atheist is not intent upon
the mere preservation of a body of dogma which will utterly
collapse if exposed to the rational and empirical or simply
experiencial view of modern man.
However this does not mean, as Ogletree seems to think,
that the Christian atheists seek nothing more "than simply an
attempt to find a private and personally satisfying viewpoint
9
in life." While it is apparent that they cannot accept a
theology which is not such, it is equally clear that they hope
their efforts will speak to and for more Christians than just
themselves. Indeed insofar as they assume or believe that
responsible theology is a living, changing reality highly sen¬
sitive to the excentricities of individuals, cultures and ages
they would argue that only a highly personal development
tested by each man's own standards can hope to be responsible
to a living, personally real tradition.
In theology as the Christian atheists engage in it the
guiding question is therefore more "what can or do I affirm?"
than "what should I affirm?" If this requires safeguards and
correctives they will be found through rigorous attention to
analyses of man and his world in which the Word is written.
Past tradition is clearly part of that which is to be analysed
9. Ogletree, op. cit., p.
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but it holds no sacrosanct position. Ultimately if a priority
is to be observed among the competing principles of evaluation
and correlation of theological statements it would have to be
in a priority of experience to reason, as Van Harvey expressed
10
it.
While Mehta spoke of modern theologians expressing a need
for more extended training in philosophy and better reasoning
11
powers and Van Buren was concerned with the logical difficul¬
ties of theism, the primary concern among the Christian atheists
is much more subjective and empirical. They are neither highly
logical by any single logical system nor unduly impressed by
the demands and complaints of those who are. Fundamentally
Christian atheism is a response to the personal experience of
Christian symbols and not a logical development of dogma.
In this process of responding to what they themselves find
they can believe and to the manner in which they do believe the
truths they verbalise, the Christian atheists, almost to a man,
tend to project their experience upon the whole of Western
society. They are therefore rather dogmatic in their claim to
speak for the vast bulk of modern men with their atheism and
secularity and in their assumption that they possess "a corner
12
on the contemporary •mood' or * style
Thus when someone like Van Buren speaks of the need to
meet the secular man within Christianity to say nothing of those
without, he seems to be arguing that theology must reflect the
10, Harvey, "The Nature and Function of Faith," Frontline
Theology, Peerman (editor), p, 127
11, Mehta, op, cit,, p, 97
12, Hamilton, Kenneth; "The Essentiality of Tradition,"
Frontline Theology, Peerman (editor), p, 88
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intellectual configuration of the age. A Jewish commentator,
Eugene Borowitz, has suggested that this is a fundamental issue
and some effort should be made to determine whether or not the
secular mood is fundamental or superficial, permanent or ephe¬
meral before religion is asked to undergo a major reconstruction
13
for alignment with it.
Ultimately however, if the Christian atheist does attempt
to reflect honestly the depths of his own experience and
situation in regard to the articles of the Christian faith, it
does not seem that the issue of how widespread experiences and
situations of that kind are, will really be so significant. The
Buddhist for example would readily agree thatmost men do not
recognise the truth about their world but that nevertheless that
truth has still been read from their own personal insight,
analysis and experience with regard to the world.
While there seems to be concern that they have broad
popular backing, this aspect of Christian atheism may be largely
a reflex of the natural insecurity of such novel developments
as those in which they are engaged. While Van Buren champions
a widespread secularity he is also the one who speaks at times
for the pluralism of our age in a manner congenial to Borowitz!s
own description of "the swirling flow of modern thought" in
which Christian atheism is "only one current, perhaps even a
14
minor one." Ultimately, there is every indication both that
one of their strengths is the highly personal development
13» Borowitz, "God-is-Dead Theology," The Meaning of the Death
of God, Murchland (editor), p. 99
14. Ibid.; cf. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, pp. 38-42
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emphasising honesty to one's modernity and also that they are
in fact only one among many modern approaches to Christianity
with an uncertain but possibly sizeable amount of support.
Along with their highly biographical and personal mode of
doing theology, the Christian atheists must be recognised as
offering a highly fragmentary theology. Bonhoeffer, for example
so central to the development which followed after him, belongs
here only because of the suggestions in a small group of letters
which Karl Barth is reported to have considered too inadequately
developed to merit close and advanced theological consideration.
Ogletree found fault with Hamilton precisely because of the
16
fragmentary nature of his thinking. Weil's vision must be
pieced together from the scattered entries in a few cluttered
diaries and letters. Van Buren, with three books, admits
openly to his technique of exploratory and experimental theology
where a position may be abandoned almost as soon as it is
17
expressed. Precisely because of the consistently fragmentary
nature of Christian atheism no apology is felt necessary for
the inclusion of Braun's and Mallard's thought on the basis of,
in each case, one published article.
The reverse side of this fragmentary pattern is the lack
of a truly systematic statement of Christian atheism. When
mention is made of the system of a Christian atheist it is only
such as can be extracted from the materials available, usually
only with the greatest difficulty. Even then, in a single
man's work there may be the basis of more than one system—as
15. Mehta, op. cit., pp. I6*f-165
16. Ogletree, op. cit., p. 27
17. Van Buren, Theological Explorations, p. 3
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we see in Hamilton, the two cycles of Weil's atheism, or
Van Buren's explorations.
Nor can Christian atheism be said to have been formulated
in only one format such as they mystical, the logical or the
mythical. The linguistic, logical and empirical concerns of
Van Buren could scarcely be more different from the emotive,
highly mythological style of Altizer or the mystical via nega-
tiva of Weil. In this sense the theme of Christian atheism
shows a breadth and diversity strongly reminiscent of an even
greater diversity in Buddhism which has been given form as
everything from a religion of faith and the supernatural to a
philosophy undertaking the greatest imaginable extremes of
abstraction and logic.
The Complexity of Dialectics
One can identify, however, a prevalence of dialectical
modes of thought which seem to rise from the deepest levels of
its structure. Both Weil and Altizer, for example, speak of
opposites and their possible coincidence. Hamilton speaks of
the victory of God's absence over his presence as the breakdown
18
of the dialectic between them. Also of course, the basic
God/world and secular/religious pairs which are deeply in¬
grained in the thought of the Christian atheists as we have
already shown, are part of this dialectical mode of thought.
Altizer told us specifically that following Eliade he
attempted deliberately to do theology dialectically, and he
also speaks of the importance of Jacob Taube's thought to his
generation, especially as Taubes discussed the nature of a
18. Hamilton, "The New Optimism," op. cit., p. 168
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dialectical theology in an article which Altizer includes in
19
his book of readings in the Death of God theology. In fact,
Taubes identifies dialectical theology as testifying to "the
20
eclipse of the divine in our present situation." Corastock
too identifies a fundamental relation between dialectic and
atheism. He posits as one of the three sources of the
Nietzschean image of the dead God, Durkheim's and Eliade's
"primitive distinctions made in all cultures between the sacred
and profane, between the holy and secular, between numinous
reality and mundane phenomena" which are "the very heart of
21
religion."
While the dialectical tendency to begin with an initial
identification of opposites therefore is natural to Christian
atheism, so also is the subsequent attempt to rise above or
build on such dualism in such a way that a new or higher level
is attained which is not subject to the same oppositions. Thus
God and the world are separate and opposed categories but it
is the world v/hich is affirmed and God who must be rediscovered
as the world gives him meaning—a development which reverses
the orthodox affirmation of a God giving meaning to the world.
We note this radical pattern even in Weil who affirms the world
as empty and then identifies it as such with the divine
emptiness.
Christian atheism takes so seriously its antipathy to the
old orthodox pattern of dialectical development that it cannot
19. Taubes, Jacob; "On the Nature of the Theological Method,"
Toward a New Christianity, Altizer (editor), pp. 221-237
(cf. especially p. 236).Altizer's comments: p. 219
20. Ibid., pp. 236-237
21. Comstock, op. cit., p. 217
328
embody Lynch's definition of dialectic "as meaning the positive
22
interplay of contraries." Rather in Christian atheism there
is an effort toward a quite radical eventual obliteration of
the dialectical situation. Somewhat paradoxically therefore
the dialectical mode arouses a pattern of deep dissatisfaction
and of search for some ultimate and permanent mastery of or
victory over its form.
The Christian atheists therefore seek a unity such as the
world, or a coincidence such as one of the sacred and profane,
or a resolution through dominance as when absence replaces
presence. They thus do not continue dialectically—playing
with opposites—but represent instead a mode of seeking a way
out of opposition. It is felt that there is strength in a
position which can formulate a divine impotence at one with the
world so that power must be redefined as no longer the opposite
of weakness just as divinity is no longer the opposite of
humanity, and transcendence no longer the opposite of immanence.
Accordingly, one can find in the thought of the Christian
atheists modes of mystical unity and non-dialectical relativity
as well. With these the divisions of dialectic's initial
oppositional patterns are re-formed into patterns not themselves
dialectical. This may reflect what David Miller suggests is
the emergence of a kind of "modern spirituality resembling
preneolithic spiritualities in which orthodox Western distinc¬
tions between masculine and feminine, aquiline and serpentine,
olympian and chthonic, solar and lunar, heroic and demonic are
23
confused."
22. Lynch, op. cit., p. 137
23. Miller, Davidj "False Prophets in the Secular City," The
Meaning of the Death of God, Murchland (editor), p. 206
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Evidence for this is not lacking and Altizer's work must
be a veritable storehouse of examples with an immanence v/hich
swallows up transcendence, a God who is identified with Satan,
the absolute mixing of sacred and profane to note but a few.
The theme of replacing concern for oneself and egoism with
one's identification of himself with his neighbor and his
neighbor's needs, may also be evidence of the breakdown of a
basic Western dialectic of the individual and the society. Not
least nor to be forgotten is the embrace of the world in such a
way that the creator fades away into oblivion, or man discovers
in the possibilities of the here and now values competitive
with those which were once projected on a paradisaical after¬
life, Everything which had been neatly put into its place by
orthodox theology seems here to have "come unstuck," become
confused, and much of it lost as new dominants come to the fore.
If Miller's suggestion is valid in this context, the
confusion of the old contraries may be rising from some change
in modern mentality, and some sensation that such is the case
may be at the heart of the Christian atheists tendency to see
his problems and his way of thinking as highly characteristic
of his time. Given their anthropomorphic reference—as Samuel
Miller calls it—which would insist that "whatever the divine
2h
means it means in reference to human experience," a radical
change in theology would automatically follow from such a
radical change in man's patterns of thought.
This may be a case of only a few men changing or reflecting
a difference from the mentality which developed orthodox
2^, Miller, Samuel; op, cit., p, 68
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Christian systems. However, if the policy of those few is to
develop their theology from internal principles rather than
those inherent in and imposed by the tradition, there would be
great significance for orthodoxy in the kind of radical changes
which would result. If orthodox Christianity embodied a given
worldview, structural differences of a worldview kind which
differed from that would essentially restructure the symbols.
The only way in which this might be slowed down or postponed
would be by insisting that revelation or a given metaphysics
are the beginning point rather than man, which as Gilkey
25
insists must not be done. The Christian atheists would
wholly agree with Gilkey.
At this point it is well to emphasise how natural to the
history of religions is the reworking of a tradition of symbols
and doctrines. Indeed, Mahayana and Theravada represent two
radically different treatments of and developments from the
same material. Likewise protestant theology was a radical
reworking of medieval Roman theology, and Gnostic or Semitic
Christianity were two quite distinct systems which failed to
establish themselves as living traditions. To what extent such
examples are relevant to the Christian atheists can hardly be
determined at this early date and with the limited materials
available now. It is however likely that if they can and do
reflect some internal patterns hostile to orthodox Christianity
which do not find satisfactory expression elsewhere, Christian
atheists may be beginning a new reworking of Christian symbols
and materials which will last.
25. Gilkey, "Dissolution and Reconstruction in Theology,"
Frontline Theology, Peerman (editor), p.
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The Christian atheists1 anthropocentric and personalistic
method of doing theology may therefore be of critical signifi¬
cance in evaluating their importance and achievement. It may
only be that they reflect a problem in communicating the old
orthodoxy but it may also be that they have achieved at least
part of a reformulation consistent with changes so deep within
the modern western cultural mindset that we have not yet
become fully conscious of those changes and therefore cannot
yet analyse them or even identify them in a highly systematic
and rational mode.
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CHAPTER 18: The Secular Sacred
Between Materialism and Theism
Failure to understand the full meaning of religious
atheism results in two opposite criticisms. First, there are
those who see in the Christian atheists the characteristics of
a society which "is not only secular and non-mythological, but
monochromatic and unidimensional--it sees life and reality all
1
on one level, the material," They are here accused of a
2
"disastrously constricted" worldview, and of being "bound to
the world of the immediate, the world of natural causes, and
3
human events," Variously, it may be said that with them "some
lesser myth has come to be adequate to sustain and to create a
if
smaller kind of human life,"
Such criticisms bear witness to the failure of Christian
atheists to communicate their vision. This may well result
from their own feeble grasp on the truth contained in it, to be
sure, but it does not follow that the truth itself is inferior.
It may be rather that the dissociation of the sacred of which
Joseph Campbell complained has blinded Western men to the
sacred potential innate to themselves and their world. In any
case the Christian atheists go too far in their attempts to
express their experiences of the sacred depths of existence, to
be taken for men whose psyche is retarded, infantile or
deformed with regard to the ability to probe toward ultimates.
Christian language, having served a God/world dualism,
along with the deep cultural habit of separating the sacred
1, Cooper, op, cit., p. 1^9
2, Shideler, op, cit,, p, 12^-
3, Gilkey, op, cit,, p, 35
Shideler, op, cit,, p, 12*f
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must account to no small extent for both the inadequacies of
the Christian atheists' formulations and the insensitivity of
their critics to their efforts to forge beyond an unreflective
superficiality. However even in this aspect of their struggle
against traditional Christian modes of thought and expression
they witness to the Christian nature of their enterprise.
The opposite criticism »would make the point that insofar
as the Christian atheists do speak of the depths of human
existence and its meaning or potential, they point to a dimen¬
sion of that existence which transcends the narrow secular
5
world. In so doing it is said, "they look for God • • • they
do not give up looking,"^ and that they reveal "a deeply
7
believing preoccupation with God."
Such expressions witness further to the inability of many
Christians to conceive a sacred which is not separable—not
theistic. All language hinting at the sacred is taken to be
but ill-formulated language about God. Only two possibilities
appear to such a mentality: God or nothing. If it is allowed
that the Christian atheists attempt to rise above an utterly
superficial secularity, they can only do so by clumsy approxi¬
mation to theistic development, however unaware of that they
themselves may be.
The problems which more traditional Christians encounter
in understanding and evaluating efforts of the Christian atheists
must indicate many of the problems which they would face in
5» Gilkey, op. cit., p. 35
6. Hazelton, "The Future of God," The Meaning of the Death of
God, Murchland (editor), p. 132
7. Adolfs, "Is God Dead?" The Meaning of the Death of God,
Murchland (editor), p. 87"
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understanding Buddhism. In both cases the sacred is neither
removed from the world nor is the world taken as devoid of the
sacred. This requires some sensitivity toward the possibility
that in man and his world isf in some sense, precisely that
which always precludes containment, specificity, certainty,
final verbal formulation. There must be, in other words, the
ability to image a world in which the sacred is to be found by
man and identified as a component of him and his world.
Two things can also be said specifically about the nature
of Christian atheism which helps to define that segment of the
*
population for whom they may speak as well as to clarify what
they are saying. First, one can recognise that Christian
atheism does not represent the vast numbers in the West who
reflect a much greater dissociation from religion than even the
most anti-religious Christian atheist. These are the men who
have ceased to be concerned with theism and atheism at all, and
who maintain no link with the forms of religion institutionally
present or with the forms of religious materials culturally
present—or maintain only the most minimal link with them such
as obtains automatically by virtue of belonging to the culture.
All that makes Christian atheism both religious and Christian
is effectively irrelevant to them.
Secondly, Christian atheism does not reflect the
traditional Christian pietism still deeply entrenched in the
culture, and it is perhaps not irrelevant here that the Chris¬
tian atheists are intellectuals, religious thinkers and
theologians. As Michael Novak, commenting on this from the
American side has said:
335
A deep gap has appeared between the
theologians and the ordinary people
of America: Those good churchgoing
people whose Virgin is a tearful,
prayerful, white Miss America of
unimpeachable mealiness. The God
of these good people is, for the
theologians, dead."
Mallard represents an almost exact example of this when he
advocates the use of the term "atheism" to designate " a kind
of popular polemic against the very crudely theistic notions
9
found to such a disturbing extent through our society."
Christian atheism therefore represents those somewhere
between the irreligious who do not share the concern to reformu¬
late the Christian worldview and1hose who still worship a
transcendent deity who is all powerful and all good and who
will help the faithful, judge and punish the evil and yet
remain himself untainted by his fallen creation. In this
position they are clearly neither devoid of concern over some
reality, aspect of reality, or manner of viewing reality which
we could designate as "sacred," nor are they either orthodox or
wholly uniform in their response to and treatment of that
concern.
Understanding the Secular Sacred
The Christian atheists are to be located, consequently,
between the irreligious secularist and the man who believes in
a transcendent God, between utter materialism and incipient
theism. Joseph Campbell has probably best described this posi¬
tion as "the secularisation of the sacred" when by that one
means "an opening of the sense of religious awe to some sphere
8. Novak, op. cit., p. 82
9. Mallard, op. cit., pp. 337-338
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of profane experience or, more marvellously, to the whole
10
wonder of this world and oneself within it#" Thus that which
could not in the past be regarded by theists as sacred cannot
now come to be regarded otherwise, actually or potentially, by
Christian atheists#
Three modes of understanding or of coming to grips with
the secular sacred situation emerge from the writings of the
Christian atheists# There is first the vision of a sacred world
incubated in its own matrix of transcendence# Vahanian reflects
this sensitivity when he asserts that culture "is a consecration
11
of the world," and "the world is what takes place in and
12
through the Word," intending in so saying a link with an
iconoclastically or atheistically preserved transcendence. In
the same vein he emphasises that "the Bible speaks of the
transcendence of God almost as though it were an •empirical'
phenomenon" in support of his argument that "the word of man is
man's access to the Word of God: No man can speak it, nor does
13
any man speak who does not speak the word#" Only thus can
the world become the answer to a self-imposed and cultural
atheism# 'With the ability to conceive transcendence gone, the
world becomes the focus for iconoclastic faithfulness,
Weil too echoes this in her cycle of themes: Necessity
14
must be loved even as is God; to love God "can only mean the
15
order of the world and one's neighbor;" this world "is the
16
mirror of this love which is God himself;" "this world insofar
10# Campbell, op. cit., p# 601
11. Vahanian, "Beyond the Death of God," op. cit., p. 11
12# Vahanian, No Other God, p# 56
13# Ibid., p.
1^-# Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 32^
15. Ibid., p. 81
16. Weil, Intimations of Christianity, p# 103
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17
as it is completely empty of Godt is God himself;" and "God
and the supernatural are hidden and formless in the universe,"*^
In this vision man is given himself and creation for the goal
of decreation but the whole—man, creation, decreation, is God
himself.
In this development one cannot abandon the symbols of the
transcendent God and the world of man but they do not stand for
two separate things, Kather they suggest the extremities of
that which man knows as his existence as as the polar tensions
sustaining a reality which is at once diverse and indivisible.
On the one hand that suggests a bounded world with a mysterious
transcendent beyond, and other than it; and on the other hand
it indicates within man himself and his world another face of
>
that same mystery, at once different from and identical with it.
The second mode of understanding the secular sacred
situation reflects a direct attack upon the traditional polari¬
ties precisely because they are not two separate things. This
understanding selects one set of the pair of opposites to name
all that was previously intended and thereby deny that they are
different, Altizer fits here with his motif of world affirma¬
tion and God negation. To him the sacred is the profane, the
religious is secular, God is the world, spirit is flesh. The
unity is therefore that of predication rather than conjunction
so that man is to know the sacred as not the transcendent
extension of God and the immanent intension of the world; but
rather as the transcendent which is immanent.
17» Weil, Gravity and Grace, p, 99
18. Ibid., p. <+9
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Behind Van Buren's, Hamilton's, Braun's, Kee's and even
Bonhoeffer's general themes of secularity is just such a pattern
as well. There is an impatience with and belief in the
inequality of one half of the old dialectical structure and
this impatience is not satisfied with a pattern of using both
halves to achieve one whole. Rather, it is based on a choice of
one over the other which assigns to the chosen one the qualities
of the rejected one, thus using the less preferred to qualify
the more preferred.
A third understanding replaces the old geographical
polarisation with a temporal one. Thus Mallard speaks of "the
radical incarnation of the Infinite, yet its openness towards
man's future" so that he can identify "the 'sacred' as now
specifically the tension of human freedom toward its secular
19
future." Likewise he can speak of that tension as "the
20
Kingdom," --an ancient Christian symbol for the perfect sacred
environment.
Solle's sacred present is also extended towards and into
a sacred future and even carries the hint of a special event
toward which man might specifically look and which he can even
cause or prevent by his decision for or against Christ's
representationalism: Namely the moment when representation is
ended. As Solle emphasises, provisionality is part of the
structure of representation which cannot be removed without
21
representation collapsing into replacement. Thus represen¬
tation is part of the very form of the world and man himself
19* Mallard, op. cit., pp. 335 and 338
20. Ibid., p. 328
21. Solle, op. cit., p. 13^
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and thereby future identity is also already a part of present
22
representation as well. The mystery of what this can mean
constitutes an openness in man's future equivalent to the
indeterminancy of which Mallard writes.
This theme of preserving an openness to the sacred by
reference to the mystery of the future can be found in minor
aspects of Van Buren's and Hamilton's thought as well. Van
Buren tells us, for example, that "whatever he is, this God is
not a finished, fixed or identifiable figure, person or
concept" but rather "a future coming to meet man" which "will
be 'all in all'" providing "a way to walk" and waiting
23
"somewhere out ahead of man."
Hamilton in his early book The New Essence of Christianity
suggested an eschatological solution to the suffering/impassible
dichotomy of God rather than the solution of the trinity, which
would see Jesus* lordship over the world as now one of
humiliation but in a time "that is to come, or that we are to
24
come to," as one of victory and power. Hamilton is careful
however to insist that this cannot support an "otherworldliness"
which "commits us to a belief in the existence of some space
25
beyond the known space of this world," and perhaps it was due
to the difficulty in avoiding this that he did not develop the
theme further.
In this third development the Christian atheists show a
heritage of apocalypticism and eschatology which gives away
22. Ibid.
23. Van Buren, The Edges of Language, p. 76
24. Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity, pp. 94 and 109
25. Ibid., p. 110
3^0
their cultural base and identifies its difference from Buddhism,
for Buddhism as we have said knows no finality of a temporal
kind either in the past or in the future. Time is never so
concrete either because it lacks dharmic reality or because
every time is ultimately empty of separate reality, as we
pointed out in connection with Altizer's misunderstanding.
However, Buddhism, especially in its Mahayana form, might
make use of dialectical symbols in a manner like that of the
first characterisation of the sacred. There samsara and
*
nirvana are such, subject to the unifying function of sunyata
or prajna. Likewise when Theravada directs its followers to
the realisation that they are meaningful as what they are only
in samsara and that the epitomy of this (sopadhisesa-nirvana)
somehow also connotes what was intended by the separate symbol
of nirvana, we have a pattern parallel to the second mode of
understanding or characterising the sacred.
The Rejection of Nihilism
Whether it utilises a dialectical structure to describe
two aspects of one indivisible unity; whether it merges one
side of a dialectical pair into the other so that the one can
stand alone yet complete in the meaning of the two; or whether
it polarises the dialectical structure in the present and the
future times to provide both the principle of unity and distin¬
ction, Christian atheism intends to assert that the sacred and
profane are one in human reality. In so doing they position
themselves in contrast to those who believe that man without an
external deity has no alternative to nihilism. Comstock is one
who made this criticism when he wrote:
3^1
The death of this [the traditional]
God means not only the end of belief
in a certain anthropomorphic deity,
but, more important, the death of
all the functions that he performed
for Western man. With him goes the
sense of a transcendent and ultimate
norm for the value of this world, of
a final purpose and a single meaning
which could serve as a focus for
human aspiration. With him goes the
religious aspect, the metaphysical
structure, the sacred dimension of
existence,26
Ultimately it is from precisely such a position that the
Christian atheist seeks liberation by his rejection of theism.
The richest potential of Buddhism and Christian atheism is in
the meaning for them which the world is quite able to reveal
for itself; and in the challenge of man's unrelieved involve¬
ment with himself and his environment. Both provide conclusive
evidence that sacred purposes and values having to do with what
man finds immediately at hand are born from individual effort
which is socially cognisant and independent of an otherworldly
reality.
This means that they can arrive at and develop from
essentially that principle which the scientific atheist,
Jacques Monod, called "the ethic of knowledge," which is a
pattern of life emerging from patterns within man's own mind
which in turn are the reflection of the patterns and structures
27
of the world itself, Altizer may speak of the chaos which
God's death would appear to leave us with but he can do so only
in the context of his own keen understanding of all that man
affirms in his Yes-saying to the world. Like Nietzsche, the
26, Comstock, op, cit., p, 21?
27, Monod, Chance and Necessity, p, 165
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Buddhists and Christian atheists may develop nihilistic themes
but only to serve the purpose of their constructive visions.
The ethic of knowledge is rooted first in the inherited
experiences of our ancestors formulated, Monod tells us, as
23
logic; and secondly in the experiences we ourselves undergo.
As such it is wholly human and can be sacred only if something
of humanity is sacred. This witnesses also to both the social
cohesiveness of mankind throughout his extension in time and
space and to his critical solitude at some point. It affirms a
logic which perceives distinctions by designating their identity,
so that neither separation nor unity dominate.
Together these principles support the point that the
sacred is nurtured by personal effort but as it is actualised
in the individual man is finally itself impersonal. This means
that the Christian doctrine of eternal life—personal human
continuation without limit (i.e. infinite), is utterly reversed.
The sacred reality is born from selflessness, whether envisioned
as impermanence or insubstantiality (anicca or nairatmya), as
the utter rejection of the possessive tendency (e.g. Weil and
the Theravada) or the affirmation of the oneness of humanity
(e.g. Altizer and the Mahayana).
Ultimately then, the only final loss resulting from the
rejection of the theistic God is the loss of eternal selfhood.
The alternative structure affirmed by atheism in Christianity
and Buddhism is of a relational nature which emerges from the
individuality which one begins with to deny the boundaries
which create such individuality and to affirm the superior truth
of the sacred reality which the world itself is or may be.
28. Ibid., pp. 145-148
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Thus we have the movement of the Divine in the thought of
Simone Weil. Bonhoeffer speaks of finite man's belonging to the
infinity of Divine absence, impotence and suffering. Icono¬
clastic culture faithful to a transcendent God in a way single
men can never be and from its own immanent resources is put
forward by Gabriel Vahanian. Living for others as the awesome
self-transcending mystery involves one in the edges of language
in Van Buren's thought, in an eschalating theology in Kee's,
and in the experiences of obligation for which the potent
symbol "God" is appropriate in Braun's. Altizer commits himself
to the Great Humanity Divine as a full coincidencia oppositorum.
Solle's highest vision is of the Christ containing the universal
representation: All of mankind and all of God. Finally,
Mallard speaks of a process—mankind stretching into the future
--as a unity of all immanence and transcendence.
Profoundly important is the fact that we could pass through
this series again, extracting other themes from these principles
or other variations on these themes. This reveals the nature
of atheistic formulations, whether realised by the Christian
atheists or not (and to the extent that they attempt to finalise
a dogma it is not realised). That nature is one of continual
development. The theological "method" of atheism is thus
inseparable from its message. Issues are always, in such
thought, both substantive and procedural with a thoroughness
which is likely to be underestimated.
In Buddhism this is provided for in the realisation that
men change through their grasp of truth which is perfected in
them in a manner which allows the Theravada to speak of the
paths to nirvana and the Mahayana to speak of the stages of
3kk
Bodhisattvahood. In Monod's ethic of knowledge it is represented
in the unending confrontation of the apparently objective
structures which can be discovered in human thought and action
with the immediacy of human experience.
The Christian atheists too struggle to understand and
communicate what they understand but they are caught in the
on-goingness of relativity. What does come through however is
that this is not the chaos and nothingness of nihilism but
rather the pattern of existence and its decisive potential, so
that it could only be theism which reflects a kind of nihilism
insofar as it refuses to allow man and his world to be what
they are.
The final truth which addresses itself to both the method
and content of atheism is that of the removal of the absolute
from its position of dominance over the world and the recogni¬
tion of an existence consistent with the subsequent relativity.
In so doing it formulates the problem of the absolute as not
thereby resolved but therein approached. Atheism then cannot
address itself to anything less than did theism but it can do
so and does do so in a fundamentally different manner.
3^5
CHAPTER 19: Heterodoxy and Orthodoxy
Identifying the Problem
Christian atheists reject that form of dualism which
survived in what is now regarded as orthodox theism's persistent
need to protect a holy God from contamination or challenge by a
fallen world and dependent reality. The dualism always was
qualified but these qualifications could not prevent two
effects: (1) the alienation of all that man senses as sacred,
numinous or even just utterly special from the stuff of which
he and his world are made, and (2) the resultant deprecation of,
distaste for, resentment of, and attempted rejection of that
which man came to know as himself and his natural world.
Insofar as atheism reverses these effects it is not a
corrective of poor theology (i.e. the doctrine of God) but of
poor anthropology and cosmology. When orthodoxy and even some
Christian atheists, suggest that atheism protects the trans-
dendent aspect of God they either miss this point or do not
address themselves to it. Such an atheism designed to protect
the transcendent God of theism would only intensify the remote¬
ness of the sacred and the unrelieved profanity of the earth
and her inhabitants. Rather, true atheism reinterprets man and
his world to himself. It seeks to find its eternal truths deep
within the world's structures, its purposes in their use, and
its end in their potential or actual nature.
Consistent atheism therefore, is in its full structure as
much the enemy of theology (the doctrine of God) as of idolatry
and if it protects a transcendent God, as it does in certain
aspects of Vahanian's, S'olle's and Weil's thought, it subse¬
quently also throws man back upon his own resources and confines
man within the limitations of his own reality. When atheism
functions religiously it can never be as a covert way of
returning to man the transcendent reality of God, It is rather
a way through which man in his understanding of himself and his
world struggles by human effort either to read the sacred in the
world or to write it there, Weil, Vahanian and Solle are thus
examples of the most subtle and complex atheism—that clearly
having this dual aspect.
It is precisely because of this that atheism can embrace
religious language and materials, acknowledging and wishing to
speak of the numinous in space and time, of the holy life or
holy states of being, of the mysterious, the transrational, the
depths, heights and inner truth of the world. Indeed to the
atheist it must seem that it is rather theism which cannot know
of or speak of the sacred, which must constantly qualify and
protect from true worldliness its epiphanies or theophanies.
The theist will never know anything but reflected light,
mediated and adapted, but the atheist lives in and is of the
source of light itself.
Orthodox theology in its efforts to moderate and mediate
the dualism of the transcendent God through the doctrines of
the immanent aspect of God, providence, grace, incarnation,
revelation, indeed all aspects of divine intervention, redemp¬
tion and presence tends toward atheism as we understand it.
Insofar as Christianity has been aware that it cannot formulate
a doctrine of pure transcendence, it has qualified theism in an
atheistic direction so that even supposedly theistic Christians
sometimes do not believe that man cannot save himself, that the
totality of creation has been subject to the Fall and is wicked
3^7
in comparison to the awesome standard of Divine reality, and
that indeed man would be lost with all creation had God not
provided a solution#
The immanent aspect of God and the doctrine of the trinity
are the ultimate qualifications of theism by orthodoxy and in
any consideration of atheism such as that in which we have
engaged they must demonstrate the difficulties in definition
and designation# It is in this context that Nels Feme's
1
article "God Without Theism" can be regarded as a good example
of an increasing impatience within modern orthodoxy itself with
the problem as traditionally developed# It recognises that the
rigorous definition of terms and the clear separation of cate¬
gories have guaranteed that theistic doctrines are never fully
consistent with the demands of Western logic, insight and
intuition.
This suggests that the process of posing theism against
atheism in a dialectical treatment creates tensions unnatural
to both and that this is sensed by theists today as readily as
Christian atheists sense the same unease at the theistic
separation of sacred and profane, religious and secular and so
on# In this light the dialectically stimulated movement toward
synthesis must be regarded as an attempt by both theists and
atheists to resolve the nearly intolerable tensions resulting
from the treatment of two conceptual units as thesis and
antithesis or as mutually negating opposites#
If Christian atheism is one indication of the need to
overcome spiritually, psychologically, and perhaps even
1# Ferre, op# cit.
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culturally intolerable divisions arising from dialectical
formulations, it is also the case that the thinking which came
from Vatican II is a further example of that same need as
experienced, and responded to, by a major segment of modern
Christians. Nor is it by chance, therefore that this is
illustrated specifically in its approach to atheism.
This new Roman Catholic thinking is evolving within and
perhaps beyond what we have been regarding as one form of
orthodox Christianity and demonstrates well the fluidity of the
entire area of theism/atheism for which dialectical treatment
used to give great clarification but with regard to which it
now seems only the source of an original distortion. As
finally this relates to our understanding of Christian atheism
as a problem and as a form of Christianity, it is appropriate
to consider here two themes reflecting these changes.
On Taking Atheism Seriously
First and most fundamental is the recognition that atheism
cannot be separated from how theology is being done. Past forms
of thought saw the matter far too simply and a new depth of
complexity is admitted with such assertions as: "Weighty are
2
the questions which atheism raises." Likewise theism itself
may have been taken too lightly and the prevalence of incorrect
or inadequate theology with regard to it is recognised as
3
contributing to the increase in atheism.
In an implicit admission that difficulties may be being
created by present theological methods, the Second Vatican
2. Reid, op. cit., p. 187
3. Gaudium et spes (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World), Art. 29, The Documents of Vatican II, Abbott
(editor), p. 217| cf. Reid, op. cit., p. "Ui-
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Council invited theologians to seek more suitable ways of
4
communicating doctrine. The task of aggiornamento which has
become so critical since the Council has itself come to be seen
as valid and proper interpretation, development and utilisation
of the teachings of the Church in terms of the people to whom
they must be conveyed, and in light of the past. Roman theolo¬
gians may still oppose Tillich's method of correlation but
principles functioning essentially as it did underly these
activities.
The biggest step to be made in the direction of a new
treatment of and attitude toward atheism was that of recognising
that there could be a true and guiltless atheism. As Reid
understood:
It is a cheap and facile apologetics
that attempts to win a point by
declaring that there are no absolute
unbelievers and that every man v/ho
claims to be such is deceiving himself
and others. This is to undervalue or
even deny the seriousness of another
man's most earnest affirmation about
himself.5
If one insists that either theism or idolatry cover all
possibilities, a guiltless and honest atheism could not be
acknowledged. Idolatry does not lend itself to moral neutrality
but perhaps, given a certain attitude, atheism could. Indeed
it was precisely this which the Vatican II discussions and
proclamations sought, and which, incidentally, Vahanian's
recommendation of methodological atheism depends upon. Likewise
Solle is assuming that atheism due to the death of God as a
4. Gaudium et spes, Art. 62, op. cit., p. 268
5. Reid, op. cit., p. 14
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cultural phenomenon can be tolerated within Christian morality
provided that Christ is acknowledged as representative.
The result of Vatican II was to date such thinkers as
s
Etienne Borne who insisted that "atheism and religious cons¬
ciousness are opposed one to -flue other as the limits of negation
and affirmation so that war between them is inevitable, all
possibility of compromise, toleration or reconciliation being
completely removed."^ Reid summarises the new understanding:
After the Council it is impossible
for a theologian to go on regarding
the atheist as such as a fool or a
villain; his present and most urgent
task is to seek out the many and
diverse causes of atheism, which can
no longer be reduced merely to
stupidity or moral perversity.''7
Thus the new thesis that there might be a guiltless atheism
gained credance. Karl Rahner tells us that while it "is not
set out in so many words" it is implicit:
... in the reference to the fact
that, on the one hand, there exists
an explicit atheism, which is wide¬
spread spacially, and is held to be
self-evident in its simplicity, while
on the other hand general Christian
principles do not entitle us simply
to condemn such atheists as being
gravely guilty before God.°
The implication is twofold. What atheists say is taken as
honest and sincere and not just a cover-up for idolatry; and
the possibility of a generally guiltless atheism is acknowledged.
Thus "the Council allows that atheism need not bar a man from
the way of salvation, provided he has not acted contrary to the
6. Borne, op. cit., p. 9
7. Reid, op. cit., p. 62
8. Rahner, "The Teaching of the Second Vatican Council on
Atheism," Concilium: Atheism and Indifference, March, 1967»
p. 6
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9dictate of his conscience," Theoretically there is no immediate
reason that the Christian atheists must be condemned by this
qualification for they represent clearly the often painful
regard for honesty and faithfulness to conscience.
It was precisely for this honesly to personal experience
that some theologians criticised the Christian atheists,
reminding them of their duty to the tradition, and while Reid
is certainly not concerned specifically with their situation,
he is here talking about a thesis which itself is not yet set
in a specific context and which therefore could be considered
in locating the Christian atheist in respect to orthodox
Christians, It may well be that the Roman Catholics who formu¬
lated this thesis were displaying a greater sensitivity to the
ambiguities of the human situation than regard for the defence
of the dogma, and this will be faulted by fundamentalist
protestants and conservative Romans alike. Yet its great
advantage is that it allows an approach with the possibility
for mutual respect between theistic Christians and atheists and
only in such a climate can a basis for understanding and
progress in understanding be sought.
There is perhaps a greater sense of confidence in the
statements of someone like Bonhoeffer or Braun than Reid
suggests when he speaks of the fact that "most modern unbe¬
lievers are not so much unwilling as unable to make the act of
10
faith," Nevertheless, we could generally agree if this were
formulated as: "Not so much unwilling as convinced that
9, Reid, op, cit., p, 10*f
10, Ibid,, p, 152
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orthodox Christian theism is, for various reasons, not
personally valid," Christian atheists are those who in all
conscience believe the traditional faith is an impossibility
for themselves and for many other modern men.
In this development within the Roman Catholic response to
atheism, such characteristics as "fidelity to conscience, the
honest seeking for truth, and the vigorous sensitivity to the
demands of moral awareness" come to be associated with "the
upright atheist who cannot be excluded from the path of salva¬
tion" so that in some sense "moral integrity can supply for
11
explicit belief in God or serve as its surrogate," Reid
suggests this occurs because an atheist so characterised in his
faithfulness to the dictate of conscience is bound "to a
transcendent order of which God is author and ultimate
12
foundation,"
Such thought is purely Vahanian in form, for while Vahanian
does not say the same thing in these words it is this which the
whole state of Christian men is hopefully resting on in a time
when they cannot be theists. That such is the case is their
only hope for if there cannot be an atheism which correlates
with the transcendent order in the world, they cannot properly
relate to God during this phase in the culture when the concept
of the transcendent is dead. It is also this which effectively
makes it valid to concern oneself with the immanent world and
which makes its transcendent aspect which man should discover
some day again, only a form of the immanent aspect.
11, Ibid,, pp, 105-106
12, Ibid,, p. 109
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Taking Secularism Seriously
Another emphasis which developed with Vatican II's
consideration of unbelief was more directly related to the
debate on non-Christian religions but it is also relevant to
Reid's categories of those who have never believed and those
13
who have lapsed from orthodox Christianity, This point,
developed most clearly in the thought of the Roman Catholic theo¬
logian Karl Rahner, revolves around the thesis that "man who is
commanded to have a religion, is also commanded to seek and
1 if
accept a social form of religion,"
It must be noted however, that Rahner intends a rather
special meaning when he speaks of the social form of religion
for he recognised that Christianity as presented in a non-
Christian country by missionaries could not necessarily claim
that members of the social form of religion already present
there were morally obligated to convert to a Christianity not
sufficiently established to possess itself a true social form.
Thus he speaks of "the moment when the gospel really enters into
15
the historical situation of an individual," and this moment
becomes critical to the matter of identifying that point at
which, before God, one is obligated to express an explicitly
Christian belief.
Short of that explicit conversion to Christianity which
may not be obligatory if the Church does not exist as a social
form, no "existentially real demand is made by the absolute
16
religion in its historical tangible form," and the individual
13. Ibid,, p, xiv
14. Rahner, Theological Investigations, Vol, V, p, 120
15. Ibid., p. 121
16. Ibid., p. 119
33^
17
who follows "the supernatural, gracefilled elements" of his
own religion participates in something lawful and may find
salvation. This means that "it must be possible to be not only
18
an anonymous theist but also an anonymous Christian." What
is involved in this is the recognition that salvation can be
found outside orthodox Christianity and that this is so even if
Christianity is not wholly unknown. Indeed, it is true up to
"the point in time when the Christian religion becomes a
19
historically real factor."
We introduce these concepts for several reasons. First of
all, as a point of interest, it is clear that the belief that
a religion must have a social form is again in accord with
Vahanian's thought. Secondly, however, if as Vahanian himself
points out, Christianity is no longer able to sustain a
culturally viable concept of God it could be argued that our
own culture does not possess a theistic religion which really
enters into the historical situation of individuals, making an
existentially real demand.
Vahanian thus suggests that our situation parallels the
situation of men in non-Christian cultures in that it has
fallen away from that point or that moment when it could be
20
subject to "the absolute obligation of the Christian religion."
Indeed it is precisely this which is intended with the phrase
"post-Christian age," and which has been used with this meaning
by many theologians of our time.
17. Ibid., P. 121
18. Ibid., P. 132
19. Ibid., P. 121
20. Ibid., P. 120
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The Roman Catholic line of thought developed by Rahner and
underlying Vatican II proclamations concerning non-Christian
religions, seeks to find and recognise those elements in a
culture which are valid and lawful even if not specifically
Christian, In terms of its treatment of atheism of a non-
Christian kind in our culture (e,g. communism and humanism), it
represented an attempt to find that which through modern Western
secular morality could bring one to salvation. Thus it recog¬
nised God's universal truths which exist independently of
institutional Christianity and it recognised man's ability to
seek, find and abide by these truths even when outside and
21
linked with beliefs in opposition to orthodox Christianity,
If the Roman Catholics were prepared to accept that all too
often in our culture Christianity is not an historically real
factor, and does not make an existentially real demand, they
might understand how the Christian atheists can suggest a form
of Christianity which does not itself possess a social form but
lives in the social forms which it finds—i,e, in the secular
world with a secular consciousness and conscience illumined by
the truth which they found in secular seeking. This too would
give them a particular light into the belief of the Christian
atheists that such order as man needs and ought to live by will
be discoverable in his secular reality.
Indeed, if Christianity has collapsed in our culture and
exists institutionally only as it does in non-Christian
cultures where it has a culturally peripheral effort estab¬
lished, the state of men in Western, previously Christian areas,
21, Ibid,, pp, 118 and 121
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is indistinguishable theologically from that of men in other
non-Christian areas. They too must abide by truths as expressed
in the social forms available to them and they must be faithful
to the moral dictates of their conscience. All of the Christian
atheists would essentially agree with this although they might
disagree among themselves as to the reason for the situation,
the moral obligations discovered in it, and its prognosis.
Christians who remain with a theistic faith which they
attempt to keep essentially in its traditional orthodox form
will need then, not just to encounter, evaluate and respond to
non-Christians but to those Christians as well who insist that
both their conscience and also truth as they discover it in their
world, demand atheism. Thinking which allows traditional
theistic Christians to grant that these atheists may be "saved"
by Christian standards—at least leaving that possibility open
—will serve the purpose of promoting respect and understanding
and thus decrease interpersonal tension.
Something of the understanding which might be expected to
apply eventually to non-orthodox Christians within Western
culture as much as to the non-Christian man of other non-Chris¬
tian cultures may be seen in Kahner's concept of "open
Catholicism" which views the Church as seeking to overcome as
much of the pluralism around her "as should not exist" and as
"understanding herself as the higher unity of this opposition"
22
represented by the "•worldly* forces."




It could be argued that the term "Christian atheism" does
not designate a phenomenon sufficiently cohesive to constitute
a school nor does it represent something which has sustained
itself sufficiently well with clear signs of growth and
development to be regarded as a movement. However the term can
certainly be used to name the situation of an undetermined
number of people today, some of whom have gone to considerable
effort to communicate the nature of and to understand the
meaning of this situation. We have at times indicated our own
interpretation of the situation which will now be reviewed in
each of its two aspects—Christian and atheist—as the format
for our final summary and comments.
Christian atheism is a situation which is first and
foremost characterised by its Christian nature. The person who
knows such a situation as his own is involved in Christian
symbols, activities, claims, modes of thought, Christianity is
his tradition with roots usually in the depths of his childhood
and the cultural foundations of his self. He has formulated
his search and concerns in terms of Christian materials and
expectations, many of which became part of his psyche long
before he can remember. He may realise very keenly that to
cast himself off from these and to sever his internal vision
and thought processes from them would handicap and imperil his
quest for meaning and for a coherent formulation of himself and
his environment. He thus embodies Jung's assertion: "Our
whole modern mentality has been moulded by Christianity" and
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"this has nothing to do with whether we believe the truth of
1
Christianity or not."
Nor does this prejudice our argument that our's is a post-
Christian era. The Christian atheists are excellent evidence
that the cultural residue of a religious tradition does not
transmit the order and coherent doctrinal whole of the orthodox
form of that tradition. Indeed, it seems likely that once
religious materials are detached from their traditional setting
they tend to generate new settings of their own which change
their form and texture so that they do not automatically fit
back into their original place when it is described to the man
who is working with them. "God" is clearly such a fragment
with the Christian atheists witnessing to the inability of the
original meaning to fit their present experience of and
understanding of reality.
In our day many, because of the tensions between their own
beliefs and traditional ones, do sometimes attempt to find a
place for themselves outside religion or in some culturally
alien religious tradition. By the same token many of these same
people are dismayed at the inadequacies and unsatisfying
results of such a break. Simone Weil showed unusual awareness
of precisely this point when she emphasised that nearly always
one's own religion is more effective for one's quest than an
adopted religion, regardless of how imperfect and inadequate
. . 2
that inherited religion is.
We would insist that the Christian atheist has a right to
be considered Christian in a more specific manner than this^
1. Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, p. 142
2. Weil, Letter to a Priest, p. 30} Waiting on God, p. 117
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however. He is also Christian therefore, because he is a
participant in a situation which should be of unique interest
to all Christians, being uniquely Christian in its form: Namely
the rejection of theism (for a variety of reasons). If Chris¬
tian atheism is to come to understand itself and if orthodoxy
is to explore the nature of a problem which cannot but be
crucial to its own beliefs, both must enter into dialogue and
not seek to carry on two monologues. In a very real sense,
the experience of God and the absence of the experience of God
z
(as Hamilton put it) are concerned with the same subject, at
least at this point.
If Christian atheists accept themselves as Christian and
are accepted as such by other Christians at least in these
senses, it is difficult to see how they could or why they should
exist outside a community of communicating Christians. Quite
apart from whether or not they wish to make use of such tradi¬
tional materials as rites and rituals which Christian
communities like other communities possess, they could certainly
make use of the community itself for inspiration, growth,
development and sharing.
One can readily understand the criticism that Christian
communities tend to be highly artificial units isolated from
the every day life of their members, and it is easy to see that
the fear of such pitfalls as this lies behind much of the
Christian atheists' anti-ecclesiastical stance. Still it does
not appear that they are opposed to community per se and much
of what they say would even indicate that they are well aware
3. Hamilton, "The Death of God Theologies Today," op. cit.,
p. 28
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of the importance of giving a community aspect to their
Christianity (accepting their own definition of Christian),
They understand that their Christianity must be and grow as a
social reality especially in the context of that Christian
atheist theme which posits the ultimate importance of the
individual in precisely his social participation,
V/hen the Christian atheists attempted to understand the
Ghurch as embodied in society in many other ways than those we
have come to identify habitually, they did not assume that such
a Church is such or will remain such without community effort.
It can readily be accepted that religion as an ecclesiastical
reality is a problem for Christian atheism, therefore, but the
criticism can still be made as well that they tended to dispose
of this problem in a manner which was far too superficial. In
so doing they doubtless reflected the superficial manner in
which many branches of orthodoxy attempted to dispose of Chris¬
tian atheism, but it is our opinion that the breech which both
sides created with their instinctive reactions of mutual
rejection must be healed for the sake of the growth of both,
Richard Rubenstein, regarded as a Jewish "Death of God"
theologian, has taken issue with Bonhoeffer by suggesting that
our problem is not "how to speak of God in an age of no reli¬
ef
gion" but "how to speak of religion in an age of no God," He
put this point because he is one who is passionately attached
to tradition and religion and like Weil asserts that:
• , , all major religions are
psychologically true for their
believers. As such they are deeply
k, Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, p, 153
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congruent with the needs and iden¬
tities of their participants.5
In agreement with these principles we do not see how
Christianity can be meaningfully isolated from religion,
religiousness and the Church, and we would suggest that it is
perhaps part of the responsibility of the Christian atheists to
make the point that they are Christian in the sense of being in
and not out of the social forms of Christianity designated by
the Church. By doing so they would draw attention to the need
of orthodoxy to discover anew the fundamental assertions of the
faith in the modern environment and to understand in dialogue
the sense in which their own changing and growing vision relates
to a changing theism.
Finally, we should like to see a constructive and
continuing interaction between theism and atheism largely
because this is one area dominated by the present dialectical
mode of thought and therefore is fertile ground for the
development of a new, "relational" mode which would learn and
grow not through the identity of unresolvable differences but
through the exploration of infinite relativities. Progress in
this area Hould seem to us to be essential and not unrelated
to the issue of whether or not mankind and the earth can
continue in a constructive and creative way.
On Being Atheistic
The second aspect of the situation which has concerned us
is the atheistic one. Here our study of Christian atheism and
Buddhism suggests certain minimal truths of religious atheism,
5. Ibid., p. 1*f8
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three of which are fundamental and should be reviewed. The
first of these concerns the nature of the world which as the
whole of reality may be seen in many ways but must ultimately
provide within itself the solutions to its own problems.
Inherent within worldly reality must be the ultimate questions
and the ultimate answers to those questions.
Religious atheism is fully able to reflect the same quality
of belief about certain questions and answers as is to be found
in the great religious traditions of the world. When this
quality of belief pertains it understands those questions and
answers about man and his reality to be ultimate in that the
believer sees them as transcending himself, his perception of
them, his ability to respond to them. They exist therefore, in
a seemingly autonomous manner and he understands his grasp of
them to be but a mere approximation to their full reality.
Religious truth always has a quality of ineffability
therefore, and the atheists will find they must allow for this
principle of uncertainty, chance, mystery or whatever it is
called as surely as must the theists, scientists and philosophers
and all others who would encompass the full scope of reality,
and thus conceive a whole. The Christian atheists* relative
impatience with the demands of logic and reason must reflect
awareness of this, even as does their use of symbols, images
and myths to convey their vision.
The second truth concerns man who is both autonomous insofar
as he is ultimately responsible for himself, and soulless.
Both of these aspects of man must hold however contradictory,
»
paradoxical or ambiguous they may be made to appear. In the
final analysis therefore, man must contain within himself both
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question and answer, problem and solution, on an equivalent
level with this truth about the world. Salvation must relate
to something which man can actualise in a manner natural to his
humanity. By the same token this means that man's finitude must
be fully acknowledged.
The Christian atheists tended to understand man's limited
reality in terms of his condition as a part of the wider, more
primary social reality. The Buddhist principles of anicca and
nairatmya reveal a potential sophistication of this truth far
beyond the very superficial stabs at its development which we
find in the Christian atheists. It is possible however that
this characteristic tendency to think of the ongoing historical
reality of the human phenomenon (e.g. Altizer's Great Humanity
Divine) rather than the more ethereal image of the Dharmakaya
or the more concrete image of streams of dharmas, witnesses to
both the very Christian and very Western nature of their
mindset.
Be that as it may, the Christian atheists have shown their
willingness to accept and their commitment to imagine the world
extended in space and time as a reality more primary than that
of the individual man, and individual men as real only insofar
as they know their own reality is contingent upon the larger
more primary one. The egoless iherae of their ethic is thus
comparable to the nairatmya aspect of the Dharmakaya and the
anatta aspect of samsara's samskrta dharmas.
The third truth concerns the sacred which is transpersonal
and worldly, and thus is neither God nor man. Rather man knows
his union with the world and knows the sacred as belonging to
that world with which he is united. Never, however, could he
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segregate himself, his world and the sacred into three or,
combining two of the trio, into two fundamental realities.
Whatever the subtleties of his formulation beyond this the
sacred permeates in some form his whole and thus also something
of what he is.
The religious atheist is awed by what he gains when he
loses himself and his God, He feels that the object of his
concern, indeed of his passionate quest, eludes the distinctions
and confines assigned to it by his tradition. It is because of
this that he is sometimes confused and confusing. If he adopts
the language of division (internal/external, objective/subjec-
tive, sacred/profane, God/man, finite/infinite) to describe the
unity, he appears absurd or tautological (of course nothing is
absolutely distinguishable as only one or the other). If he
abandons this language he must develop a new way of speaking
which will not be immediately meaningful to those unfamiliar
with it.
The Christian atheist is thus caught in a severe linguistic
dilemma. He might feel, for example, that he could use the
word "God" but if he is not allowed to alter or rework its
meanings he must seek an alternative term. As no other term
may be quite so appropriate for adaptation to his purposes the
alternatives may prove too inadequate, too insubstantial for
his vision. In such a situation "God" may say too much in
other contexts, and "the sacred," for example, too little in
his.
The first truth separates the religious atheist from the
theist but the other two represent the foundation stones of
his system, V/e must say that from this point on, comparisons
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with the great edifices of theism and Buddhism reveal atheism's
diminutive stature however, and the linguistic difficulties,
sectarian antagonisms or the imperfection of the culturally
present religious materials will not wholly account for this.
Yet the need is not diminutive nor the situation of the Chris¬
tian atheist unworthy, for the full pathos and promise of the
human condition is represented in them.
It may be important to this point that only Weil and
Bonhoeffer, our only World War II atheists, attempted to
aggressively incorporate the dark and tragic side of existence,
whereas those who wrote in the 1960*s and 1970's were struggling
so hard for affirmation and optimism that they avoided the more
troubled depths of the human soul. Rubenstein was one who
criticised the radical theologians of the past decade for their
"inability to take seriously the tragic vision."
Specifically Rubenstein felt that Christian atheism tended
to believe in real, substantial human progress and in so doing
to ignore the destructive side of history. This weakness he
saw as a continuation of the same weakness in Christian and
even Jewish thought and it caused him to assert in reflection
upon Hitler's efforts to exterminate the Jewish race:
To see any purpose in the death camps,
the traditional believer is forced to
regard the most demonic antihuman
explosion in all history as a meaningful
expression of God's purposes. The idea
is simply too obscene for me to accept.7
The idea that a world which includes such events is the
incarnation of the transcendent must certainly be equally
6. Rubenstein, op. cit., pp. x-xi
7. Ibid., p. 153
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obscene to him and he does not believe in substantial moral
g
progress on the level of whole societies. If Rubenstein
wished to phrase his criticism so, he could certainly accuse
the later Christian atheists of failing to develop a theodicy.
His judgement however demonstrates clearly that the discovery
that man has no God does not solve the problem of evil and
suffering.
We would suggest that such desperate failings as this
point directly to the highly polemical nature of Christian
atheism in the 1960*s, and its frantic concern to be modern,
worldly or secular. It seemed to understand far more clearly
what it could not allow, what threatened and crushed it, than
it did the nature of its own inner life and the principles
of its own growth.
While Buddhism does not offer atheism on a platter to
Christians who have come to know themselves as without God,
Christian atheism has much to learn from it of the richness,
brillance, vitality and complexity of which a great atheistic
religious tradition is capable. The key to the religious
future of the Christian atheist may well lie in a study of
Buddhism not because it will answer his questions directly
(indeed he is unlikely to ask the kind of questions which
Buddhism is culturally designed to answer) but because it may
show him afresh how to start and how to continue.
What is intended here is threefold and is symbolised by
the three refuges: The Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha,
For the Christian atheist it means that he must not disdain to
8. Ibid,, p. 106
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learn from the God, gods or god-like men of the past who he
may find, upon attentive and reflective listening to their
words (the Dharma, Truth or Law), have said far more about his
situation than he conceived possible, and in the process of
speaking to and sometimes from that situation have inspired a
great community of men who also listen and also reflect, and
also themselves, even if they do not realise it, speak to him
truths about his situation.
Our final evaluation of and characterisation of the
Christian atheist then is to agree with William Hamilton:
9
Thursday's child has far to go, and the Christian atheist is
such a child if there ever was one. Likewise, Christian atheism
does constitute a real and specific path upon which he treads
but one of which much remains to be explored before he will know
if it leads to the cosmic center where all patterns are
revealed.
9, Hamilton, "Thursday's Child," op, cit.
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